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The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries witnessed a change in the percep-
tion of the arts and of philosophy. In the arts this transition occurred around
1800, with, for instance, the breakdown of Vitruvianism in architecture; in
philosophy the foundationalism of which Descartes and Spinoza were
paradigmatic representatives, which presumed that philosophy and the
sciences possessed a method of ensuring the demonstration of truths, was
undermined by the idea asserted by Nietzsche and Wittgenstein that there
exist alternative styles of enquiry among which a choice is open. The essays
in this book examine the circumstances, features, and consequences of this
historical transition, exploring in particular new aspects and instances of the
interrelatedness of content and its formal representation in both the arts and
philosophy.
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Introduction
CAROLINE A. VAN ECK, JAMES W. MCALLISTER and
RENÉE VAN DE VALL
THE NEED FOR STYLE
Why do philosophers concern themselves with questions of style?
Moreover, why should they bring together a volume of essays
dealing with matters as seemingly diverse as Heinrich von Kleist's
Marionettentheater, Hogarth's graphical work, the writings of
Tocqueville, the use of ellipses in Kepler's astronomical theories,
and eclecticism in eighteenth-century English architecture? The
answer is a short one: to get clarity about their daily work.
Philosophers can no longer consider the question of style a mere
artistic or literary question. Style has transgressed the boundaries of
art and aesthetics, and has invaded philosophical fields such as
metaphysics, the philosophy of science, political philosophy, and
ethics. One of the consequences of what could be called postmodern
pluralism in philosophy is that philosophy as a whole - whether it
accepts a postmodern stance or opposes it - has grown more
conscious of the importance of its medium, which is generally the
written text, and as a consequence of its own hidden aesthetics.
This awareness is most often prompted by philosophers who, like
Nietzsche and Wittgenstein, write in a distinctive, more or less
literary style, and who, moreover, attach a particular importance to
style in philosophical thinking, knowledge, or life in general. But
even those philosophies that deny having a dependence on style,
seeing themselves as conducting a methodical search for truth,
cannot be exempted from stylistic analysis. In the first essay of this
volume, Berel Lang makes clear why the question of style is
inescapable, even for those philosophical writings that profess to be
style-less. In fact, Lang writes, philosophy's silence about the literary
character of its writings is part of a more general effort to repress its
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own historicity. Method aims at excluding what style embodies:
method is supposed to lead anyone who follows its rules to the same
results, whereas style is essentially personal and historically rooted.
Nevertheless, even such methodically rigorous writings as Descartes'
and Kant's exhibit style-related features, of which the contrast
between style and method itself is not the least important. The
contrast between method and style, Lang writes, has become part of
the representation of philosophy, and thereby of its meaning;
philosophy's disregard of its own expressive features and its
emphasis on methodological rigour has itself become an expressive
feature of philosophy. As Lang says, 'In this sense, style gives
method a voice that method by itself would not have or even allow
for'.
It is therefore not surprising that many philosophers are suspi-
cious of the recent concern for philosophy's styles: what is at stake is
the self-image of their discipline. They fear a trivialisation of
philosophy, in which the rigorous reflection on time-honoured
questions about the true, the good, and the beautiful is reduced to
the rhetoric efficacy of advertising strategies. Indeed, the growing
awareness of the stylistics of philosophy could lead to cynicism: for
instance, when the hidden rhetorical strategies of a text are shown to
be in opposition to the overtly proclaimed argumentation, as when
Plato, in the Gorgias, sets out to demonstrate the futility of rhetoric,
but, in doing so, does not shrink from employing all the rhetorical
devices he professes to despise.
But there is more to style than that. The philosophy of style could
tell us that the emperor we so earnestly believed in has in fact
always been naked. But it could also show the other side of that
story: the capacity we have to visualise those non-existent clothes.
Even if we saw through philosophy's tricks, and discovered how it
tries to convince us of imperial robes that actually consist of thin air,
we could marvel at its capacity to stimulate our imagination and to
give form to a hitherto unthought aspect of the world. Even if a
philosophical text fails to give us certainty about the world, it can
give us new and fruitful ways to think about it. Not only by what it
sets forth through its explicit argumentation, but also by what it
jîhows: by what it makes us see through its imagery, by what it
makes us feel through its tone, by the way the text constructs its
jvorld_for us through the selection and arrangement of its material.
Call it the je ne sais quoi of good philosophy, that makes the
difference between a book we merely use in our research, and a book
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we continue to cherish after our theses are written. That is, in short,
what good philosophy makes us discover through its style.
The question of style presents itself not only when we read other
philosophers, but also — most forcefully — when we ask ourselves how
we should write. There is the problem of the method, or approach, or
tradition, and the concomitant style we choose to work in — style here
in the sense of 'general style'. Do we choose an analytical, a
dialectical, or a phenomenological approach? Do we opt for herme-
neutics, semiotics, or deconstruction? Or do we combine several of
these, and if so, how do we do that? We seem to have too many
options. And it is difficult to compare them in a neutral, rational way.
What one considers relevant depends on the approach one has
chosen; and the particular approach one chooses, depends on what
one finds relevant. Our choice, therefore, is not wholly justifiable from
a neutral, third-person stance. It will have something to do with who
we are or want to be: with our style in the sense of 'personal style'.
And our choice will also have to do with our sense of our subject-
matter. How do we want to present it, so that we not only define it,
analyse it, compare it, but also bring it alive? What happens to our
subject matter after we have dealt with it? Do we still recognise it, or
have we irrevocably changed its appearance? Are we still able to tell
our readers, not only what its component parts are, which muscles
and bones and nerves we find under its skin, but also why it
fascinated us in the first place? What we communicate about our
subject depends on the form of our writing: 'form' not as an external
and arbitrary mould we use for a given content, but as the way we
discover and construct that content for ourselves and our readers.
This is also very much a question of style. Style might be the place
where our sense of our subject-matter and our sense of ourselves as
philosophers meet.
With respect to the analytical power of the notion of style,
philosophers can learn from musicians, painters, architects, and
writers, and from the theorists and historians of their practices. We
can learn how styles work, how they are formed and transformed,
from those fields where style has been a major issue long before
philosophy discovered its significance. Richard Wollheim's essay,
for instance, offers many categories, distinctions and insights on
pictorial style that with some modification might be valid for
philosophical style as well. Wollheim makes a persuasive case that
while an individual pictorial style (such as the style of Rembrandt)
has psychological reality, and reference to it may therefore have
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explanatory value, there is no 'fact of the matter' to universal style
(such as the style of the northern baroque). Therefore reference to the
latter may have taxonomical value, but can have no explanatory
power. We might ask whether the distinction between general and
individual philosophical style runs along the same lines as that
between general and individual pictorial style, or differs in that
general style has a more substantive reality in the case of
philosophy, a reality being rooted in method. In this way, compari-
son with the arts can help us to develop stylistic categories that are
specific to philosophy, as Lang's essay proposes.
STYLE AND PROPRIETY
The first requirement is a philosophical analysis of styles and their
choice that attributes no privilege to any particular style (not even to
'scientific', Objective', or 'representational' styles), but rather sets on
an equal footing all styles that may be adopted in a practice. A
possible tool is the interpretation of a style as the codification of a
notion of'propriety.
A feature of many human practices (perhaps of all, save the
conceptually most elementary ones) is that their practitioners
construct for themselves a notion of propriety. (The term 'aptness'
might serve almost equally well.) The notion of propriety that a
practice has stipulates, in some sense, which potential contributions
to the practice should be regarded as proper or apt. It serves to
validate certain contributions to the practice, and to disqualify
certain other ones. A notion of propriety is particular to a certain
practice, and it alters with time; moreover, especially in periods of
crisis, different members of a practice may advocate competing
notions of propriety. Physical science in eighteenth-century France,
government in nineteenth-century Britain, painting in the Soviet
Union, had each one or more distinctive notions of propriety.
In different practices, the notion of propriety assumes different
forms. Depending on the nature of the practice, propriety might be
identified in a methodological, epistemological, aesthetic, moral, or
communicative value. Objectivity', which has entered into defini-
tions of propriety in many practices, including the sciences and
prose genres in literature, is a primarily epistemological notion;
'authenticity', which has entered into definitions of propriety in
music and architecture, is largely an aesthetic notion; 'justice',
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which has entered into definitions of propriety in political practice,
is chiefly a moral notion.
Now, where is a practice's notion of propriety codified? We
 t n
suggest that it should be seen as codified in a style. This suggestion
coheres well with many well-entrenched turns of phrase which we
use about style. In virtue of coming under the influence of a style, a
practitioner becomes acquainted with the notion of propriety
currently prevailing in his or her practice. In creating and proposing
an unprecedented style, a practitioner offers to the community a
fresh notion of propriety. A work created outside the prevailing style
is seen as improper, as lacking propriety. Clearly, styles in this sense
are not the styles projected as interpretative or classificatory
concepts by historians into the arts of the past. Rather, they are,
while probably never explicitly voiced in an art, what guides the
practitioner in his or her contributions.
This explains how it is that we can usefully identify something
like a style in many different practices, while they seem so unlike
one another. Styles in all practices resemble one another in being
codifications of notions of propriety, and they can be identified on
this criterion; but the notions of propriety constructed within
different practices are very different, and therefore so are styles, their
codifications.
On this view of styles, it is not the case that there is for each
practice a 'non-stylistic' specification of what counts as a proper
contribution, and styles merely suggest different ways in which such
a contribution may be made. Rather, styles stipulate what a proper
contribution to the practice is. For instance, it is not the case that, in
painting, there is a style-independent notion of 'representation', and
that different painterly styles compete to offer such a representation;
rather, these styles issue their own norms governing what 'represen-
tation' itself should be understood as.
This view lends itself to, but probably does not require, a strongly
constructivist interpretation of many epistemological and other
notions. According to this interpretation, the notions of the rational,
the objective, the rigorous, and so on, are defined afresh in each new
style which refers to them, and have no content outside particular
styles.
By relating styles in this way to notions of propriety, we can
identify certain questions as being worthy of consideration when
analysing a given style. Which notion of propriety is codified in this
style? Why did some practitioners find it necessary to originate this
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notion of propriety? What is its relation with notions of propriety
prevalent in other practices at the same time, or in the same practice
at other times?
A phenomenon of especial interest for our concerns is the
development within certain practices of notions of propriety
referring to Objectivity'. Clearly, a very effective way of com-
manding assent for a certain manner of doing things is to portray that
manner as the 'sole possible', the 'sole true', or the 'natural' manner.
Portrayed in such light, this manner ceases to be one contender
among many approximately equally worthy manners, and comes to
constitute the benchmark against which other manners are to be
judged for their lesser degrees of 'naturalness'. So it is for the
manners which constitute styles.
Portraying a style as 'objective' generally involves establishing that
reality is uniquely or unusually amenable to treatment by a
particular manner of representation or expression. This is an
interesting rhetorical manoeuvre, since it amounts to promoting and
validating a particular choice by portraying it as lying wholly
beyond discretion. Reality is, so to speak, depicted as being not the
sort of thing that can be depicted in a choice of ways. None the less,
it is a stylistic choice. As Martha Nussbaum has written about
philosophy,
The telling, if the story is a good one, is not accidentally connected with the
content of the told. And this ought to be so whether the teller is a literary
artist, whom we suppose always to be conscious of the nature of stylistic
choices, or a philosopher, whom we often think of as avoiding or eschewing
style altogether. No stylistic choice can be presumed to be neutral - not even
the choice to write in a flat or neutral style.1
The next step in entrenching a style as natural is, of course, to
deny that its adoption poses any stylistic question at all. A particular
mode of representation or expression, one hears, is not subject to
styles; only the modes alternative to ours are styles; to introduce
questions of style here would be to relinquish objectivity. In this line
of reasoning, 'style' invariably acquires a pejorative connotation, as
if it were a perturbing influence on the otherwise natural administra-
tion of business.
Therefore the greatest victories of particular styles are signalled by
the widest and most enthusiastic proclamation that a practice has
resisted the lure of a style. Traditionally, the practitioners of logic,
mathematics, and the natural sciences have prided themselves on
the avoidance of styles. These are also the disciplines in which the
rhetoric of objectivity is strongest. Clearly, these disciplines have, for
a large part of their existence, been under the complete domination
of a particular notion of propriety, a particular style.2
Members of other practices, which are more obviously subject to
styles, sometimes strive to establish a notion of objectivity in
reaction to the styles which they find on offer. These attempts are
generally expressed as calls for the return to the primitive or
unvarnished manner of doing things: the idea of styles as unnatural
perturbations is reinforced by the implicit suggestion that they have
grown on us in recent times. The concern for objectivity which is
advocated by these reformers is, of course, just one style among
many; but it is presented as the repudiation of styles.
Our analysis suggests that all styles, being a working out of a
particular notion of propriety, are to be treated on an equal footing
from the systematic point of view. However, of course, from the
historical point of view, the realisation that one style could be an
alternative to another, rather than the natural way of telling the
truth, arose only from an appreciation that there were different ways
of telling the truth, or even different truths. Many practices spent a
period of their development during which it was thought that they
were immune to styles, and had only to identify the representational
mode which was appropriate for that practice. This transition
occurred, at different times, in the visual arts and in philosophy.
Both to understand historically the development of self-aware styles,
and to appreciate the current debate on styles in philosophy, it is
necessary to retrace this transition.
STYLE AND MEANING IN THE ARTS
The term 'style' was mainly used until the end of the eighteenth
century by artists and art critics, as opposed to art historians in the
present day, to indicate the place of a work of art in the hierarchy of
the arts. Historical paintings, for instance, used the 'grand style',
corresponding to the style of epic poetry, which was considered to
be the summit of literature. It was also used in contrast with the
terms 'manner' and 'maniera' to describe the general characteristics
of a genre or school of painters, as opposed to the personal
idiosyncracies of an individual artist. It had not yet acquired the
importance it was going to have after 1800, when, as this volume
demonstrates, style became an integral part of the content or
meaning of a work of art.
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When we inquire into the causes that led to the rise of style as a
major artistic factor, it is illuminating to contrast the writings of two
eminent artists, orie writing before and the other after 1800, on
artistic standards and style. Reynolds and Schinkel serve here as
examples, but there are many other possible instances. Reynolds
repeatedly declares in his Discourses that the assiduous imitation of
nature and tradition, guided by reason, is the only way of reaching
perfect truth and beauty in painting:
Nature is, and must be the fountain which alone is inexhaustible, and from
which all excellencies must originally flow . . . All the inventions and
thoughts of the Antients . . . are to be sought after and carefully studied; the
genius that hovers over these venerable relicks, may be called the father of
modern art.3
Whereas Schinkel, writing sixty years later, looking back on his own
lifelong preoccupation with style, is not so sure:
I observed a great vast store of forms that had already come into being,
deposited in the world over many millennia of development among very
different peoples. But at the same time I saw that our use of this accumulated
store of often very heterogeneous objects was arbitrary . . . It became
particularly clear to me that the lack of character and style from which so
many new buildings seem to suffer is to be found in such arbitrariness in the
use [of past forms]. It became a lifetime's task for me to gain clarity on this
issue. But the more deeply I penetrated into the matter, the greater the
difficulties that stood in the way of my efforts. Very soon I fell into the error of
pure arbitrary abstraction, and developed the entire conception of a particular
work from its most immediate trivial function and from its construction. This
gave rise to something dry and rigid, and lacking in freedom, that entirely
excluded two essential elements: the historical and the poetical.
I pursued my researches further, but very soon found myself trapped in a
great labyrinth.4
Nature, the classical heritage, and reason lost their status of reliable
and unquestionable guides and standards for the artist. Instead, the
artist was confronted with an overwhelming repertoire of forms left
from the past, and at a loss to find a reliable and justifiable criterion
for selecting from these. Thus bereft, art becomes style-less and
therefore meaningless: because it can no longer evoke the tradition
to which it should belong, it lacks the power to speak to the
beholder. Although Schinkel's use of the term 'style' still echoes
Reynolds' definition - 'Style in painting is the same as in writing the
power over materials, whether words or colours, by which concep-
tions or sentiments are conveyed'5 - in his stress on the instrumental
role of style in conveying the meaning of a work of art, he does not
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share Reynolds' serene confidence in nature and the past. Instead, he
tries to find new foundations. Prefiguring the splendours and misery
of Modernist architecture, he tries to find a guide for design in the
function and construction of a building, but without success: the
result was not architecture, we might say, but mere building,
without freedom or meaning. In other words, concentrating on
structure and content is not sufficient to create meaningful architec-
ture, when the traditional standards for its design and interpretation
are no longer there. Something else is needed, which Schinkel, and
many others with him, call 'style'.
Style thereby takes over the role of nature, the past, or reason as
the provider of meaning. That is, an aspect of writing, painting, or
building traditionally associated with ornament or presentation, that
could be varied without changing the content, gradually becomes
the principal jaearer of meaning pf the work of art. This can perhaps
be demonstrated most clearly in architecture, where the selection of
a historical style, unrelated to structural or functional matters,
becomes the vehicle for the meaning of the building. One example is
steel and glass architecture, which, because of its rejection of the use
of historical styles, was called meaningless and therefore denied the
status of architecture.6
The growth of the importance and scope of style in the arts is
traced in the contributions of Mary Lindberg, Joe Mordaunt Crook,
and Caroline van Eck. Lindberg shows how style is invested with a
new role in Hogarth's satirical work: from being a technique for the
selection of the appropriate idiom, it becomes a strategy, that is, a
purposive method for conveying meaning and persuading the
spectators of his work, by making use of the associations connected
with several theatrical and operatic genres and their formal devices.
Lindberg examines in detail in what way Hogarth borrowed devices
from the theatre and from satirical fiction, such as conventions for
stage-setting, acting or story-telling, and incorporated them into his
own prints. She thus brings fresh insights to the study of the
interrelatedness of the arts based on the doctrine of utpictura poësis,
which in the case of the links between theatre and painting has until
now received very little critical attention7~
The essays of Mordaunt Crook and van Eck throw light on the
evolution from stylistic device to style from a different angle. Van
Eck shows the rhetorical origins of the concept of style when it was
introduced in French architectural theory around 1750. There it
performed the role of a unifying concept, regulating the choice and
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use of ornament in order to enhance the emotional effect of the
building on the spectator. By taking into account the rhetorical
background of the notion of style, new light is thrown on the
breakdown of Vitruvianism at the end of the eighteenth century. She
then discusses the way style acquired a wider meaning in the
writings of Quatremère de Quincy, where it became the expression
of the age, country or material of a given period, thereby prefiguring
nineteenth-century notions of style. Her essay thus illuminates the
development of the meaning of the concept of style in architectural
theory in a new way, by taking into account the hitherto neglected
role of rhetoric, and shows why the nineteenth-century quest for a
style of its own was bound to fail because of its inherent contra-
dictions.
Mordaunt Crook shows the historical origins of what he terms the
'dilemma of style': the rise, as the consequence of the disintegration
of the classical tradition in the second half of the eighteenth century,
of a situation in which architects were faced with a choice between
several styles. This dilemma was the result of the combination of the
Renaissance notion of an individual style and of Romantic Pictur-
esque aesthetics, which gave birth to the notion of a multiplicity of
styles. Thereby style was transformed from the expression of
structure into a pictorial allusion which would act on the memory
and imagination of the spectator. This development resulted in the
theory of architectural association, which stressed the individual
nature of beauty, and rejected objective standards. Thus Association-
alist aesthetics contributed to the displacement of Classicism as the
universal style. Mordaunt Crook then traces the development
resulting from the Picturesque choice of styles on Associationalist
grounds to the conflict in the early nineteenth century between the
Neo-Gothic and Neo-Classicism, which he presents as the triumph of
the Picturesque. It led to a stylisticjungle later on in the nineteenth
century, to which Modernism momentarily put an end. But with the
rise of Postmodernism, the dilemma, based on our desire for
ornament, semiotic codes, or images of structural processes, has
returned.
As we have sketched above, style becomes the focal point for the
artist's search for meaning, after the loss of belief in the absolute
standards of reason, nature, and antiquity which occurred around
1800. Before 1800, there was hardly a question of there being a
possible choice among styles: contributions to a practice were
regarded not as belonging to one style or another, but rather as
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falling within or being alien to the practice. For instance, in
architecture, buildings that did not conform to the Classical style (as
we would say), such as Gothic buildings, were regarded as falling
outside the scope of architecture.7 Rather than a distinction between
different architectural styles, there was merely a distinction between
architecture and non-architecture.
In our view, the development from stylistic monism to stylistic
pluralism in artistic theory and the arts can be seen as fore-
shadowing the present concern of philosophy with style.
STYLE IN PHILOSOPHY
The deepening erosion of objective standards in the arts, as
exemplified in architecture, and the arts' growing self-awareness as
style-bound, invested philosophy too, with a time-lag of about a
century. From the late sixteenth century onwards, western philoso-
phical writing incorporated standards of propriety and efficacy
about which there was no debate. These standards were based in
part on mathematical and geometrical forms of reasoning, that were
credited with the power of leading infallibly to truth. Philosophical
method, as exemplified in Descartes' Discours de la methode, in
Spinoza's Ethics, or in Kant's Prolegomena, took the analytical
rigour, conceptual clarity, and absolute standards of truth of
mathematics as its model. Writings which did not embody this
model, while apparently philosophical to present-day eyes, such as
Pascal's Pensees or the fragment of Kleist's that Dorothea Franck
reproduces, were in their time considered as literature rather than
philosophy or science.
In the twentieth century, we have relaxed both the criteria for
what counts as effective manners of reasoning in philosophy and
correspondingly the range of works that we are prepared to see as
philosophical. In place of a distinction between philosophy and
non-philosophy, there is now a portfolio of philosophical styles.
Both Nietzsche and Wittgenstein contributed to the erosion of this
monolithicity by their" critique of the absolutist pretensions of
traditional metaphysics and of the supposed transparency of
method. Simultaneously, their writings exemplify the stylistic
diversity of what became acceptable in philosophy. In their work,
the notion of style, which originated in rhetoric, with its focus on
persuasion rather than proof, probability rather than truth, ornament
rather than content, and more generally on the process of writing
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rather than on the body of truth revealed in the philosopher's
writing, becomes the point on which the concern for meaning and
truth focuses.
The approach of philosophers such as these is examined in this
volume by Lambert Wiesing and Salim Kemal. Wiesing sees in their
work a 'Stil statt Wahrheit programme': they tend to substitute style
for truth.
Wiesing explores the parallels between the stance of Ludwig
Wittgenstein in philosophy and of Kurt Schwitters in art. Each was
trained in a discipline in which the traditional goal was truth, but in
which confidence that truth could be attained had in the early part of
the twentieth century been shaken. Each reacted to this state by
setting out a view of his discipline in which truth was replaced as a
goal by style. Schwitters, whose reflections originated in artistic
practice, found in style the sole admissible principle of orientation
for artistic work. For him, works of art had no meaning but only
style. For instance, he regarded his poetry as 'sound painting', in
which words are used as expressive but meaningless material of
composition. Schwitters thus rejected two of the images of art that
were most influential during his lifetime. On the one hand, he
regarded as an illusion the conventional view of artworks as bearers
of meaning and portrayers of the truth; on the other, he resisted the
dadaists' anguish at the apparent lack of any principle of orientation
in the arts. The intermediate line that Schwitters traced posited that,
while this principle of orientation could not be truth, it could and
had to be style.
Wiesing sees in Wittgenstein a similar response to his age.
Wittgenstein writes that the behaviour of persons is determined not
so much by the content of dogmas as by images, especially images of
themselves. Moreover, the effect of such images is more subtle than
any effect that dogmas could ever have: pictures do not issue
injunctions, but rather offer to the agent forms of expression. In his
more radical writings, Wittgenstein interprets even the question of
the validity of propositions as a matter of style. So Schwitters and
Wittgenstein saw style discharging the roles that had formerly been
attributed in art and philosophy to the ideal of truth.
> Kemal argues that Nietzsche's concept of w^ll, understood as the
stylistically guided creation of values, can be reconciled with a
progressive idea of community. He does so by showing that
Nietzschean genealogy does not necessarily lead to nihilistic
consequences. Though genealogy considers values to be interpreta-
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tions, issuing from particular standpoints, the threat of solipsism can
be surmounted if one stresses the space it allows for the creation of
new values. Those styles are marked as healthy, strong or full that
make possible the generation of new interpretations and the creative
interaction between the producers of values. Therefore the pursuit of
style can engender a viable and progressive community of creators.
Now that we have been alerted to the existence of this diversity of
philosophical styles, we can turn a fresh gaze onto the history of pre-
nineteenth-century philosophy, and reinterpret even those philoso-
phers who prided themselves on the objectivity of their method in
stylistic terms. We can now detect stylistic devices in all philo-
sophical writing, however remote in time, however apparently
straightforward. Some stylistic devices are evidently chosen with a
persuasive effect in mind, such as the dialogue form.8 As Lang's
essay shows, Plato's dialogue form implies an individual role for the
reader and - like a poem or play - does not allow for generalising
conclusions without obscuring other, more central features of the
text. But even the apparently more neutral treatise styles must be the
fruit of stylistic choice. Descartes and Kant, writers who are usually
considered to address their readers in a straightforward manner, use
different stylistic devices. Descartes' implied readers have to do
something beyond their reading: they have themselves to practise
the method described by Descartes and to come to its conclusions
individually. With Kant however, reading the description of the
method is itself its application.
The conscious introduction of stylistic devices as an argumenta-
tive strategy into philosophical discourse is exemplified by the
writings of Tocqueville on democracy, which are discussed in the
essay by Frank Ankersmit. In Tocqueville's analysis, democracy is a
subject-matter that lends itself to being treated in only certain ways
by historians and political theorists. Unlike the despotic political
systems that preceded it, democracy is not an entity about which
one could lay out an objective and detached theory using familiar
scholarly language. In Tocqueville's time, historiographie language
was heavily metaphorical. Metaphors order reality by identifying
essences and creating centres. But Tocqueville saw democracy as
lacking essences and centres. The language most suitable to depict
the network of interrelations between people and their democratic
rulers was, in Tocqueville's view, not metaphorical, but paradoxical.
As Ankersmit shows, verbal paradoxes cause us to mistrust
utterances and direct our attention back to the object of discussion.
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When the object of discussion is unsusceptible to well-worn
utterances, as was democracy, this stylistic strategy alone enables us
to grasp its nature.
Even the practice of the natural sciences, which up to the
Renaissance were classed as branches of philosophy, shows stylistic
aspects. Branches of science traverse periods in which theorising is
dominated by a particular style. The task for historians and
philosophers of science is to proceed beyond recognising styles of
theorising in the historical record, and provide some account of how
these styles become entrenched in scientific practice. James McAllis-
ter's essay defends the suggestion that scientists attribute weight to
stylistic features of theories in recognition of the empirical perfor-
mance of past theories that have embodied those features. Lest this
utilitarian connection be regarded as foreign to the notion of style,
McAllister portrays well-known episodes in the formation of styles
in the applied arts as exhibiting similar aspects. For instance, in
architecture, the design possibilities offered by new materials of
construction have won favour within stylistic canons only once the
utilitarian advantages of the new materials have become apparent.
The parallels between the manner in which styles become en-
trenched in the sciences and in the applied arts hint at a unity
underlying phenomena of style in different practices.
USES AND LIMITS OF STYLE
Looking backwards, we cannot but acknowledge that philosophical
propriety might be encoded in more than one way. But what does
this recognition of philosophical pluralism entail for the philosophy-
to-be? The task of the stylistically informed philosopher is a
precarious one. To use the potential of style to its greatest
philosophical advantage, one has on the one hand to do without the
certainties of style-less and objective truth, and on the other to avoid
the nihilism that pluralism might lead into. This task in many ways
resembles that of the artist, who, in the midst of a proliferation of
styles, has to find his or her own way of working.
Some of the possibilities and the dangers of a philosophy that is
aware of its style are traced in the three essays that conclude this
volume. Nicholas Davey's essay focuses on a question that was also
commented upon by Kemal's essay: how to save philosophy, now
that it is aware of its inherent stylistic character, from collapsing into
indifference. He attacks the presuppositions of the deconstructive
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strategy that aims at reducing meaning to 'mere' stylistics. Decon-
struction may be right in challenging metaphysical notions of
meaning-in-itself, but what it cannot challenge is a dimension of
philosophical awareness that cannot be put into words and that
prevents philosophy's reduction to the rhetorical. This dimension
lies in the revelatory experience of meaningfulness that happens for
instance in the sudden understanding of what somebody is 'getting
at'. Only if we re-learn to trust this experience of meaningfulness
whenever this occurs, Davey writes, will we be able to 'climb over
the stile of being merely mannered' and find our own individual
styles.
Davey tries to find a middle ground, in between traditional
philosophical claims on certainty of meaning and deconstructivist
denials of its possibility. The construction of this 'in between' is also
a central concern in Charles Altieri's search for a dynamic concep-
tion of intentionality, in which both the quest for individual
fulfilment and the ethical responsibility towards others are con-
ceived in terms of a personal style. He tries to shed light on those
aspects of subjective agency that are 'too fluid and too resistant to
concepts to be easily handled by traditional models of desire and
judgment, or to be easily demystified into the equation of subjec-
tivity with subjection now dominating literary criticism'. He
especially focuses on the notion of responsibility, which can be
understood neither in terms of how we respond, nor be deduced
from third-person understandings about categorical imperatives.
Responsibility depends on 'how we represent actions so as to
involve consequences in our relations to future selves and to other
persons'. Our personal style might be conceived of as the making
visible of the boundary conditions allowing our engaging in those
relations: 'Style maps a will onto a world'.
Davey's and Altieri's essays focus on a dimension of reflective
awareness that hovers between determinacy and indeterminacy. The
fragility of this awareness and its articulation is brought out with
poetical lucidity in Franck's essay. Franck attempts to illuminate the
elusive notion of style from a new angle: from its aspects of
innocence (lost or regained), self-consciousness and gracefulness.
She takes as a starting-point Heinrich von Kleist's essay on the
theatre of marionettes, which is printed here as an appendix to her
essay. Her paper charts the risks and difficulties of tracing the way
style can be understood by calling in such concepts as grace and
innocence without losing the sense of the topic or without letting
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slip the separation between what we say and the act of saying it. As
Franck points out, 'when we state that a strict borderline between art
and the discourse about art can no longer be drawn, our own
discourse might become infected by this confusion, without,
however, automatically becoming art'. By using Schleiermacher's
notion of divination (instead of interpretation) as the appropriate
mode of understanding style, and Wittgenstein's ethical criterion of
truthfulness rather than truth, she illuminates the change in the role
and meaning of style in contemporary philosophy.
As this volume shows, style has always been with us, though not
always acknowledged. By bringing together essays on style in the
arts and in philosophy in one volume, we show that the relation
between philosophy and the arts is not only one of the arts being
influenced by philosophy. On the contrary, these essays show that
developments in recent philosophy that are intimately related to
style can be made intelligible by looking at the way the concept of
style functioned and developed in the arts. In both fields, we can
observe that when a crisis occurs, and practitioners start to look
around for new foundations and certainties, the scientific or
philosophical criteria of truth and the rigour of method are
abandoned in favour of an approach that is closer to the rhetorical
attention to strategies for formulating insights. Then the philosopher
or artist has the task of selecting the stylistic devices apt to captivate
and move the audience, rather than searching for the inescapable
objective representation. This represents not a loss, but an opportu-
nity.
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The style of method: repression and repre-
sentation in the genealogy of philosophy
B E R E L L A N G
Every philosophy also
conceals a philosophy.
Nietzsche
The issue that I try to unravel here takes its cue from two
misquotations of my own making. In Hamlet, Polonius - artless
plotter, doting and dolting father — finds himself perplexed by a
conversation with the prince whose meandering wit he understands
only to the extent of guessing that it does make a kind of sense:
'Though this be madness', Polonius mutters to their common
audience beyond the stage, 'Yet there is method in't', an acknowl-
edgement that has since been canonised in one of the many clichés
for which Shakespeare bears a certain responsibility - 'There's
method in his/her madness'. And then, a century and a half after
Polonius spoke for the first time, the French naturalist Buffon,
turning from his study of animal-species to human character,
reaches a conclusion that also seems to follow naturally: 'Le style',
he surmises, 'c'est l'homme même' - or, as the English version
compresses it, 'Style is the man.'
I want to consider first what happens with a small exchange
between these formulas. Polonius now takes a slightly different
direction in his view of Hamlet's wandering: 'Though this be
madness', he says in this new version, 'yet there is style in't', And
then Buffon, as though to balance the number of times any one term
appears in world-history, chimes back: 'La méthode', he pro-
nounces, 'c'est l'homme même' - 'Method is the man.'
Obviously, the revised statements reach us as a jangle, to the mind
no less than to the ear. If anyone had supposed that style and
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method are interchangeable, a prima facie disproof is evident here -
together with the beginning of a more exact account of the relation
between the two. In what follows, I focus on the role of this relation
specifically for philosophical discourse, considering also the ques-
tion of why acknowledgement of the relation in that context has
been, as I shall argue, consistently repressed. This discussion can
hardly avoid referring to style and method in their more general
appearances, and from those we will understand why Shakespeare
and Buffon wrote as they did rather than as the misquotations cited
would have them. Such confirmation does not mean that possible
allusions to a 'style of madness' or to 'method making the man'
would be pointless or unintelligible. But the metaphoric conceit in
the former conception and the latter's flat-footedness argue against
them; certainly there is little worth remembering in either.
What separates the original statements from their revisions does,
however, shed light on each of them. Polonius' juxtaposition of
madness and method assumes a contrast: if madness were delib-
erate, shaped by reason, it would not be madness. What does
madness amount to with such features? Well, feigned madness at
most, calculating reason - or method — at least. And so, too, the
beginning of a definition of method as deliberate and, still more
narrowly, intentional. What does 'method' in this sense entail for
Polonius that 'style' would not? Not simply a place for intention,
since style, too, is neither accidental nor involuntary (the two
contraries of intentional). In method but not in style, however, the
end intended exists beforehand and independently: it, too, is
intended, with the consequence that the intention itself may also
occur beforehand and independently. In method but not in style,
furthermore, the requirement of reiterability, of exact reapplication,
is a constant feature. Method so emphasises the regularity of its
process, in fact, that the means it prescribes are held to be
independent of both agent and object;1 it can be applied by anyone
who 'learns' the method, and equally well to any of an indefinite
class of situations or objects - both of these, as we shall see, absent
from the conditions of style.
The assertion, 'Method is the man', does not produce the same
jangle that the first misquotation does, but method is none the less
clearly not what Buffon meant. Method could not be the man
because, unlike style, it is fully contrived by the man; and Buffon
need not have shared the suspicions of human nature held by La
Rochefoucault or La Bruyère to know that other contrivances -
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hypocrisy or even forthright lying - may at times be as fundamental
as method itself. To know a person fully requires that we observe
him as he himself cannot, since he otherwise could make himself
seem to be what he isn't. No matter now circumspect method is,
then, style remains one step ahead of it, more exactly, beyond it.
And so, Buffon's verdict in its favour.
It might be objected that this is an unlikely pair of examples on
which to base so large a distinction - but other, more standard
examples move in the same direction. Notwithstanding the vague
boundary by which we circumscribe the 'baroque' style, for instance,
we do not associate that style with a similarly baroque 'method'. Not
because there is no method in the style (for example, in Bernini's Si
Theresa), but because for that sculpture, it is the style not the
method that matters - the style, we might say, that is the woman. Or
again: we ascribe to science the 'hypothetico-deductive' method
which, for theorists if not for scientists themselves, has a standard
form: first, hypothesis, then inference, then confirmation or discon-
firmation. What then, in counterpoint to the baroque, of a hypothe-
tico-deductive 'style'? Well, it is not that physicists or biologists may
not also have styles, but that it is method and not style that they
profess. Only by following a common - single - method are
experiments duplicatable - that is, verifiable. (By contrast, a painting
that duplicates an earlier one provides nothing in the way of
confirmation; its maker would in fact be likelier to face charges of
forgery.) The virtue of impersonality in method is thus a vice from
the viewpoint of style. We know well enough the one style that
method - any method - would choose for itself if it indeed had the
choice. Attempts at a 'style-less' style recur, after all, in the history of
style - from realism in painting to naturalism in the novel to the
claims for an ideal and transparent language in philosophy.
REPRESSION
The misquotations and category-mistakes thus cited point to
characteristic differences between method and style. Before elabor-
ating on these, however, I would call attention to a connection
between the two that is no less fundamental. I do not refer here to
the most obvious features that style and method share - the presence
in them, as I have suggested, of aspects of intention, or their common
reliance (in different versions) on repetition. (As a measure only of
these features, Meyer Schapiro's definition of style as 'constant form'
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would be broad enough to include method as well.)2 Rather I allude
to an involuntary relation between them - method (despite itself)
anticipating style; style, also despite itself, presupposing method.
I shall mainly be considering here the former of these, that is, the
'style of method' — more narrowly, the style of philosophical
method. But even with this emphasis, the general connection
between style and method is evident in the inverse relation between
them. Where the focus of interest in a particular process or object is
on method (as in scientific or technological discourse), the role of
style is shunted to one side; where style is primary (as in artistic
representation), the allusion to method is subordinate, if not absent
altogether. Admittedly, this inverse proportion might simply mean
that the two phenomena of method and style have nothing to do
with one other. But the inverse ratio is too persistent to support such
a benign explanation, especially when a conspiracy theory is
available that has the additional advantage of giving a fuller account
of the evidence. I shall be arguing rather that it is intentional
concealment - that is, repression - that has governed the relation
between method and style in philosophical discourse (and else-
where as well - but that is another story). In these terms, the focus
on method in philosophical writing and the silence there about its
literary character are symptomatic not of the irrelevance of stylistic
issues, but of an effort — presumably for philosophy's own reasons -
to repress them, to deny a role for style or (what amounts to the same
thing) to 'allow it only in ornamental doses', as Stanley Cavell
criticises that alternative.3 So, at least, the argument presented here
will go - itself part of a broader claim for the substantive and not
merely 'ornamental' role of style in philosophical discourse.
The starting point of this diagnosis of repression is prosaic enough
- a matter of counting. Philosophers and their historians have
expounded conceptions of method (their own and others') with a
much stronger emphasis than in their relatively few and unsyste-
matic references to the stylistic means by which method is
articulated. So we hear familiarly about Descartes' method of doubt,
Spinoza's geometric method, Kant's transcendental method, James'
pragmatic method, Husserl's phenomenological method - all expli-
citly affirmed at their sources, but with only brief glances (if any) at
the medium in which they are inscribed, and still less at what the
methods themselves, viewed through style, represent or express.
Admittedly, the presence of method is not always announced by
its author. But the fact that Socrates did not himself name the
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'Socratic method', for example, hardly stands in the way of the
procedure. On certain views, moreover - Pyrrho's radical scepti-
cism, or in the anti-sceptical but also anti-methodic claims of
Kierkegaard or Nietzsche - philosophical method in itself is under
attack; the attack, then, not on one or another method, but on
method as such. And lastly, of course, it is undeniable that
philosophers as central and otherwise diverse as Plato and Locke,
Descartes and Wittgenstein, Spinoza and Kierkegaard, albeit often
tacitly and always unsystematically, do implicate aspects of style
and literary structure as substantive factors in their work.
Even with these disclaimers, however, the disparity in philoso-
phical writing between its references to method, on the one hand,
and to style, on the other, is notable. One can imagine a ready if
rough history of philosophy based on what philosophers have said
about method (their own and others') - but not even an approximate
history from their statements on the writing of philosophy. And
although this disproportion has something to do with style's self-
effacing character (if it did talk about its own stylistic features, that
talk, too, would only become another such feature), it also reflects an
ideological view that philosophy, corporately, has exhibited of itself.
Again, this disproportion might be a chance occurrence; or it might
follow from the more basic claim that nothing in philosophical style
matters philosophically. My thesis here, however, is that the neglect
has been due to neither of these, at least not primarily: that it is
rather a tactic of avoidance, related to a specifically tendentious -
and ideological - self-image projected by philosophy; and that the
combination of those reasons and of the role of style seen more
generally disclose style as at once a source and analogue — even
more deeply rooted in the text - for philosophical method. Both of
them, in any event, are integral to the writing and then the reading of
philosophy - although only one of them, method, is explicitly
professed.
The evidence for this claim of repression is circumstantial, but
those circumstances demonstrate that method's usual (if proble-
matic) priority in philosophical discourse would lead to silence
about its stylistic features. One central factor here is that, in contrast
to method, style is a 'retrospective' concept - ascribed from an
external view or 'after the fact' (when the stylistic work is complete),
and as the one work cited is, in time, invariably juxtaposed with
others. This retrospective feature affects not only the analysis but the
occurrence of style as well: no author or artist chooses a style
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beforehand as, for example, one selects clothes from a rack - for the
good reason that style does not in this sense exist beforehand.
Intentional as stylistic choices surely are, they do not aim at ends
that exist prior to the choices themselves; it follows, then, that the
categories of style could not be known beforehand either.
To be sure, acolytes, imitators, and even forgers will have their
day wherever style occurs, the most successful of them passing
forever undetected. But there is no reason to believe that forgers or
even more open imitators have been much of a presence in the
history of philosophy - in part because the ratio of profit to effort
would be small, but also because the element of philosophical
discourse most easily mimicked - method - would not take a forger
very far philosophically. Group style serves everywhere and readily
as a model - as, for example, in Mannerist or Impressionist painting.
But unlike 'group method', group style can be rehearsed only in very
broad outline — too broad to confine or, more certainly, to assure
success for the individual who adopts it. Thus even for the Neo-
Thomists and Neo-Kantians who would deliberately follow Thomas
and Kant, the swerve of style takes them, despite themselves, outside
their sources. Like the 'Neo' in 'Neo-Classicism', the designation is
for them neither redundant nor only an historical point of reference.
The invisibility to a writer of his own style does not explain why
philosophers have been silent about the role of style in other
philosophers. But to call attention to its occurrence elsewhere
would, after all, call attention to it in themselves as well; juxtaposed
to the inversely related features of method and style, the reasons for
avoiding all reference to the latter thus emerge as ideological, tied to
a specific and tendentious conception of philosophy. On the ideal of
method as yielding the same results for anyone who follows its rules,
method appears as at once impersonal and ahistorical. As imper-
sonal, anyone can do or use it; the requirement of duplicatibility -
that 're-application' of the method should yield the same results -
presupposes this condition. Method is ahistorical in the sense that
the same rules hold whenever and wherever the method is invoked.
(Particular circumstances may hinder a method's application (as
carbon-dating is impossible in the absence of carbon) but this is not a
limitation of the method.)
Style differs from method in both these respects. It is inseparable
from the agent whose style it is and whose name often remains to
designate it (as 'Rubens' or 'Dickens' are used as metonymies for
their writings). In this sense, style is both personal and expressive of
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that fact. (This holds, in my view, for 'general' style in a school or
group as well as for individual style - inasmuch as the former
conceptually presupposes the latter.)4 It is historically rooted
beyond this personal ground, furthermore, as it presupposes the
completion of the individual work and a comparison between it and
others. (This is reflected, again, in its 'retrospective' character.)
Styles are virtually never named or recognised on the basis of one
work alone, still less on the basis of a single part of one work; even
the connoisseur's attribution of a painting on the evidence of a
brushstroke or the shape of an ear - if indeed these qualify as
stylistic analysis any more than does fingerprint identification -
presupposes a more extensive basis. A corollary of this feature is that
style requires multiplicity: no one style without two. (So we better
understand Spinoza's odd pronouncement in the Tractatus that 'God
has no particular style in speaking.')
These general differences between method and style disclose the
repression of style in philosophical discourse as part of a more
inclusive repression - the tendency of philosophers to decontextua-
lise or dehistoricise their own discourse. Characteristically, philoso-
phers profess to write not within or for a particular context but
against it (and any), admitting no external - historical, causal -
factors as motivating their work. 'What does history matter to me?'
Wittgenstein asks rhetorically, 'My world is the first and only one'5 —
and although this is an extreme formulation, the view it expresses
has a broader resonance. This is not a matter of philosophers
acknowledging that future evidence may compel revision in present
conclusions (as the present has done for the past), but a denial that
history (the particularity of the particular) matters for either the
writing or the judgement of their philosophical claims. They purport
to speak out-of-time even when, as often happens, they take time
seriously as a subject for philosophical analysis.
One might expect this anti-historicism to founder in the
launching, since the words and texts of any discourse are evidently
set in particular historical contexts. But the question is how
philosophers conceive of their discourse, not what it is in fact - and
the difference here is evident. I have alluded to the scarcity of
references by philosophers to the character of their own writing - to
the body accompanying philosophy's mind. Even authors who
admit this relation in principle have reported it impressionistically
and unsystematically; more often, they simply avoid such refer-
ences, preferring then as before to detach themselves from history in
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general and from their own origins in particular. The assumption
underlying this avoidance is that the medium of philosophical
writing has nothing to do with what gets written, that the texts of
philosophy are simple transparencies — which then, from the
viewpoint of the reader, 'interpret themselves' (to extend Luther's
phrase about the Bible). On this view, the material and so the
historical status of the acts of writing and reading are quite
incidental to the work of philosophy - a contention that maybe true,
but that would even so require more by way of evidence than is
usually provided.6 And of course, it would also have to defend itself
against the thesis — asserted here - that it is not true at all.
There is, furthermore, more positive evidence of this self-denial -
for one thing, in the stance of philosophers toward their predeces-
sors that makes into a principle what might otherwise be only
another skirmish in the war between generations. Certainly some-
thing of the generational strife that Harold Bloom finds in the
historical relations of 'strong poets' figures also in the history of
philosophy as well.7 Indeed, philosophy may provide more sus-
tained evidence of this than poetry does, since in it examples of such
conflict are not confined, as Bloom's are, to the 'romantic' tradition. I
would argue, however, that this aspect of the history of philosophy
is better understood as related to the character of philosophy than to
the psychological make-up of philosophers; there are, in other
words, more substantial institutional than personal grounds for the
repression.
Whatever the explanation, it is clear that their 'predecessors' have
posed for philosophers an unusual provocation - philosophers in
the present acting to ensure the death and not only the revision of
their predecessors. Significantly, such efforts commonly appear in
the prefaces or introductions of philosophical works, that is, just
before philosophy truly comes to life: so, for example, in Descartes'
dedication to the Meditations, in Locke's introduction to the Essay,
or in Kant's two prefaces to the First Critique. What is supposed to
follow these summary openings is to be a new and a true beginning,
one that at once overturns earlier solutions and then promises a
definitive resolution. For Heidegger or Wittgenstein, the declaration
of this (new) end to philosophy is explicit - what religious discourse
more candidly names apocalypse. But even when the claim of
resolution does not assume so explicit a philosophy of (philoso-
phical) history, it acts causally in the discourse. The present is
necessary because the past has failed; the future is already
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redundant because the present - the philosopher's own text -
anticipates it. This is, again not a philosophical version of scientific
modesty which concedes only that the new evidence may compel
the revision of earlier conclusions. Philosophers exempt themselves
from the present (both past and present) because this is what
adherence to a method means to do. Philosophical method does not
provide for its own displacement — for the same reason, one
supposes, that governments do not legitimise civil disobedience: the
corporate body would not survive.
To be sure, philosophers usually admit (however unenthusiasti-
cally) to being part of a history, accepting for themselves a place in a
vertical line of philosophical questions and answers. But they rarely
acknowledge that this history is tied to a genealogy - where the
production of philosophy involves a chain of causes and motives,
expressing sources that, strictly speaking, may not be philosophical
at all. The phenomenon of style is part of just this genealogy, as it
has acted on and through philosophers and also as that role has been
repressed in their writing. Some of this repression has been wilful -
a 'noble lie' told by philosophers to themselves and others about the
atemporality of a temporal discourse. Some of it has been intrinsic
and unavoidable, a symptom (one among others) of the presence of
style. Even those writers most acutely aware of the embedding of
style in philosophical discourse - Plato, Kierkegaard - do not fully
give themselves away stylistically. One reason for this is a feature of
style that both distinguishes it from method and assures to method a
stylistic afterlife: whatever philosophers say in writing, including
what they write about writing as writing, itself becomes an element
of style - which thus, silently, has the last word.
REPRESENTATION
The search for motives behind the repression of style in philoso-
phical discourse would be pointless unless philosophical style did
in fact bear substantively on the work of philosophy. Obviously, that
thesis takes a good deal of proving, but the evidence for it, and its
potential importance if proven, have been increasingly acknowl-
edged.8 (One notes also the turn to a role for style in other
disciplines - in history, sociology, anthropology, economics, law,
political theory, and even the 'hard' sciences; in literary theory, of
course, stylistic categories now compete with what used to be called
the primary texts.)9 Admittedly, the repetition of a claim does not
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prove its significance or even its legitimacy. But if evidence of a
stylistic presence similar to that for other, less central elements of
philosophical discourse can also be found in philosophical method,
the substantive importance of style for philosophical writing and
reading would be compelling indeed. This would not imply that
style and method are equivalent; it would not imply even that they
are different aspects of the same 'thing'. But it would indicate that a
significant relation exists between the two, and thus that philoso-
phical discourse is to be taken not only literally, at its own word (as
required by the prescriptions of method), but also representationally,
at more than its word - that is, as style.
Let me turn again to an improbable example - something like a
'thought-experiment'. In his classic Principles of Art History,
Heinrich Wölfflin proposes five pairs of stylistic categories as
distinguishing renaissance from baroque style. In elaborating these,
Wölfflin meets a number of contentious issues in the concept of style
- among them, the logic (if there is one) in the historical
development of style, and the question of stylistic correlation among
individual arts (and between them and the culture as such). His
position on these need not concern us here except for the assump-
tion they share with his paired stylistic categories that style and its
elements are expressive - modes of 'representation'. Thus, notwith-
standing the formalist cast of his analysis, the features governing
style are for Wölfflin not mere forms but speak beyond form; style
betokens an 'ideal of life' - a referent thus also implied in the five
stylistic pairs individually: the linear and the painterly, plane and
recession, closed form and open, multiplicity and unity, clearness
and unclearness.10
I suggested earlier that, in contrast to style, method is in its own
terms prescriptive, enacting rather than representing or expressing.
In its philosophical appearances, moreover, method purports to be
complete, at the very least accounting for its own presuppositions
axiomatically. On these terms, method excludes even the possibility
of anything other than a literal understanding of its own statements.
Let us imagine, however - here the thought-experiment begins -
method taken not at its word, but as that word might itself be
interpreted; for example (here), through Wölfflin's categories; that is,
as viewed stylistically. I do not mean to exaggerate the possibilities
here. It is clear that Wölfflin is not writing about philosophical style
even when he finds a ground in philosophical terms or principles for
artistic style. But consider the following three statements - the first,
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a composite account from Wölfflin of the differences between linear
and painterly styles; then, two composite statements of method, by
Descartes and Kant respectively.
So, first, Wölfflin:
There is a style which, essentially objective in outlook, aims at perceiving
things, and expressing them in their solid tangible relations, and conversely,
there is a style which, more subjective in attitude, bases the representation
on the picture, in which the visual appearance of things looks real to the eye,
and which has often retained so little resemblance to our conception of the
real form of things. Linear style is the style of distinctness plastically felt.
The evenly firm and clear boundaries of solid objects give the spectator a
feeling of security, as if he could move along them with his fingers . . .
Representation and thing, so to speak, are identical The painterly style, on
the other hand, has more or less emancipated itself from things as they are
. . . Only the appearance of reality is seized, and . . . just for that reason, the
signs which the painterly style uses can have no further direct relation to the
real form . . . The tactile picture has become the visual picture - the most
decisive revolution which art history knows.
(pp. 20-1)
Listen now to Descartes and Kant - Descartes in the Rules for the
Direction of the Mind:
[Rule IV] In the search for the truth of things method is indispensable. [Rule
V] Method consists entirely in the orderly handling of the things upon
which the mind's attention has to be concentrated . . . We shall comply with
it [method] exactly, if we resolve involved and obscure matters step by step
into those which are simpler. [Rule VI] For the distinguishing of the simplest
things from those that are complex, and in the arranging of them in order,
we require to note . . . which thing is simplest, and then to note how all the
others stand at greater or lesser distance from it. [Rule IX] It is also helpful to
draw these as figures, and to exhibit them to the external senses, in order
that thereby our thought may be more easily kept attentive.
And then, Kant, in the Critique of Pure Reason:
If appearances were things in themselves, and space and time forms of the
existence of things in themselves the conditions would always be members
of the same series as the conditions . . . [and] freedom cannot be upheld . . .
If, on the other hand, appearances are not taken for more than they actually
are, if they are viewed not as things in themselves but merely as
representations . . . they must also have grounds which are not appearances.
The effects of such an intelligible cause appear, but the intelligible cause . . .
is outside the series. (B564-645)
[Transcendental method] treats only of the understanding and of reason, in a
system of concepts and principles which relate to objects in general but take
no account of objects that may be general but take no account of objects that
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may be given . . . We take nothing more from experience than is given . . .
We take nothing more from experience than is required to give us an object
of outer or inner experience. (B873, 876)
This method . . . consists in looking for the elements of pure reason in what
admits of confirmation or refutation by experiment. . . All that one can do is
to ... view objects from two different points of view — on the one hand, in
connection with experience . . . and on the other hand, for the isolated
reason that strives to transcend all limits of experience as objects which are
thought merely. (Bxix)
The parallels here should be evident — even if what follows from
them is less so. Wölfflin's category of linear style finds a methodic
anticipation in Descartes' statement: the clear and distinct ideas that
Descartes requires for certainty have a 'linear' counterpart in the
'distinctness plastically felt' which for Wölfflin discloses 'represen-
tation and thing' as identical - an identity also close to Descartes'
conception of truth. The Cartesian method, like linear style, is
intended to mark the boundaries among 'things', defining the
distances, relations, and order among them - the essential features
that philosophy, in Descartes' view, attempts to identify for the
understanding and that, according to Wölfflin, the linear style
employs in the plastic arts as the expressive means of its 'ideal of
life'.
Then, too, a sharp contrast appears in Kant: the painterly
revolution which, according to Wölfflin, produces a new world of
appearance has a parallel in the transcendental method that grounds
the limits of knowledge in the domain of appearance; more than this,
appearance itself is the basis for inferring another domain that
cannot be known but only thought. Appearance here, in Wölfflin's
words, has no 'direct relation to the real form' - but there is no doubt
either, from appearance itself, that the other domain exists - in what
Wölfflin later refers to as the 'beauty of the impalpable' (p. 72). The
painterly world of the senses defers its most fundamental distinction
to a point outside appearance (and the painting) altogether - with
this asserting a likeness to both the starting and end points of the
transcendental method which similarly moves from the apparent
distinctions among phenomena and noumena. It is not only that
method finds here a stylistic counterpart, but that this relation
discloses the possibility of viewing method itself stylistically, as
formally expressive.
Now I recognise the sharp demurrals that this reading is likely to
provoke: analogies are endlessly possible; Wölfflin's five pairs of
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stylistic categories (of which I cite but one) lack rigour; it is much
easier to claim that form is expressive than to say exactly what it
expresses. And then, even if in reapplying Wölfflin's terms we do
arrive at the odd images of a Durer-like Descartes and of a now-
baroque Kant, the question is inevitable: 'So what?' 'What philoso-
phical advantage could there be in this?'
Such objections cannot be avoided, but that does not mean that
they cannot be cut down to size or postponed, and I hope for
something of both. By cutting them down to size, I mean that prima
facie, doubts about the relevance of stylistic analysis have no more
force directed at philosophical discourse than they do elsewhere: the
test of stylistic analysis is always in its disclosure of the object to
which style is ascribed. More specifically: as stylistic categories
applied to painting or architecture are judged functionally, by what
they disclose or illuminate of the artwork or its kind, so stylistic
features attributed to philosophical discourse will be assessed in
terms of the understanding they provide (or fail to) of that discourse.
The category of the baroque, with its checkered history, is obviously
a shorthand label for much else in the artworks to which it is
applied; and certainly one can question how informative the
conception of a 'baroque' Kant (for example) is. But quite apart from
the issue of this specific reading, what is crucial here is establishing
the possibility of a 'style of method' - the sense that method can be
articulated in stylistic terms, and that this possibility itself says
something more about method and its place in philosophical
discourse than method by itself would admit or disclose.
The example cited applies Wölfflin's categories to philosophical
discourse even though they were initially conceived for the plastic
arts. I have argued elsewhere that all stylistic categories have some
such analogical or figurative ground11 - but that claim, too, would
grant that some categories are closer than others to their objects. A
question remains, then - one ignored so far in discussions of
philosophical style — of whether stylistic categories can be found
that are specifically grounded in philosophical discourse, as
Wölfflin's categories, for example, derive from the plastic arts. The
goal of this search is clear - to bring the literary analysis of
philosophy to a stylistic 'point-zero' in philosophy itself, or as close
to that point-zero as the converging phenomena of style and
philosophy permit.
A substantial literature already exists in which certain terms of
literary analysis are applied to philosophical texts - through such
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common categories as genre, authorial point-of-view or the implied
author, reader-response, and figurative language.12 These stylistic
traits pertain to philosophical texts on the basis of their status as
writing, and I believe the evidence is compelling that they do indeed
disclose important and neglected (or as I have claimed, repressed)
aspects of philosophical discourse in individual authors, for schools
or groups, and even for the 'genre' of philosophy as a whole. But
these categories by and large originate not in philosophical dis-
course but 'imaginative' literature where stylistic issues cut with
rather than against the grain, attempting to emphasise rather than to
conceal the mark of style. The question remains, then, of whether
stylistic categories can be found that are similarly grounded in
philosophical discourse. The relevance of stylistic analysis to
philosophical writing does not depend on this possibility since that
writing would (arguably) be subject to more general literary
categories in any event. But obviously claims for the connection
between style and the philosophical text would be strengthened if
categories of this sort could be identified.
I offer two possible examples of such categories, the first of them
drawn from Stephen Pepper's book, World Hypotheses. In that
suggestive work, Pepper introduces a conception of 'root-metaphors'
- four images which, inferred retrospectively, serve (he claims) as a
metaphoric basis for the 'world-hypotheses' underlying philoso-
phical systems.13 Admittedly, metaphor is not distinctively a
philosophical figure of speech; nor would I propose to defend the
specific 'root-metaphors' Pepper names (likeness, the machine, the
event, organism). More significant, it seems to me, is the systematic
issue posed by his claim. For if philosophical discourse has a
metaphoric ground, figurative representation would be a constant
feature even of philosophy's ostensively non-figurative assertions (of
which statements of method are a notable instance). And the
conclusion would then follow that to ignore the literary or stylistic
reading of philosophical texts in favour of an exclusively 'philoso-
phical' analysis would be self-defeating and even self-refuting. Any
attempt to demonstrate the latter conclusion as a general thesis will
depend to some extent on our being able to demonstrate it
empirically and thus piecemeal, text by text. But (as suggested
above), this is the case for the phenomenon of style as such and not
only for philosophical style. To prove that or how any term is
figurative or expressive is a problem for discourse analysis generally,
not peculiarly for the history or genealogy of philosophy.
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A second, more specifically philosophical category of philoso-
phical style appears in what I call 'stylistic implication'. The term
'implication' itself, of course, has a standard definition in logic ('One
statement logically implies another if from the truth of the one we
can infer the truth of the other by virtue solely of the logical
structure of the two statements').14 Similarly, accounts of philoso-
phical method invoke that meaning in the relation between method
and its conclusions. By contrast, stylistic implication is on my
account also a form of inference - but stylistically, as viewers or
readers are 'implicated' or have their roles determined by method in
its representational character.
Consider again the statements quoted above of Cartesian and
transcendental method. Formally, the two are similar: each specifies a
progression of steps to be followed in philosophical thinking as stages
on the way to truth or understanding. Viewed representationally,
however, the two methods 'implicate' the philosophers-to-be whom
they address - that is, their readers - in quite different ways, with
what I call 'plural' and 'universal' implication respectively. Des-
cartes' statement of method is directed to a reader who must yet,
beyond his reading, practise or implement the method. The method is
indeed described; in this sense it is addressed in common to all
readers who presumably will then reach like conclusions. But they
are required to reach those conclusions individually - not because
each reads with his own eyes (which is of course true, but not only
here), but because the reading involves a distinctive 'doing'. When
Descartes says that 'we require to note . . . which thing is simplest
. . .', he appeals neither to an authorial nor to a collective we — but to
the individual employing (and required by) the method. (This point is
epitomised in the Meditations when Descartes insists that the 'proper'
reader will not read about meditation, but actually meditate -
something that no one else can do for him.) 'Plural implication' here
offers the promise of a common conclusion - but one to be arrived at
only as the method is activated by the individual, and then by the
'plural', readers. In the statement on transcendental method, by
contrast, the description of the method - available in common to all
readers - is itself the application of the method. The method itself has
the form of an argument, not simply because it states what the
outcome of applying the method will be, but because that outcome -
in broadest terms, the distinction between phenomenon and nou-
menon — is itself asserted in the method itself. The reader here, all
readers together - whether they in the end agree to its terms or not -
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follow the method and then its conclusions. The reader's 'implica-
tion' in the method, then, is universal, actualised in any one reading
as also in the common reading and asserted also in the common
conclusion then reached. The role of this universal or shared
reference is not asserted by Kant in so many words; but it is none the
less implied, required, in his discourse - a feature of method that is,
moreover, learned stylistically, through the figurative or expressive
structure ofthat discourse and the conclusions claimed by it.
For 'singular' implication - the last of what I take to be three
modes of stylistic implication — Plato provides an example. In the
genre (and method) of the Platonic dialogue, a number of individual
persons speak - each of whom has a name and history as well as a
voice and present. But the implication of the method - that is, the
method viewed stylistically - is also individual, since unlike most
instances of dialogue (philosophical or not), Platonic dialogues do
not incorporate a universal voice. Even Socrates, the likeliest
candidate, is never more than a mitigated — that is, an ironic - hero.
The reader, in other words, makes his or her own way, not only
because readers in general are on their own, but because the
dialogue implies an individual role for the reader, perhaps as the
latter identifies with one or another of the characters, but more often
in projecting a character of the reader's own making. This 'singular'
implication is entailed for Plato in the act of philosophy itself, as a
means of 'doing' that is quite different from only following or
understanding the lines of a text. This process intensifies the relation
between method and style - on the one hand, posing a systematic
method of inquiry; on the other hand, stylistically implicating the
individual reader who is not and could not be literally present in the
dialogue at all. Does this mean that there is no 'universal' implica-
tion in dialogues like the Phaedo or the Theaetetust No — any more
than it means that no generalisations can be drawn from an
individual poem or play. It does mean, however, that such general-
ising in a 'singular' text comes always at the expense of obscuring
other, arguably more central features — a disparity that is no less
evident for philosophical texts than it is for other literary forms.
In certain of its features, the category of stylistic implication
resembles the literary category of 'implied reader'. Certainly both, as
instruments of style, relate formal features of the text to its meaning
(the latter connection one of particular importance to philosophical
texts). The differences among the three methods cited are, then, not
'merely' stylistic but implicate the 'reader' of method in specific and
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different ways of carrying on the work of philosophy. How to read
thus becomes a component of what is read. Stylistic implication,
evoked first in the 'look' of the philosophical text, is no less essential
to it than its 'internal' organs (of which method is undoubtedly one)
- much as the look on a face (or the face itself) is integral to the
person. In this conjunction, style and method are interdependent,
although not, from what we have seen, identical, not even alternate
views of the same structure.
One way of summarising the difference engaged here between
method and style is in the factor of intention which, I have
suggested, is presupposed in both. For method, the goal intended is
fixed beforehand and then continuously motivates the process. For
style, by contrast, the goal is itself always being elaborated; stylistic
categories are retrospective because of this, and the status of their
intention is then affected by this condition. Roland Barthes
compares style to an onion in which one peels away layer after layer,
hoping to find a centre but alas finding only layers until one finds
nothing at all.15 With method, by contrast, there is only a centre, no
layers. Until, that is, we view it stylistically — a view that is even
more pertinent to philosophy than to other disciplines because
philosophy has no single or presumptive method. For it, method is
constantly in question, almost as close as style itself to the
philosopher-in-the-text. And yet, as I have also claimed, philoso-
phical method is in its own terms posed against style. In philosophy,
too, method is prescriptive and reiterative; style is retrospective
(perhaps retroscriptive), and not reiterative but representational.
Stylistic implication - like other stylistic categories - shows how
this opposition becomes part of the representation and then of the
meaning of philosophy. In this sense, style gives method a voice that
method by itself does not have or even allow for.
Admittedly, it is possible to imagine the distance between style
and method even further diminished. As Kant in his ethical
conception of a Holy Will finds inclination and obligation won-
drously reconciled, one might envision the freedom and indivi-
duality of style in philosophy unified with the strictures and
objectification of method. This ideal recalls the Platonic identity of
the true and the beautiful, and it is more than coincidental that
philosophy comes closest to this ideal in the weave of style and
method in Plato's dialogues - a genre which, notwithstanding that
achievement, has since remained outside the mainstream of philoso-
phical discourse. More commonly, method is asserted in the history
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of philosophy as autonomous - intended, among other things, to
repress any attempt to view it representationally or expressively or
stylistically. I speak of the style of method, then, not to force a
connection between them but to disclose a relation already present.
As that relation was previously denied, supposedly on philosophical
grounds, it is now reasserted - also on philosophical grounds. The
issue between these claims thus becomes more recognisably a
dispute between differing conceptions of philosophy - an acknowl-
edgement which in its concession of pluralism already grants much
of the claim made here for ascribing style to method.
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Style in painting
RICHARD WOLLHEIM
In this chapter I want to re-present and to reconsider a thesis about
style - specifically, pictorial style — which I advanced in an essay
written in 1977 entitled 'Pictorial Style: Two Views', to be found in
Berel Lang's 1979 collection, The Concept of Style.1 Pictorial style is
a long-standing interest of mine, and I believe style to be a
fundamental, indeed a foundational, element in the art of painting,
and anyone interested in the very little progress that I have made
with this element over the years — which may show something about
me, but which also, I think, shows something about it — may
compare this essay with an earlier and more complex version of the
thesis which I gave in 1972 as the Power Lecture in Sydney and
other Australian cities under the title 'Style Now', as well as with the
more up-to-date summary of the thesis which I included in my 1984
Mellon Lectures at the Washington National Gallery of Art: now
published as Painting as an Art.
II
One way of looking at 'Pictorial Style: Two Views' would be to see it
as offering a whole catalogue of distinctions.
The essay opens with a broad distinction between general style
and individual style. General style is subdivided into universal style,
historical or period style, and school style: and individual style,
which is the contrast to general style, and which is the real topic of
the essay, and for that matter of this chapter, is in turn opposed to
signature. To grasp what is special to individual style, the contrast
between a merely taxonomie and a generative conception of style is
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invoked, and the better to understand a generative conception of
style, the notion of a style-process is invoked, and a style-process in
turn breaks down into a schema or universal, a rule or instruction,
and a disposition: the disposition being the internalisation of a rule
operating upon what falls under a schema. To refute the taxonomie
conception of style I suggested two arguments, each of which is
directed against an alleged consequence of this conception: these
two consequences I associated with what I called the description
thesis and the relativisation thesis. At this stage it struck me that in
order, not just to refute the merely taxonomie conception of style,
but (a further matter) to establish the generative conception, what
was required was not argument but evidence: and this evidence
could only be the fruit of research that presupposed the generative
conception. In 1977 I suggested that this search lay in the future. It
still does. This means that, now as then, my advocacy of one view of
style, in so far as it aims at more than α priori or intuitive appeal,
remains promissory. Another way of putting this last point would be
that, now as then, it is the intuitive, the a priori, appeal of the thesis I
advanced in my essay - in other words, that aspect of it which rests
on the distinctions I proposed — that should get the lion's share of
attention, and the attention it needs is a matter of showing that these
distinctions do not compose a mere catalogue. It has to be shown
that they furnish the most natural way of ordering the material of
style.
Ill
Perhaps I should make it clear that the view of pictorial style that I
advocate cannot be expected to find favour, or even to possess
intelligibility, outside a broader framework within which the art of
painting may be set. This framework is essentially an interpretative
framework, and it presupposes that, in trying to understand a
painting, in trying to grasp its meaning, we should always see it as
(what after all it is) the product of a human mind: the mind of its
painter. I say its painter in the singular: though I do not see any
fundamental difficulty in extending the framework to cover paint-
ings whose authorship is plural. There should be no greater
difficulty in using this framework to understand a work made by
more artists than one than the artists themselves would have had in
co-operating on the work: which was probably not negligible.
Such a framework might be called a psychological framework.
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Arguably it might also be called an intentionalist framework, the
open question being whether the project of understanding works of
pictorial art as products of painters' intentions is or is not narrower
than that of understanding them as products of painters' minds.
Since I at any rate take a very broad view of what an intention - that
is, of what a painter's intention - is, equating it with more or less any
psychological factor that motivates him to paint one way rather than
another, I shall assume there to be no crucial difference between the
two projects.
It is in Painting as an Art that I put the real case, as I saw it then, as
I see it now, for understanding pictorial works of art in psycholo-
gical, indeed in intentionalist, terms. My argument was this: that, in
the case of human artefacts, intentionalist understanding prevails
except in those cases where for a special reason it doesn't. It is, as is
said nowadays, the default mode of understanding. And those cases
where intentionalist understanding does not prevail, or where it
meets principled opposition, amount to three in number. In two of
these cases, understanding of an artefact does not appeal in any way
to the artefact's history of production. Let us look at these two cases
first. One is where the artefact essentially figures as part of a rule-
governed system that assigns meaning to every item, to every simple
or complex, according to the position it, the item, occupies within
that system as a whole. As example would be a sentence or a well-
formed string of words — not a speech-act, or the utterance of that
sentence - as a part of a natural language. The second case where
any appeal to history of production is superfluous is where the
artefact essentially has a purpose or function, and this purpose is
specific enough to determine what the artefact is like to a very
minute degree. An example here would be a law or an article in the
constitution of a sovereign state. Now the third case where
intentionalist understanding is out of place is where the history of
production is relevant, but in each case, this history is so totally
choreographed - it might, for instance, exemplify a Markov chain
where each link in the chain is absolutely conditioned by the
immediately preceding link - that what goes on in the head of the
artificer, or in the heads of the artificers, can be completely
discounted. An example here would be a ritual.
Now it is my claim that a pictorial work of art falls under none of
these three headings: hence it requires psychological or intention-
alist understanding. (A point about this claim. There may very well
be some parts of pictures, there may even be some pictures in their
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totality, that are bound by meaning-rules, or that are teleologically
conditioned, or whose production is exhaustively choreographed,
but these instances would do nothing to overthrow a claim about
how pictures as a whole, alternatively pictures in general, are to be
interpreted. So if you are impressed by these seeming counter-
examples - if, I stress - then take my claim as requisitely qualified.)
I am fully aware that our age bristles with anti-intentionalist, anti-
psychologistic, claims about the understanding of art. It bristles with
semiotic claims and teleological claims: that is, claims that, from the
point of view of explanation, art can be assumed to have the
structure of a language or can be equated with the output of a social
or economic system. So let me make clear that, if any of these claims
were justified, my particular view of style would fall to the ground.
Having made this point, I now move on to my view of style, armed
with the conviction, which you may not all share, that none of the
arguments for these claims have the power to detain us.
IV
The starting-point of my consideration of pictorial style calls for the
deployment of two of the distinctions I have reviewed: that between
individual style and general style, and that between a generative
conception of style and a merely taxonomie conception of style.
(The word 'merely' here is all important.)
I start thus: We can and do talk of the style of Rembrandt. At the
same time we can and do talk of the style of the school of
Amsterdam (or the school of Ley den): of the style of northern
baroque: and, finally, of the baroque itself as a style. Here we have
individual style, school style, historical or period style, and
universal style. And the first point I want to make is that, when we
make these distinctions, it is at least open to us to make one more
distinction than the surface structure of our talk makes apparent, for
it is a distinction buried in what we say: furthermore we often take
advantage of this opportunity. The opportunity arises because in the
world individual style differs from school style, period style, and
universal style not just in that an individual is a different, or
different kind of thing from a school, from a period, or from the
world of art at large - that is, the things that have the style are
different - but in that style itself, or the thing had, is a different, or
different kind of, thing when had by an individual from what it is in
the other three cases. We don't of course always recognise this: but,
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when we do, though our talk continues not to, our thought does. For,
in giving expression to this recognition, we employ, when we refer
to individual style, the generative conception of style, as opposed to
a merely taxonomie conception, which is what we use in talking of
school style, period style, universal style. However, employing a
generative conception of style is not simply a way of recording that
there is something special about individual style. It does that, but it
does more than that. It registers what is special about it. In other
words, unpack the generative conception, and you will discover
what is different about individual style. Unearth what is different
about individual style, and you will have the materials for
reconstructing the generative conception of style.
So let us consider what it is that is different about individual style.
What are the characteristics that single out individual style? I
suggest the following:
(a) Individual style has reality. That is, there is a fact of the matter to
a painter's having a style: having a style makes a difference to the
painter.
(b) Individual style has psychological reality. That a painter has a
style is a fact of psychological matter: the difference that having a
style makes is a difference in the mind of the painter.
(c) Individual style is something that the painter acquires. A
painter's style is not a matter of natural endowment. Nor does a
painter have a style solely in virtue of being a painter. It is easy
to confuse the truism that, if X, a painter, has a style, then it is
X's style that he has with the further claim that, if X is a painter,
then there is a style, X's style, that he has. The latter claim is not
truistic, it is false. A painter may have no style: though, if he has
one, it would be his and it would be named after him. In my
earlier essay I made it true, stipulât!vely true, that every artist
has an individual style. That impresses on us a particular way of
understanding the term artist.
(d) An individual style is acquired through being formed. It is
formed, not learnt: though an artist may learn how to form a
style. He may learn it through being taught, from example, or by
trial and error. Or he may just form a style without having first
learnt how to do so.
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(e) Before forming a style, the artist produces his pre-stylistic work.
The style once formed accounts for the artist's stylistic work, so
long, that is, as the style endures. However, the style may, for
one reason or another, decay or disintegrate, and then, if the
artist continues to work, his work will be post-stylistic. And
finally the style may persist yet a possibility opens up which
conventional art history often overlooks and which a realist
understanding of style singularly equips us to recognise: that is,
the artist may engage in some undertaking that his style cannot
encompass, and in this case his work will be extra-stylistic.
Extra-stylistic work presents special problems for the student of
style or (as he is called) the connoisseur. He may be misled by it
in one or other of two ways. If he is trying to build up a
description of the artist's style, he may be misled by extra-
stylistic work and build up an unduly broad description of the
artist's style: however, if he has already built up a true
description of the artist's style and is now trying to use this
description to construct a corpus of the artist's work, he may be
misled by extra-stylistic work into constructing an excessively
narrow corpus.
(f) The style that the artist forms subdivides itself into two
capacities or skills. The first consists in segmenting or concep-
tualising the elements of a painting in a certain preferred way:
this gives what I call the 'schemata' of that artist's style. The
second consists in evolving rules or principles for operating with
these schemata: that is to say, giving shape to them and placing
them on the support in relation to one another. Two points need
to be stressed about both these capacities. In the first place, they
are practical, not theoretical, capacities. They are exercised by
the artist in making his picture and they evince themselves in an
intellectual form only if it is in the nature of the particular artist
to reflect upon his way of making a picture. Secondly, both
capacities resist propositional or (for that matter) imagistic
formulation. This point does not merely recaptiulate the pre-
vious point: it also tries to do justice to the high degree of
context-dependence to which these capacities are submissive. In
different contexts the same style might find outlet in two very
different-looking outputs.
(g) Individual style is highly internalised: not just in that it does not
require reflective consciousness, but further in that it is
encapsulated in the artist's body. Individual style involves a
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modification of the movements of the fingers, the hands, the
arms, indeed the whole body: more specifically, it involves
modification of those movements through the monitoring role of
the eye. Style is a particular fine-tuning of what Merleau-Ponty
called the 'hand-eye'.
(h) And finally style can be partially grasped through its conse-
quences. Specifically style puts within reach of a painter the
fulfilment of his intentions. An artist can fulfil his intentions: the
painter who is not an artist can merely make work that is
suggestive of, or evidential for, his intentions. A further point, or
perhaps the same point, and I find it hard to decide which, the
formation of a style permits expression.
VI
A point that cannot be too heavily or too frequently emphasised is
that this view of style is not a formalist view of style. The schemata
that are the bricks out of which individual styles are formed are not
to be understood as limited to formal or formally defined elements.
(The problem here, as elsewhere in arguing against formalism, is to
make the target, formalism itself, a coherent view.) Formalism, if it is
to merit its appellation, ought to think of schemata as narrowly
configurational items which a careful scrutiny of the support will
reveal inscribed on it. Schemata should be confined to such things as
lines, squares, spatterings, absence of black, expanses of white or
red, and film of blue over apricot. Few formalists are as consistent as
this, so my strategy will be to give a capacious list of items that I
believe a viable account of pictorial style must be ready to admit as
possible schemata in an artist's style, and I am confident that, at
some point in the course of this list, any self-styled formalist will
object.
In the first place, then, room must be found in the list of schemata
for material elements of the painting: that is, elements that depend
upon the artist's materials not only for their realisation (all plausible
candidates, including configurational items, must do this) but also
for their identification. Examples would be: cross-hatching, contour,
(in medieval panels) punch mark (in later art) impasto, patches of
lapis lazuli, priming, weave of the canvas. Secondly, room must be
found for represented elements in the painting: that is, elements
whose claim to be part of the content of their paintings rests on the
fact that they can be, and correctly are, seen in the surface of the
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painting. Examples would be: sphere (as opposed to circle, which is
configurational), middle ground (as opposed, say, to halfway up the
surface, which also is configurational), in movement or fast-moving,
foreshortening. A sure sign of a represented element is when its
identification requires attention not just to the two dimensions of the
surface, but to a third dimension. For that third dimension is a
represented dimension. Finally (and by now at any rate the formalist
is left behind) there must in the list of schemata occur figurative
elements: that is, elements that not only require for their detection
seeing-in but are then identified through concepts of which
geometry, even in the most extended sense, has no ken. Examples
would be: body, foliage, drapery, valley, battlefield, shadow, reflec-
tion in the water, skin, eyebrow.
Incidentally the last four examples of figurative elements that
might turn up as schemata within a particular artist's individual
style have not been chosen at random. They are taken from
interpretative views of my own about the style of two major artists:
Monet and Titian. I have recently argued that shadows, particularly
shadows that run at six o'clock from the represented object straight
down towards the bottom edge of the painting, play a crucial role in
Monet's strategy of incorporating the spectator. They account for his
marked preference for back-lighting or the contre-jour effect. Indeed
it was only when Monet fully appreciated that reflections in the
water are not like shadows but invariably run straight towards the
spectator, no matter where the source of illumination is, that he
shifted from back-lighting to direct or frontal illumination. (The
Poplar series is the turning-point.) Again, I have argued - and the
argument is too detailed to recapitulate here - that in the style of
Titian, the segmentation of, and emphasis upon, skin, human skin,
and the eyebrow, envisaged as the arch that frames the organ of sight
and shows off the delicacy, the fragility of skin, are crucial factors in
the systematic fulfilment of his intentions.
In decrying a formalist understanding of pictorial style, I ally
myself, as I see it, with two highly original thinkers in the field,
whose contributions to the theory of style are momentous but whose
work has been in several regards gravely distorted: Heinrich Wölfflin
and Giovanni Morelli. Morelli's anti-formalist stance is surely
attested to as strongly as one could wish by the schedules that he
offered for the recognition -1 should say for the stylistic recognition,
the recognition via style - of the work of the great, and the less great,
masters: for these schedules try to establish how the artist in
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question depicted the ear, the ball of the thumb, the forefinger, the
toe. What has allowed Morelli to be erroneously recruited to the
formalist camp is the suggestion, made (I believe) too much of, that
these depictions always preserved a constancy of configuration; that
they were completely inelastic to the pressures of context. The case
of Wölfflin is more complex. Addressing himself primarily to the
issues of general style, he gave the impression that, when the issue of
individual style came to be broached, the schemata out of which the
different individual styles were made up could be identified in the
same way, in the same terms, as those in which he purported to
describe general style: that is, in overtly configurational terms, such
as open versus closed forms, painterly versus linear etc. But when
we examine Wölfflin's account of an individual style - say his
account of Raphael's style in the Stanze, in Classic Art — it is
represented elements, indeed figurative elements, that are invoked
and do the work.
VII
Reference to Wölfflin and to Wölfflin's preoccupations might seem
to provide just the right pretext for switching from individual style
and the generative conception of style and the merely taxonomie
conception that suffices for its characterisation. But I shall delay
making the transition until I have made a methodological point
about the study of individual style. It is a point that requires the
introduction of a new distinction, and once the point is made, the
contrast between individual and general style should be starker.
I start then with the distinction. The distinction is between a style-
description and a stylistic description. A style-description, as I use
the phrase, is a description of an artist's individual style: it describes
the schemata and the rules, and it might, for good measure, throw in
some indication of where and why it was that the artist took on tasks
to which his style could not be turned so that the work he did was
extra-stylistic. In contrast to a style-description, a stylistic descrip-
tion is a description not of an artist's style but of a painting by an
artist in his style, and, in describing it, it concentrates on the
picture's stylistic features: it concentrates on those features which
the painting owes to the artist's style and shows how this is so.
I hope that I have said enough about individual style to put it
beyond doubt that in my view the project of producing either kind of
description is a fantastic idealisation of conceivable art-historical
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practice. But this does not mean that to reflect upon these idealisa-
tions is without value. Quite the contrary, I should say.
The first thing that such reflection reveals is that there is a
distinction to be drawn between the stylistic and the non-stylistic
features of a painting. For not everything that manifests itself on the
surface of an artist's work is the direct output of that productive
system which is his style: though it might be hard to find features
that were untouched by style. Secondly, what are the stylistic
features of a picture in an individual style depends on the content -
that is to say, the schemata and the rules - of the style that it is in,
and there is no way, independent of the style itself or in advance of
the style description, to predict how the features of a painting will
divide themselves between the stylistic and the non-stylistic. And
the third thing that reflection on the distinction between style-
description and stylistic description brings to light is the inelimin-
able gap that divides the two. In other words, there is no delimitable
body of information that will allow us to infer from any stylistic
description of a work by an artist or any set of stylistic descriptions
of works by the same artist to the relevant style-description. This
results from amongst other things, the fact that, in any given work or
in any given body of work of an artist, his style may not be employed
in its entirety. Conversely, there is no delimitable body of informa-
tion that will allow us to infer from the style-description for a given
artist to the stylistic descriptions that paintings of his will satisfy.
This results from, amongst other things, the vast complexity of ways,
which is not in principle reducible, in which the different rules
constitutive of the style interact with one another.
VIII
And now is the moment, as I see it, to turn from individual style to
general style in all its varieties, or to turn from the generative
conception of style to a merely taxonomie conception. For once we
make the transition, then it will turn out to be a feature of the new
terrain in which we find ourselves that here there is no gap to open
up between style description and stylistic description.
Let us look at this.
In so far as it is plausible to think of a style that belongs to a
school, or of a style that belongs to a period, or of a style that is in
principle universally available, it is clear that we are not entitled to
claim that in each case there is a productive system that could
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account for the style. That being so, in what does the unity of a
general style consist? And the answer must be that it consists in
some conjunction, or some disjunction, or (likeliest) some conjunc-
tion of disjunctions, of features or properties that are identified by
their appearance, and what makes it plausible to colligate such
features is that clusters of otherwise related works of pictorial art
satisfy just such colligations. We scan, say, the paintings of students
of some artist and find that they share certain features to define a
certain school style. Or we scan the paintings produced by various
painters living in some temporal and probably spatial propinquity
and find that they share certain features and then we use these
features to define a certain period style. And the same kind of thing
goes for universal style. And that general styles are, all of them
defined in this way, by invoking solely manifest properties that are
observed to be co-instantiated, reveals conclusively that general
style involves a merely taxonomie conception of style.
And now we should be able to see why, in the domain of general
style, there is no gap between style-description and stylistic
description. The only discrepancy that could occur would be of a
trivial kind. It would be when a painting in a general style does not
satisfy all the properties definitive of that style, for then there would
be an underlap of stylistic description and style-description. Not the
whole of the style-description would be taken up in, or find its way
into, the stylistic descriptions of work in that style. But this offers no
difficulty of principle. In the case of a general style, particular
stylistic descriptions stand to the appropriate style-description like
different texts in the same language do to a lexicon of that language.
However in the case of individual style, particular stylistic descrip-
tions stand to the appropriate style-description more like different
texts in the same language do to a grammar of that language.
What characterises general style may now be formulated. I suggest
the following:
(a) General style, unlike individual style, lacks reality. There is no
fact of the matter to it. From this it follows that
(b) general style, unlike individual style, has no explanatory value.
It cannot explain why paintings in a given general style look as
they do. On the contrary, they are in whatever general style they
are in because of how they look. And another consequence to
follow from the fact that general style lacks reality is that
(c) art historians may reconstruct or redefine general styles as they
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find helpful. They may tamper with the identities of styles by
amalgamating, subdividing, or gerrymandering them, and they
may tamper with the contents of styles by altering the properties
that define them. They may do so for a number of reasons, but
the reason can never be that they thereby do better justice to the
styles themselves. By contrast all justified rewritings of style-
descriptions of individual styles will, if justified, be justified in
this way.
IX
I have mentioned, as have other contributors to this volume,
signature. Signature is not, strictly speaking, a form of style at all. It
is however a sibling of style, and, in so far as we look at it in this
way, it is the merely taxonomie conception of style that we employ.
Signature is a set of features that we use, and are justified in using, to
establish authorship. They are drawn from stylistic and non-stylistic
features of the work indifferently, but, in so far as they include
stylistic features these features do not have to be identified
stylistically, i.e. as the outcome of certain stylistic processes. They
can be identified in any way that best serves the purpose for which
signature is invoked: that is, making true and secure attributions of
painting to painter. Signature itself is of great importance to art
history, but I do not believe that the conception of signature is of
much interest to the theory of art.
X
I have talked of individual style as psychological. I wish it to be
recognised that, on my understanding of the matter, it is psycholo-
gical only in a minimal sense. It is psychological only in the way in
which vision or language-competence is psychological. It interacts
with other psychological phenomena at any rate at some level. There
has been no suggestion on my part that the artist has direct access to
the processes of style, or even that he is in a particularly good
position to retrieve them after the fact: indeed there is no reason to
think that he has any mental representation of his individual style,
either in an overall way or in its detail or structure. This last fact is
connected with the well-attested way in which artists never fail to
resent the fact that they have a style. (Which is not to say that they
wouldn't also resent the allegation that they didn't have one.)
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However, times of crisis may arise in an artist's life when he starts
to represent his style internally. And at the same time he represents
to himself the style of others. If this time is a time of deep crisis, we
have to be prepared for the possibility that these representations will
be misrepresentations, and in line with what depth psychology
teaches us is pervasively the case, they will be misrepresentations in
corporeal terms. The artist's own style and those around it will be
conceptualised as bits or parts or products of the body, and by this
stage the scene is set for any one of the great dramas of projection,
introjection, projective identification, that deep crisis precipitates.
The style of another becomes an introject, and it is I think in this
way, in these terms, that we should attempt to understand the
otherwise puzzling phases in the lives of great artists when their
individual style drifts into grave trouble. I am thinking, for instance,
of the extraordinary momentary submission of Titian to the
muscular style of Michelangelo or Pordenone: or the momentary
submission of Renoir to the hard-edged style of Ingres: or the
clamorous inner dramas of Picasso's stylistic evolution.
I mention this subject not to develop it, but just to show what must
be developed if we are to stick to the maxim that I claimed in 1977 is
fundamental to stylistic studies: one artist, one style. Only in cases
of real breakdown should this maxim be abandoned. After all, a style
can retain its identity, can be the very style it is, and undergo
change. Indeed nothing can undergo change unless it remains what
it is, or retains its identity. It is not change that contrasts to identity:
what contrasts to identity is diversity. I am sorry to end this chapter
on a truism, but regrettably the state of the subject makes it
appropriate.
NOTE
1 Now reprinted in Richard Wollheim, The Mind and Its Depths (Cam-
bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993).
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Stylistic strategies in William Hogarth's
theatrical satires
MARY KLINGER LINDBERG
The study of rhetorical or persuasive strategies in literary works is
now well established. Less known are the stylistic strategies at work
in the domain of graphic art. What is the relation between stylistic
strategies in these different domains? Are they specific to graphic art,
or are they common to modes of expression in general? And what is
meant by 'stylistic strategy'?
One approach to answering these questions is to focus on the use
of theatre in the arts. It is well known, for instance, that novelists like
Henry Fielding in the eighteenth century, and Charles Dickens in the
nineteenth century, used theatrical conventions in their work,
incorporating experiences at the theatres, critiques of actors and
acting, and elaborate use of gesture and expression.
Turning to representational art, there is a similar generalised use
of theatre as subtext on at least two levels, one as subject and the
other as visual persuasion. One thinks of Daumier, for stage
moments and portrayals of actors and audiences, for example, and
Watteau, for a deeper sense of rhetorical theatricality in outdoor
scenes.
Not much work has been done to explore the nature of such
interconnections in art and the theatre, links which in the case of the
English artist William Hogarth (1697-1764), reflect both his artistic
and theoretical roots in the eighteenth-century rococo style, as well
as his manipulation of conventions to postulate his own theory of
beauty. Richard Wendorf, who considers Hogarth 'the century's
most literary artist', coins the term 'iconicism', which covers verbal
or literary motifs in visual portraits. However, his focus is on
portraiture in art and literature.1 Hogarth's stylistic strategy is to
borrow extensively from accepted devices of the eighteenth-century
theatre - its dynamic stage and acting commonplaces, and a
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storyline of satirical fictions, for example — and incorporate them
into a static, pictorial form.
To some the word strategy implies a temporal sequence of
intentions and actions and therefore might not seem applicable to
print or text, although this is arguable for Hogarth's work, since he
created 'progresses' or series of prints to show temporal sequence.
Some might consider Hogarth's setting out to convince the public of
his opinions by creating a series of prints to be stylistic strategy.
These are indeed all valid uses of the term with regard to Hogarth.
However, what I define as stylistic strategy in this chapter is (1) a
visible feature of the graphic works themselves, the choice of
motives and devices Hogarth's prints display, and (2) his particular
way of converting ideas into graphical forms. Moreover, I consider it
'stylistic' rather than rhetorical because of the pervasiveness of the
use of the theatre in Hogarth's work and writings.
He is not simply creating a group of prints that deal with the theatre
as a theme and incorporate conventions of gesture or signs shared
between the arts of stage and print. Rather, Hogarth consciously
makes the effort to have his scenes considered as stage works. He
declares this in his autobiographical notes and in other places. For
example, to proclaim his new strategy of representation, a variation of
the accepted modes of history painting, Hogarth in his writings
repeatedly utilises stage comparisons and posits dramatic analogies.
His stylistic strategy in the theatrical satires is to create a picture
using theatrical constructs or parts thereof to express his convictions
about taste in graphical form. In one case, indeed, he uses a verbal
structure from the stage world to frame his picture - a playbill.
I have found a proactive reliance on stage topics, themes and
devices in over 50 per cent of Hogarth's lifetime graphical output.
His persistent use of theatre in pictures is supported in his
commentary by pointed verbal references to London staged events. It
is a primary source. When Hogarth might turn to earlier painters,
sculptors or others, social or historical, in his writings, he empha-
sises the English theatre, closely observing and commenting on
practical details of costuming, dance, and acting practice as well as
Shakespearean scenes.
It could be argued that Hogarth's concerns with social customs,
religion, mores and morals were, at the least, as ubiquitous in his
work. However, enough specific evidence exists of theatrical themes
and forms in over half his graphic works, I believe, to use the word
style in this context.
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It is Hogarth's unique contribution to eighteenth-century art to
employ theatrical subtexts so pervasively. Other artists did not
integrate the theatre in this closely woven manner; they were more
interested in the use of theatrical trappings for embellishing
portraiture, for instance. However, in the nineteenth century,
linkages between theatre and art experienced a more aesthetic
focus.
Marvin Meisel has looked at conjunctions of narrative, pictorial
and theatrical arts in nineteenth-century England in his book
Realizations - Narrative, Pictorial and Theatre Arts in 19th Century
England.2 He points to a special use of pictorial allusion onstage
called 'realizations'. He takes the word from stage scripts, where
actors and actresses were directed pointedly to arrange themselves
in a way that would 'realize' a spécifie painting. 'Realizations' were
aimed at spectacular not 'thematic' enrichment. Further, he observes
that these 'shared structures in the representational arts', i.e.
painting and acting, helped constitute 'not just a common style, but a
popular style' in the nineteenth century (p. 93). They also represent
a more aesthetic approach.
Looking back to the eighteenth century, Meisel observes that
Hogarth's pictures on the walls in his series 'Marriage à la Mode'
(1745) were not 'realizations', but rather 'visual emblems'. More
than emblems, I would argue, these paintings, consciously chosen
and depicted by Hogarth, amount to a literary and theatrical device
analogous to the play-within-the-play (here paintings-within-a-
painting), where they provide thematic point and counterpoint to
the action in the rooms they decorate. Hogarth was extremely adept
at integrating myriad aspects of the theatre in his art for rhetorical
and persuasive purposes to a greater extent than Meisel credits
him.
Indeed, I contend that the strong interplay of theatre and art in a
majority of Hogarth's graphic works constitutes a stylistic strategy,
one that visual artists such as Watteau and Daumier or Picasso may
partake of at times, but in Hogarth's case, it is formidable enough to
command special notice. His extensive writings on the London stage
and theatrical world, especially in his only book, The Analysis of
Beauty (1753), underscore the significance of this stylistic mode in
his work.3 In a major number of graphic works he uses theatre as a
subject, but also weaves many signs of theatrical presentation in his
scenes.4 Rooted in the eighteenth-century theatre and its world,
these techniques are particularly useful in the domain of pictorial
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satire as he critiques theatrical taste and contemporary London
entertainments in the early eighteenth century.5 This chapter will
explore how these strategies work in four of his satires.
THEATRICAL SATIRES
Grant Sampson has shown that shifts in Hogarth's iconography of
Nature and Time over his lifetime reveal an awareness of ambi-
guities in the eighteenth-century tradition of satire. The vision
becomes complex and even 'dark'.6 Ambiguities in Hogarth's moral
vision and satire have also been noted by Joel Blair and Ronald
Paulson.7 However, in three early prints of the 1720s and a drawing
from the 1740s, Hogarth is unambiguous in attacking the 'follies' of
public taste.
In these works, he argues with theatrical taste, decrying inattention
to traditional English dramatic literature. I call these scenes
'theatrical satires'. The term has been defined by Samuel Macey in a
literary mode as 'all plays which ridicule their own medium' from
Buckingham's Rehearsal (1671) to Sheridan's The Critic; or, A
Tragedy Rehearsed (1779).8 Into this genre fit Fielding's The Author's
Farce (1730) and Eurydice Hissed (1737), among others.9 Hogarth's
pictorial theatrical satires offer similar strategies of commentary, as
he targets taste and judgement of authors, managers, and the public.
Moreover, his four satires go beyond criticism of staged plays to attack
operas, pantomimes, and masquerades - all part of the whole show
from the 'First Music' to the afterpiece that theatregoing Londoners
enjoyed and grew to expect in the eighteenth century.
Specifically, in Masquerades and Operas (1723/4) and Mas-
querade Ticket (1727), Hogarth criticises the public's attraction to
evenings of disguise and entertainments emphasising purely specta-
cular effects; in A fust View of the British Stage (1724), he
unsympathetically portrays theatre managers catering to the panto-
mime rage in the guise of staging a show himself. In Charmers of the
Age (1740/1), he makes ludicrous the London popularity of
European ballet dancers.10 The three prints and drawing fall into a
satiric mode defined by Blair as 'direct didactic statement', whereby
rhetorical pressures force a rejection of the objects under attack.11
In these scenes, Hogarth expresses concerns similar to those of
such literary and social satirists as Pope, Addison and Steele, and
dramatic satirists Buckingham, Gay, and Fielding. Their targets, like
Hogarth's, were attitudes of playgoers who treated theatres 'merely as
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places of fashionable entertainment', as well as theatre managers and
playwrights whose goal was to satisfy the taste of the town regardless
of standards.12 Hogarth is no different in his theatrical satires.
Hogarth's satiric style is also highly literary and dramatic. To
clarify a point or enhance irony, he adds verbal/textual elements to
his portrayals — verses, tags, subtitles, playbills, book titles. Through
this satiric subtext, he extends his own medium as versifier,
playwright-manager, and critic of dramas, theatre management, and
continental choreography. His own newspaper advertisements are
part of this subtext as well. His primary strategies in these prints
consist of (1) the visual use of theatrical conventions and stage forms
as fictions (2) drawing illustrative examples of his own theory of
humorous effects, and (3) calling upon the shared base of cultural
knowledge within his audiences. The satiric contrasts are enhanced
since his patrons, i.e. spectators and consumers, shared an aware-
ness of the theatrical values and conventions depicted in these
graphic scenes. As Shirley Strum Kenny has shown, the lively
interplay of theatre and visual arts in this period was a cultural
commonplace.13
We will look at the prints in detail to see how these strategies
operate.
MASQUERADES AND OPERAS (1723/4)
Announced as 'The Bad Taste of the Town' in periodical advertise-
ments by Hogarth, Masquerades and Operas (see figure 1) appeared
in early February 1723/4 (HGW, 47). In the 1760s, Hogarth described
this 'first plate' as one wherein he 'lashed' the 'then reigning'
follies.14 By choosing a theatrical subject for the first engraving he
published, Hogarth shows himself an enterprising artist and an alert
playgoer fighting for literary and theatrical standards. He must have
been confident that his print buyers would be interested too, since
they shared the same entertainment experiences.
With Masquerades and Operas in particular, Hogarth adds his
views to the many printed attacks on the pantomime craze, peaking
from 1723 to 1725. As G. Winchester Stone, Jr points out, this 'rage
for opera, pantomime, masquerade and raree show' gave both
authors and artists opportunity to 'bewail decay in taste' and to look
for a return of the 'dramatic giants of the past'.15 All these elements
appear in Hogarth's print.
He depicts crowds of Londoners as they rush or are drawn to
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operas and the midnight masquerades organised by Heidegger,
who leans out of a building. This Swiss impresario was famous
not only for his ugly features, but for the masquerades and late
night shows he produced. In 1728 Fielding ironically dedicated
his first published poem, 'The Masquerade', to him, and like
Hogarth earlier, he critiques public taste, especially that of the
women.16
The first state of Hogarth's print was accompanied by the
following verses, presumably Hogarth's own, where he asks
Could new dumb Faustus, to reform the Age,
Conjure up Shakespear's or Ben Johnson's Ghost,
They'd blush for shame, to see the English Stage
Debauch'd by fool'ries, at so great a cost.
What would their Manes say? should they behold
Monsters and Masquerades, where usefull Plays
Adorn'd the fruitfull Theatre of old,
And Rival Wits contended for the Bays.
(HGW, 47)
His graphic scene expands on this commentary, illustrating a
rampant enthusiasm for pantomimes and masquerades as crowds
strain to see John Rich's Harlequin Doctor Faustus on one side of the
street. On the other, a masked, costumed queue is literally (but not
unwillingly) roped in by a satyr and fool. The bulging queues profile
the potency of the public's addiction to Heidegger's masked balls,
conjurer shows, and pantomimes.
Above the maskers hangs a showcloth. In it Hogarth lashes at the
current rage for opera by depicting Francesca Cuzzoni, the famous
soprano of the day, literally raking in money offered her by three
noblemen (HGW, 47). The abandonment of 'usefull Plays' is
explicit, as the works of Congreve, Dryden, Otway, Addison, and
Shakespeare are carted away in a wheelbarrow with their destina-
tion: 'Waste paper for Shops'. The theme of Hogarth's satire
concurs with contemporary criticism. As Emmett Avery noted, the
success of pantomime entertainments was unquestionably great;
they set new records and dominated legitimate plays.17 Satirical
attacks attempted to diminish the value of such shows, and
Hogarth's role in this pattern is unequivocal. As M. D. George
observes, the first print Hogarth published on his own account
illuminates two standard themes which long prevailed: the 'neglect'
of drama for spectacle, and 'resentment at large sums paid to
foreigners'.18
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MASQUERADE TICKET ( 1 7 2 7 )
He targets the sexual motivations of masquerades in Masquerade
Ticket (see figure 2, here; HGW, 70-1).19 Specifically the print marks
the accession of George II, and criticises his royal endorsement of
masked balls (HGW, 70).20
George II, Heidegger's patron as Prince of Wales, now as King,
made him Master of Revels. Public opposition to masquerades was
quite widespread in 1726, but no parliamentary legislation was
passed to suppress them; only lip service was paid to their
deleterious effects. Heidegger himself was indicted in 1729 as arch
promoter of vice and immorality, but the masked evenings
continued. The only concession to the popular outcry was to change
the name to 'Ridotto'.21 Thus James Bramston in 1733 wrote: 'if
Masquerades displease the Town, / CalPem Ridottos, and they still
go down'.22 Wheatley notes that Hogarth's Ticket shows the 'interior
of a large room which serves as a vestibule' to the chamber where
the masquerade is held.23 It may be intended as Heidegger's 'Long
Room', the destination of maskers in Masquerades and Operas.
Like Hogarth, contemporary poets and playwrights focus on the
lascivious opportunities and, particularly, adulterous assignations
offered by such occasions. Indeed, one poet describes an ironically
happy flirtatious meeting of a man and wife in disguise.24 Play-
wrights were fond of staging a scene, as Charles Johnson does, in 'a
Masquerade-Room in Imitation of that in the Hay-Market' with
'several People in Masquerade' (The Masquerade, 1719).25
Hogarth employs pictorial devices and emblems, some rather
original, in his Masquerade Ticket. The lion and unicorn lying on
their backs (on either side of a clock with the face of Heidegger on its
dial) allude to George II's patronage of masquerades.28 The large
room is flanked by the signs 'Supper below' on either side, the 'pair
of Lecherometers', and the altars and distorted statues of Priapus and
Venus/Cupid. The emblematic furniture emphasises the mechanical
nature of lechery at these affairs, which in turn discloses the dubious
pleasure of the masquerade itself. For instance, the left 'Lecherom-
eter' indicates degrees of potential 'Expectation Hope Hot desire
Extreem Hot Moist Sudden Cold [sic]', while the one on the right
indexes 'Cool Warm Dry Changable Hot moist Fixt [sic]'.
Stage treatments speak frankly of the enterprising sexual intrigues
made possible by these events. The opening dialogue of Johnson's
The Masquerade attributes the origin of the custom to the refined
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class. In Benjamin Griffin's two-act comedy of 1717, The Mas-
querade; Or, an Evening's Intrigue, onstage in a 'large Room for the
Masquerade', a 'Reveller' comments:27
Well, to carry on an Intrigue with an Air of Secresy, to debauch a Citizen's
Wife, or steal an Heiress, what Contrivance in the World so proper as a
Masquerade? We are allow'd to be satyrically rude to our Superiors, free
with our Neighbours Wives, and talk lasciviously to the Sex in general,
delighting their Fancies without the Expence of a Blush [sic].
Hogarth's satiric strategy in these prints of the 1720s uses stagelike
settings, indoors in the Ticket, and outdoors in Masquerades and
Operas, to expose the pernicious aspects of vizard evenings. He
underscores what are to him negative aspects of such public
entertainments by adding visual emblems and verbal subtexts. Not
long after, he calls upon all of these strategies in his satire of theatre
management, A fust View of the British Stage.
A JUST VIEW OF THE BRITISH STAGE
(December 1724, see figure 3)
In this print Hogarth devises an original mock playbill that
advertises a rehearsal of his own 'new Farce' titled 'Scaramouch Jack
Hall'. He thus adds to pantomime criticism a visual satire on theatre
management. Both visual and verbal elements in the playbill itself
attack the Drury Lane managers and the London populace for
catering solely to pantomime extravaganzas without regard to more
serious and 'usefull Plays'.
The playbill exemplifies Hogarth's strategy of using a particular
theatrical form which becomes a fiction of his satire to convey
criticism. In this case layers of theatrical values are embedded in the
two-part form he gives to the playbill, a picture with an accompa-
nying inscription beneath. His title, visible above the print, taps the
contemporary pulse of theatre productions, stating: 'A Just View of
the British Stage, or three Heads are better than one, Scene Newgate,
by: M D-V-to.'28 The 'three Heads' refer to managers Colley Gibber,
Barton Booth, and John Wilks; DeVoto was a known scene painter;
and the Newgate prison 'Scene' refers to a contemporary Drury Lane
pantomime production.
Most spectators would recall John Thurmond's Harlequin Shep-
pard (performed 28 November 1724), when Gibber and his collea-
gues created a harlequin story based on a criminal executed that
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year. In spite of the notorious topical exploitation, their pantomime
failed, closing after seven performances.29 Hogarth here contributes
to the lively discussion excited by the rivalry between drama and
pantomime that accelerated in the early 1720s when playwrights
denounced the spectacles, and dramatic satirists 'ridiculed the
follies of the stage', often attacking theatre managers.30 Paulson
observes that one barb of Hogarth's Just View is the managers'
attempt to outdo Rich in folly, and that the artist comically contrasts
'their high-flown pretensions' with their own 'real pandering' (HGW,
55). But I think Hogarth's target may be broader, extending to the
palace walls, an idea that close scrutiny of his own playbill suggests.
To see this at work, we need to look closely at the Hogarth's
substantial bill of fare, which includes his own favourite dance, the
hay. Here is the text of his playbill in full:
This Print Represents the Rehearsing a new Farce that will Include ye two
famous Entertainments Lf. Faustus & Harlequin Shepherd to wch will be
added Scaramouch Jack Hall the Chimney-Sweeper's Escape from Newgate
through ye Privy, with ye Comical Humours of Ben Johnsons Ghost.
Concluding wm the Hay-Dance Perform'd in ye Air by ye Figures A, B, C,
Assisted by Ropes from ye Muses. Note, there are no Conjurors concern'd in
it as ye ignorant imagine. The Bricks, Rubbish &c. will be real, but the
Excrements upon Jack Hall will be made of Chew'd Gingerbread to prevent
Offence. Vivat Rex. Price six pence. (HGW, 55)
This mock playbill may be a piece of Hogarth's subtlest politico-
cultural satire. 'Vivat Rex' was customary for playbills at Theatres
Royal ('Rex and Regina' for double monarchs), but on this occasion,
the phrase implies that the taste derives not only from the diverse
views of the hoi polloi, or even management, but from royalty itself.
And it did. Both George I and George II commanded and were
present at many pantomimes, equilibrist shows, and freak acts, as
the London Stage calendar enumerates.
Hogarth manipulates stage format and content here, creating a
conglomerate form that simultaneously documents taste in the
period and hawks a new production. There are elements in the scene
Hogarth does not mention in the inscription, such as the flying
dragon and fiddler playing 'Music for y° What Entertainment', a
likely reference to John Gay's The What D'Ye Call It, a dramatic
satire (also in rehearsal form) with assorted ghosts. Crudely nailed
on the headless proscenium statues, doubtless representing the
demise of comedy and tragedy, are the titles 'Harlequin D. Faustus'
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(left) and 'Harlequin Shepherd' (right). He thus attacks the stress on
machines, extravagant transformation, risings and sinkings of
characters and objects, engineered to hold the eyes only.
Puppet shows are one wooden amusement Hogarth targets as he
depicts each manager with a puppet in hand. Everything, indeed, is
now mechanical, including inspiration. The caption in Gibber's
mouth, 'Assist ye Sacred Nine', acknowledges ironically the
traditional invocation to the muses who are dimly outlined in a
mural above the managers' heads. But the hanging ropes suggest that
the theatremen need to be pulled up to the muses, and that they
themselves are puppets.31 Hogarth's main point, of course, is that the
Drury Lane managers must look to increasingly gross props instead
of ideas for inspiration, and their abundance on the stage under-
scores this point.
Hogarth here aligns himself with stage and page critics of the day.
A similar protest appears in an anonymous farce of 1724, The British
Stage: or, The Exploits of Harlequin, an 'After-Entertainment for the
Audiences of HARLEQUIN Doctor Faustus, and the NECRO-
MANCER'.32 A set of verses on the title page lists the same
paraphernalia Hogarth criticises in fust View and Masquerades and
Operas:
Here you've a Dragon, Windmill, and a Devil,
A Doctor, Conjurer, all wond'rous civil;
A Harlequin, and Puppets, Ghosts, and Friends,
And Raree-Show to gain some Actors Ends:
So perfectly polite is grown this Town,
No play, without a Windmill, will go down.
The author explains in his preface that he had not expected to see
puppets, dragons or windmills, but found them meeting with 'far
greater Applause than the most elegant Play that ever appear'd upon
the British Theatre' (p. vi). Like Hogarth, the critic writes his own
'Dramatick Piece' to expose the senselessness of public approval of
risings and sinkings of windmills, dragons, and the like. The stage
characters and critical dialogues correspond remarkably to Hogarth's
visual satire in matter and manner. At one point, 'Windmill' says to
'Dragon': 'Then the Harlequin Conjurer jump'd over the Moon,
without breaking his Shins - We had Shades that could sing, and
Ghosts which could dance; Puppets that were Men, and Men who
were Puppets' (p. 3).
Regardless of contemporary dramatic and stage parallels that can
be drawn, Hogarth creates a new work. His Just View, which
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simultaneously puffs and presents his own stage satire, comes much
closer to the text of John Thurmond's Faustus pantomime33 than to
Rich's version (the Necromancer) at Lincoln's Inn Fields. The Rich
entertainment relies less on mechanics and harlequinade, but
contains more dialogue. The other pantomime mentioned by
Hogarth on his playbill - Thurmond's Harlequin Shepherd - lacks
textual parallels, though a frontispiece to the first edition shows a
privy, a barred window and a broken wall.34 Moreover, Hogarth's
theatrical satire is much closer in words and picture to the
anonymous British Stage of the same year than to those shows more
often associated with it.
The artist manipulates traditional and novel props on his boards:
statuary, trap doors, curtains and drops. He shows how they are
being pressed to grotesquerie as one manager lowers a puppet of Jack
Hall into the 'Privy'. The strategic ploy of a stage setting (either
imagined or real) was applied again and again by Hogarth. In the
1740s, he devises a crowded stage to attack the popularity of
continental dancers.
CHARMERS OF THE AGE (1741/2)
A number of years later he thus lashes at another 'reigning folly' -
London's vogue for imported dancers - in his sketch of the
Frenchman Desnoyer and the Italian Signora Barberini, dancers he
calls Charmers of the Age (1741/2, see figure 4). Stylistic strategies of
satire in this work show continued use of a stage setting (more
generic in this case), and examples of his own aesthetic theory of
linear humorous effects. In expounding this theory, and in his lively
commentary on the art of dancing in the Analysis, Hogarth refers
frequently to London stage dancers.35
English criticism of continental performers goes back at least to
Jeremy Collier, but was kept alive into the early decades of the
century. For one, The Occasional Paper in 1719 discusses Collier's
views, with the observation that many 'Musicians and Players of
late' have 'found their way hither from foreign Parts'.36
Theatrical dance was the London craze by the early 1740s, to the
extent that the houses required resident ballet-masters. M. G.
Desnoyer worked at Drury Lane from 1735 to 1740 (LS, 3, clxxix). He
has been identified as the ballet master Hogarth caricatures here,
along with Barberini, whom Desnoyer had introduced to audiences
at Covent Garden in October 1740 (LS, 3, II, 857 and HGW, 111).
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Linear angular effects produced by the body were by Hogarth's
own theory comic, not aesthetically pleasing. Specifically, he claims
that when the body's form is divested of serpentine lines, it becomes
'ridiculous as a human figure' (Analysis, 158). Hogarth draws
Barberini leaping off the stage in an exaggerated manner, her legs
spread out horizontally, the linear effects of which he considers
'ridiculous'. The male dancer, possibly performing a 'Pirouette',
drawn to emphasise the perpendiculars of legs and arms, creates an
effect of straight lines, similarly 'ridiculous'.
Whether or not Hogarth intended an obscene pun in this drawing,
his allegiance is to the serpentine line and its related pictorial theory
of humour outlined in the Analysis.37 The more that serpentine lines
are excluded in a dance, he claims, the more 'low, grotesque and
comical' it becomes (Analysis, 158). Thus, ironically called 'Char-
mers', his inelegantly exaggerated figures become grotesque carica-
tures.
Hogarth strategically creates, moreover, a stage space large enough
only for two, a visual sign that the overriding popularity of
continental dancers was literally crowding English drama off the
stage. In the 1730s and 1740s dancing was so popular that formal
ballets were included in pantomimes and offered separately between
acts. By mid-century, each patent theatre employed a 'ballet master',
a 'premiere danseuse, and a company of from ten to twenty dancers'
(LS, 4, cxxv).
Barberini's initial success may be judged by an increase in house
receipts that more than tripled (LS, 3, II, 857). The Covent Garden
playbill for her English debut indicates that the managers expected
large audiences at this command performance: 'Tis humbly hop'd no
Person will take it ill their being refused Admittance to the Music
Room; the Dances depending greatly on the same being kept entirely
clear' (LS, 3, II, 857). Five nights later, on 30 October 1740, at
another command performance, management was even more spe-
cific about ensuring room for Barbarini and Desnoyer: 'The Perfor-
mance of the . . . Entertainment depending greatly on the Orchestra
and the Stage being kept entirely clear'. No spectators were to be
admitted behind the stage scenes (LS, 3, II, 859).
It is entirely possible that Hogarth had these popular premiere
performances in mind when he depicted the applauding spectators
onstage, standing very close to the dancers, clearly behind the
scenes. The irony increases with knowledge of the managers'
requests to clear the stages for these dancers.
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In each of the theatrical satires, Hogarth becomes the imaginative
critic of a multi-faceted theatrical world. His style in these works
utilises the eighteenth-century theatre and its values as he attacks
contemporary taste in entertainment. He specifically uses its forms
and milieu as stylistic signs.
Masquerade Ticket underlines the lecherous motivation of mas-
querades. But operas and masquerades are pernicious in their effect
on stage production, driving serious plays off the boards and into
wheelbarrows for waste paper or toilets in Masquerades and Operas.
And though Hogarth praises dancing from the minuet to the country
'hay' in the Analysis, he indicts the dancing of French ballet masters
and dancers as awkward and absurd, along with public taste, shown
as an overcrowded stage audience applauding dancers' acrobatic
feats in Charmers of the Age.
In A fust View, Hogarth 'draws the scene', opening for us a stage
darkened with bad taste, the only light coming from a feeble ghost.
Everything depends on false appearances, or 'gingerbread'. For one
thing, the men rehearsing are managers, not actors. Hogarth en-
gineers stage and green room conventions, along with thematic
elements such as the rehearsal and masquerades. Thus he attacks the
empty sensationalism prevalent on the London stages that he felt
was driving legitimate drama into waste-paper bins. This trend his
patrons would readily acknowledge; whether or not they would alter
their 'reigning folly' is less easy to know.
This approach to Hogarth's satiric strategies is not meant to ignore
the graphic conventions he employs as well, but rather focuses on
the theatrical values in form and content he so explicitly enumerated
in his own writings about his art. He was always alert to the nature
of theatre and the causes of its effects.
In explicit efforts to alter cultural focus and restore what he calls
'the fruitfull Theatre of old' in these four works, Hogarth creates
visual statements of satiric intent, dressed in fictions familiar to his
audiences from their evenings at operas, masquerades, pantomime
performances, and other entertainments. Without this common and
settled base, his satire would lack potency.
In his 'lashing' of contemporary taste, Hogarth takes his place
among the Augustan satirists of his day, employing with originality
the traditions of theatre and literature as stylistic strategies of satire
in a pictorial form. To this he adds his own linear theory of
humour. For optimal effect, he relies upon a shared body of
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cultural tastes, and sharp awareness in his viewers of theatre and
drama conventions. By exaggeration, he points out the failings of a
culture falling into the quicksand of mindless and escapist
spectacle, blindly following the lead of profit-oriented managers
who lure them to ambiguous pleasures. Thus he attempts to disturb
(and hence correct) the age's self-images in dramatic art and
theatrical taste.
Hogarth's extensive use of theatre in the visual domain demon-
strates that these stylistic strategies are more rather than less
common to modes of expression in general. The use of theatre as a
subject, the satirical fiction of its foibles, and specific stage conven-
tions, all elements in Hogarth's style, appear in contemporary
literature and criticism as well. The four works examined reveal
Hogarth's heightened use of shared structures in the arts for
rhetorical and persuasive purposes. His theatrical satires in parti-
cular illuminate this, since he employs the form of theatre in an
attempt to alter its content.
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Style in architecture: the historical origins of
the dilemma
J. MORDAUNT CROOK
Architecture is two things: it is service and it is art. It has to work
and it has to be seen to work. It is building and an image of building;
structure and an image of structure. An architect is thus both a
builder and an image-maker, and style in architecture is just a way of
building codified in imagistic form. In simply organised societies -
communities with unitary cultures - there is no radical choice of
image. Style is still a vernacular medium, not a product of aesthetic
preference. But between the disintegration of the classical tradition
in the second half of the eighteenth century, and the rise of the
Modern Movement in the first half of the twentieth century,
architects were faced with a choice — in many cases a multiple
choice - between alternative images, alternative codes, alternative
systems of design, alternative styles. That choice I have called The
Dilemma of Style.1 This chapter is a summary of my findings as
regards its historical origins.
In brief the stylistic dilemma was a product first of the Renais-
sance (which gave us the idea of individual style), and then of
Romanticism (which gave us the idea of a multiplicity of styles). The
dilemma strikes first - historically speaking - in England, where
Romantic taste found particular expression in the formulation of the
Picturesque aesthetic. That was the historical phenomenon which
lay at the root of the dilemma of style.
The word 'picturesque' derives from the Italian pittoresco,
meaning 'in the manner of painters'. The work of a group of
seventeenth-century French and Italian masters, chiefly Claude
Lorrain, Salvator Rosa, and Gaspard and Nicolas Poussin, made such
an impression on early eighteenth-century Grand Tourists that it
conditioned the Englishman's way of seeing for more than one
hundred years. Historians, however, have tended to speed up the
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pace of this conceptual change. By using a teleological telescope,
they turn 'picturesque' (an early eighteenth-century term: 'as in a
picture') into 'the picturesque' (a latter eighteenth-century label
involving the aesthetics of untamed scenery). Still, both sets of mind
overlap and coalesce; operating together in the writings of William
Gilpin. By the second half of the century, through the polemics of
Uvedale Price, Richard Payne Knight, and Humphry Repton, the
Picturesque had become established as a set of visual criteria based
on pictorial values. Hence the aesthetics of the landscape garden.
What links the early phase and the later - the emblematic and the
expressive garden, William Kent and Capability Brown - is a
continuous feeling for the garden as theatre, the reciprocity of setting
and spectator, the aesthetic dynamic of landscape in action. In all
this, architecture plays a secondary, scénographie role. And therein
lies the origin of the dilemma: style had become not an expression of
structure but simply a pictorial allusion.
It was in the area of romantic landscape that the idea of
appropriate form, that is a style appropriate to a particular context,
first came to fruition. Of course the idea had a long history. Vitruvius
endowed the different classical orders with distinct characters -
masculine Doric, matronly Ionic, and so on - establishing a classical
tradition of decorum, or manner, and thus variation and stylistic
differentiation; ideas which in turn were developed in eighteenth-
century France. J.-F. Blondel explained the appropriate use of style
as a kind of 'colouration', 'the poetry of architecture'. 'In a word', he
suggests, 'style . . . enables the architect to create a sacred genre, a
heroic one, a pastoral one'. Ledoux took such ideas of stylistic
expression a good deal further, designing buildings such as his
notorious phallic-shaped brothel, or his barrel-shaped house for a
cooper or barrel-maker, which are themselves three-dimensional
metaphors. Architecture thus becomes a symbolic language. In
eighteenth-century England, where Neo-Palladianism was, by defini-
tion, a conscious stylistic choice, stylistic symbolism never devel-
oped in such a literal way. Nevertheless the range of stylistic
reference widened considerably as part of the furniture of the
landscape garden. At Stourhead, Wiltshire (1744 onwards), for
example, architectural features included a Turkish tent, a Chinese
Alcove and Umbrello, a Rustic Cottage (see figure 5), a Roman
Pantheon, a 'Convent in the Wood', a Tuscan Temple of Flora, a
Temple of the Sun modelled on the original at Baalbeck, as well as
medieval fragments salvaged from nearby Bristol.
71
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In effect, the Rococo, or Poetic, or Emblematic garden of the early
eighteenth century revived in Augustan England the apparatus of the
ancient Roman garden, via surviving Renaissance examples. This
apparatus was then turned into pictorial form and naturalised by
absorption into a different climate and a different agricultural
context. The romantic garden emerged not just as a paratactic art -
that is a sequence of stage sets designed for peripatetic spectators -
but as a kinetic art in four dimensions. The mobile spectator not only
experienced the three-dimensionality of landscape, he was also
carried back through time on a magic carpet of associations. Through
the multiplication of fabriques — garden structures designed as
triggers to the imagination - these landscapes of romance became
four-dimensional memory-banks. Surrounded by temple, ruin,
hermitage, or grotto, the receptive spectator was wafted through time
and space by means of his manipulated imagination. As at
Duncombe Park, Yorkshire, where a sinuous walk between classical
temples overlooks the ruins of Rievaulx Abbey: 'space-time', by
association.
William Kent's landscape buildings - the Praeneste Monument
(1739) at Rousham, for instance - are chiefly informational, or
emblematic: their allusions require explanation. Capability Brown's
landscape buildings, by contrast, are chiefly affective and expres-
sive; as at Stowe, where he smoothed down the work of Bridgeman
and Kent: the landscape forms are naturalistic, and the temples less
obtrusively allusive. One contemporary, Thomas Whateley, de-
scribed Brown's landscapes as having 'the force of a metaphor, free
from the details of an allegory'. Repton's garden buildings - the
Camellia House at Woburn, Bedfordshire (c. 1806), for instance - are
different again: they do furnish a landscape but they also make
concessions to utility, or at least amenity.
But despite their differences, the landscape buildings of Kent,
Brown, and Repton all convey messages. Hence their emphasis on
style. Stylistic choices act as triggers to the imagination: to conjure up
a memory, to reinforce a mood, to express a specific purpose or
ownership, or simply to focus a landscape and create a sense of place.
In this way, the notion of appropriate character in architecture — the
idea of a style for each mood, and a mood for each style - eventually
emerged full-blown as the theory of architectural association.
The philosophy of association can be traced back at least to the
seventeenth century, to Thomas Hobbes' Human Nature (1640), and
more especially, to John Locke's explanation of mental processes in
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his Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690: 4th edn. 1700).
Locke's theories were popularised by Joseph Addison in The
Spectator of 1712, and refined in David Hartley's Observations
(1749). But it was the Scottish school - Hume and Hutcheson,
Gerard, Kames, Dugald Stewart, and Archibald Alison - who built
on Locke's psychology and developed a consistent theory of associa-
tionist aesthetics. 'All beauty' noted Hutcheson in 1726, 'is relative
to the sense of some mind perceiving it'. 'Beauty', Hume concluded
in 1757, 'is no quality in things themselves; it exists merely in the
mind which contemplates them . . . Each mind perceives a different
beauty'. That — despite equivocation - was the basis of Burke's view.
Archibald Alison is often given the credit for the propagation of
these ideas. But he was not well known South of the Border until
noticed by Francis Jeffrey in the Edinburgh Review of 1811. 'There is
no such thing as absolute or intrinsic beauty', Jeffrey concludes, 'it
depends altogether on ... associations . . . All tastes [if not all men
of taste, are therefore] equally just and correct'. Universal standards
of taste, therefore, had no foundation except in 'universal associa-
tions'.
This rejection of the idea of objective standards of beauty, or
absolute values, had the significant effect of displacing Classicism as
the universal style. Classical harmonies were no longer the eternal
verities of architectural taste: architecture was no longer synon-
ymous with classical architecture. In a kind of aesthetic Reformation,
private judgement - in this case stylistic multiplicity — triumphed
over prescriptive authority. So much so, that the mysteries of
classical proportion came popularly to be regarded as a forgotten
secret. 'A rule of proportion there certainly is', lamented William
Gilpin in 1792, 'but we must inquire after it in vain. The secret is
lost. The Ancients had it. They knew well the principles of beauty;
and had that unerring rule, which in all things adjusted their taste
. . . If we could only discover their principles of proportion . . . " In
fact, even by 1792, the Vitruvio-Palladian system of proportional
harmony was not quite lost. Architectural skill was still thought to
consist in the manipulation of standardised components. But there
had been a distinct shift in aesthetic attitudes: from objective to
subjective, from the pursuit of harmony to the cult of sensibility,
from absolute standards to relative values, from unitary style to
plurality of choice, from mimetic to expressive, from classic to
eclectic. This shift of taste has been called Romanticism.
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Although Alison's personal taste was basically Neo-Classical, his
associationist theories opened the way to stylistic agnosticism, and
thus to a veritable Pandora's box of stylistic choice.
It was Payne Knight who produced the definitive statement of
associationist thinking:
As all the pleasures of intellect arise from the association of ideas, the more
the materials of association are multiplied, the more will the sphere of those
pleasures be enlarged. To a mind richly stored, almost every object of nature
or art, that presents itself to the senses, either excites fresh trains and
combinations of ideas, or vivifies and strengthens those which existed
before: so that recollection enhances enjoyment, and enjoyment heightens
recollection . . . [For example] a person conversant with the writings of
Theocritus and Vergil will relish pastoral scenery more than one unac-
quainted with such poetry. [And a] spectator [whose] mind [is] enriched
with the embellishments of the painter and poet . . . [feels] beauties which
are not felt by the organic sense of vision, but by the intellect and
imagination through that sense.
Hence C. R. Cockerell's compounded delight on seeing William
Wilkins' recreation of a Grecian temple in a Reptonian landscape at
Grange Park, Hampshire (1805-9, see figure 6): 'Nothing can be finer,
more classical or like the finest Poussins . . . There is nothing like it
on this side of Arcadia.'
That viewpoint had been nicely summed up some years before, in
1769, by William Gilpin, in a letter to William Mason. 'I have had a
dispute lately', writes Gilpin - with Mr Lock of Norbury Park - 'on
an absurd vulgar opinion, which he holds - that we see with our
eyes: whereas I assert, that our eyes are only mere glass windows;
and we see with our imagination'. Not a bad explanation of the
physiological process by which the brain makes sense of the images
transmitted to it by the eye.
Ruins were the most obvious stimuli. These 'towers and battle-
ments', noted Sir Joshua Reynolds in 1786, these 'Castles of Barons
of ancient Chivalry', bring 'to our remembrance ancient costume
and manners', and 'give . . . delight . . . by means of association of
ideas'. 'Real ruins', explained Whateley in 1790, produce the best
'effects . . . but [effects] are [also] produced in a certain degree by
[ruins] which are fictitious; the impressions are not so strong, but
they are exactly similar'. One of the first of these mock-ruins was
King Alfred's Hall, Cirencester Park, Gloucestershire (1721, see
figure 7).
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Figvire 6 William Wilkins, Grange Park, Hampshire (1805-9)
Figure 7 King A//red's Ηα7Λ Cirencester Park, Gloucestershire (1721 onwards)
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In 1772 Sir William Chambers noted that the Chinese had thought
of the same thing long before:
They are fond of introducing [into their gardens] statues, busts, bas-reliefs
. . . [for] they are not only ornamental but . . . by commemorating past
events, and celebrated personages, they awaken the mind to pleasing
contemplation, hurrying our reflections up into the remotest ages of
antiquity . . . their aim is to excite a great variety of passion in the mind of
the spectator.
For Chambers, such excitements - what Gilpin and Knight called
'the chain of ideas' - formed the basis of architectural aesthetics,
and Kew Gardens became an advertisement for his theories.
Besides his famous Chinese Pagoda (1761—2), there was a ruined
Roman Arch (1759-60), Ionic temples of Victory (1759) and Peace
(1763), Tuscan temples of Aeolus (c. 1760; 1845) and Bellona
(1760), a Mosque and an Alhambra - all by Chambers - as well as a
Gothic Cathedral (1753-9) and Moorish Alhambra (1750; 1758) by J.
H. Muntz; a Palladian bridge, and a House of Confucius (designed
c. 1750 by Goupy or Chambers with furniture by Kent). Queen
Charlotte's Cottage (1770; 1805) adds a final touch of vernacular
rusticity.
So all styles were grist to the associationist mill. But were they
all equally appropriate? As early as the 1730s and 1740s, at
Stowe, Gothic and Grecian styles had been used symbolically.
Antique ideals were expressed in classical symbols: Ancient
Virtue took the shape of a classical temple (Kent, 1734); while
ancient English liberties took on Gothic forms, as in Gibbs'
Temple of Liberty (c. 1740-4), with its ceilings emblematic of the
Saxon Heptarchy.
Lord Kames, whose Elements of Criticism (1762) developed
Hume's 'Association of Ideas', distinguished - rather speciously -
between the impact of Greek and Gothic ruins. 'Should a ruin', he
asked, 'be in the Gothic or Grecian form? In the former, I think;
because [a Gothic ruin] exhibits the triumph of time over strength; a
melancholy but not unpleasant thought: a Grecian [or Roman] ruin
suggests rather the triumph of barbarity over taste; a gloomy and
discouraging thought'. But Kames did concede that beauty in
architecture was twofold: relative and intrinsic - intrinsic beauty
consisting in proportion and harmony; relative (or extrinsic) beauty
consisting in a building's fitness for purpose or contextual relevance.
For example, he thought Inverary Castle (1745 onwards) appropri-
ately Gothic because of 'the profuse variety of wild and great objects'
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in the vicinity. Dr Johnson was more forthright: 'What I admire here',
he boomed, 'is the total defiance of expense'. In fact, Kames and
Johnson were both right: Inverary is a symbol of wealth and power -
a trigger of neo-feudal emotions - but it is also a symptom of habitual
stylistic preference, in other words, taste.
But it was Humphry Repton who made stylistic differentiation
popular. Repton was less concerned with symbols than with pictorial
impact; he was concerned to maximise - partly through architecture -
the picturesqueness of a given site: to bring out the genius of the
place. He showed first how Grecian, Gothic, or Castellated trimming
could change the nature of otherwise identical buildings, and then
how Grecian and Gothic compositions suited different settings.
Grecian suited a site which was pastoral or Arcadian; Gothic
maximised the pictorial impact of a setting which was already
Picturesque, and could, in turn, be divided into 'castle Gothic' and
'abbey Gothic'; 'castle Gothic' for a rocky eminence, 'abbey Gothic' for
a fertile valley. In his Sketches and Hints on Landscape Gardening
(1795), Repton had already pointed out that irregular Gothic houses
looked best surrounded by deciduous trees; classical buildings
looked best surrounded by 'spiry-topped' or coniferous trees. Partly
that was due to contrast: the horizontal lines of Greek architecture
contrasted well with vertical pines and cypresses. Partly, however, he
admits the effect is due to association: 'the ideas of Italian paintings
[or paintings on Italian themes], where we often see Grecian edifices
blended with [pines], firs and cypresses'.
In Repton's writings, the choice of style in landscape or garden
building is dictated as much by considerations of status, situation or
use as by historical associations. He recommended a rustic hut for a
primeval forest; an irregular Gothic house for an irregular landscape,
as at Luscombe, Devon (1800-4); a cottage orné, as at Endsleigh,
Devon (1800-11), for a small-scale, variegated landscape; or a seat in
the manorial style - Haddon Hall being the ideal - for the sort of
place where 'the Lord of the Soil resides among his tenants'.
Repton was certainly an eclectic. But he was an eclectic in taste
rather than an eclectic in style: he never developed the idea of
synthesis. 'To add Grecian to Gothic, or Gothic to Grecian', he wrote,
'is equally absurd'. The result would be a mere 'pasticcio, or
confusion of discordant parts'. He preferred to think of himself as a
stylistic utilitarian. At Plas-Newyd, for instance, he used the idea of
a cathedral chapter-house to produce a charming green-house-cum-
prospect-pavilion - especially delicious by moonlight - on the basis
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that conservatories particularly suited the 'flat Gothic arch of Henry
VIII', an arch which admitted more light.
Repton's ideas can be traced through a whole series of publica-
tions on Picturesque design, by Flaw, Malton, Elsam, Lugar, Gandy,
Papworth, Goodwin, and others, but particularly in the writings of
J. C. Loudon. Now Loudon was enough of a radical - in social and
aesthetic matters - to talk wistfully of the fading away of style:
traditional taste, he believed, would eventually go the way of
traditional social attitudes. However, this withering away of the
empire of style never actually happens: Loudon's Encyclopedia -
with all its multitude of styles - remains a monument to bourgeois
taste.
It was Richard Payne Knight who developed the idea of stylistic
eclecticism. 'In the pictures of Claude and Gaspar', he notes, 'we
perpetually see a mixture of Grecian and Gothic architecture
employed with the happiest effect in the same building, and no critic
has yet objected to the incongruity of it'. Such a 'miscellaneous', or
'mixed style', Knight recommends as 'the best style for irregular and
picturesque houses'. He designed his own house, Downton Castle,
Herefordshire (1771-8), to be 'Gothic . . . without, and Grecian . . .
within'. In consciously propagating synthesis rather than accumula-
tion, Knight was well ahead of his contemporaries, and his synthesis
set out to be consciously modern. 'The design of almost every age
and country', he wrote, 'has a peculiar character . . . [every house]
should . . . maintain the character of a house of the age and country
in which it is erected'. That Proto-Hegelian notion - what
Summerson once called 'the Mischievous Analogy' - had a long life
ahead of it.
In the early eighteenth century - the cultural watershed when
nature replaced religion as the motive force for creative artists - the
cult of styles had become rooted in the soil of the Romantic
landscape. But it was not until the early nineteenth century that
choice developed into conflict. The first uses of revived Gothic - that
is Gothic as a post-vernacular image - had been determined by
environmental considerations. Sir Christopher Wren's Tom Tower,
at Christ Church, Oxford (1681-2), for example, was built in the
Gothic mode to avoid 'a disagreeable mixture'. Hawksmoor,
however, at All Souls College, Oxford (1715-40), took a major step
forward in the direction of stylistic autonomy; and William Kent, at
Esher, Surrey (1729-32), went one stage further, with a tentative
synthesis of Gothic and Classic, indicating a shift from environ-
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mental to associational design. In the work of Batty Langley,
Sanderson Miller and their circle, this evolution from environmental
to associational thinking is complete. Their Rococo rejoiced in
severing the link between form and structure, and treated Gothic
ornament simply as a species of communication - a kind of visual
Morse code, tapping out the message 'medieval' — as in Henry
Keene's Gothic chapel at Hartlebury Castle, Worcestershire (c. 1750).
By comparison, the Picturesque placed less emphasis on ornament
and more on pictorial impact: architectural design became basically
a scenic device. Buildings were now pictorially conceived as
memories in three dimensions, as at Miller's Tower on Edge Hill,
Warwickshire (1747-50): there are echoes here of Guy's Tower at
Warwick; but it was also designed to enshrine a statue of the Saxon
hero Caractacus on the spot where Charles I raised his standard
against the Roundheads, and it was ceremonially opened on the
anniversary of Cromwell's death.
The habit of regarding buildings as scenery - as aggregates of
separate visual units - encouraged not only irregular skylines and
asymmetrical plans, but triangular, hexagonal, and octagonal
features, eyecatchers and all manner of follies - John Carter's
Midford Castle, Bath (1775, see figure 8), for example. Picturesque
thinking was certainly an encouragement to drawing-board architec-
ture: designing a house from the outside inwards, rather than from
the inside outwards — a process of design ideal for landscape
features. Carter's triangular fort is reciprocally picturesque: a
building designed to be looked at as well as looked from; an example
of scénographie design, based on the multiplication of points of
vision.
This was a clever but dangerous game, which, in conjunction with
the multiplication of stylistic choice, came near to disintegrating
architectural design altogether. In the Menagerie at Woburn, Bed-
fordshire (1806, see figure 9), Repton suggested different styles for
opposite faces of the same structure - classical for the formal
approach, Gothic for the informal. Castle Ward, Co. Down (c. 1762),
has separate Palladian and Gothic facades; Castle Goring, Sussex
(c. 1790) is another stylistically schizophrenic house - Neo-Classical
and Castellated - designed by Biaggio Rebecca for the eccentric
Shelley family. Eccentric or calculated, this pursuit of optical effect
lay at the root of Picturesque thinking, and threatened the disintegra-
tion of architectural composition into a mosaic of Picturesque
devices.
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Figure 8 John Carter, Midford Castle, Bath (1775)
One man whose career encompassed all styles was John Foulston
of Plymouth, the leading Regency architect of the West of England.
He was a Greek Revivalist who could rival Smirke, a Gothic
Revivalist who could rival Wilkins. He was a town planner who
could rival Nash; and he was a Neo-Classicist who could, occasion-
ally, rival Soane. But Foulston will always be remembered for
something else. He appears in every textbook as the architect of the
extraordinary group of buildings at Kerr Street, Devonport, Ply-
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Figure 9 Humphry Repton, The Menagerie, Woburn Abbey, Bedfordshire (1806)
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Figure 10 John Foulston, Town Hall, Column, Chapel and Library, Kerr Street, Devonport, Plymouth (1821-4)
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mouth (1821-4, see figure 10), where no fewer than five styles are
simultaneously represented: a range of terraced houses in Roman
Corinthian; a Greek Doric town hall and Naval Column; an 'Oriental'
or 'Islamic' or 'Mohammedan' Mount Zion Chapel (now demol-
ished); a pair of Greek Ionic houses (now also demolished); and an
Egyptian Library (later, appropriately, an Oddfellows Hall).
Architecture was starting to flex its muscles for the Battle of Styles.
There is a choice, but Pugin had yet to give the dilemma a moral
dimension. Indeed, by the Regency period, the comparability of
styles had become something of an article of faith. As Thomas
Hopper put it in 1830: 'it is the business of an architect to understand
all styles, and to be prejudiced in favour of none'.
Foulston's successor, George Wightwick, clearly found this urge to
experiment irresistible. In 1840 he published an architectural
romance entitled The Palace of Architecture — the first architectural
coffee-table book - in which he portrays just the sort of stylistic
fantasy Foulston was dreaming of, a veritable 'epitome of the
architectural world'. His book, Wightwick explains, 'aspires to that
station in regard to Architecture which the Novels of Scott occupy in
relation to History'. The palace itself was Neo-Classical, but its
gardens were the reductio ad absurdum of Picturesque theory; an
anthology of all styles known to man: Indian, Chinese, Egyptian,
Greek, Roman, Constantinal (i.e. Lombardic Romanesque), Norman,
Decorated Gothic, Old English or Manorial, Tudor Gothic, Turkish,
Protestant Baroque, Soanean, Anglo-Greek, and Anglo-Italian. But it
was reserved for the entrance gateway to combine all these modes,
in a fantastic portal compounded of fragments of all styles. 'This
gateway', Wightwick explained, 'symbolises MUSEUM. . .A
masonic riddle, teeming with multiplied significancy'.
Wightwick made no attempt to explain the choice of any particular
style, he merely rejoiced in the fact that choice existed. But in the
following year, 1841, a book appeared which did attempt such an
explanation: Richard Brown's compendious volume, Domestic Ar-
chitecture. Here every conceivable historic style is set out: cottage
orné, Tudor, Stuart, Florentine, Flemish, Pompeian, Venetian,
Swiss, French Chateau, Egyptian, Grecian, Roman, Anglo-Grecian
(which is actually Soanic), Anglo-Italian, Persian, Chinese, Burmese,
Oriental, Morisco-Gothic, Norman, Lancastrian, Plantagenet, Palla-
dian. To assist the budding architect or patron, 'Prof.' Brown
suggests that the choice of each style should be determined by
purpose and situation. He illustrates in one view (see figure 11),
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Figure 11 Richard Brown, 'Norman, Tudor, Grecian and Roman Residences: their appropriate situation and
scenery'
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appropriate landscape settings for at least four styles: a Norman
castle in rugged mountains, a Tudor seat among bosky plantations, a
Grecian villa in rolling woodlands - with hints of Arcadia - and a
Roman (i.e. Palladian) mansion in verdant pasture - with suitable
echoes of the campagna. But for the more bizarre styles, there could
be no such explanation. Their choice was determined by romance
rather than utility. Henry Holland's Dairy at Woburn (1792) is
Chinese; Cockerell's Dairy at Sezincote (1827) is Moorish: English
architects during the Regency were simply indulging their imagina-
tions. Sezincote, Gloucestershire (c. 1805), was indeed a nabob's
retreat, but its 'Indian' style had no contextual relevance to the
Cotswolds. 'In the midst of all this', noted John Weale in 1844, 'there
was but one man, the late Sir John Soane, who dared to be positively
original. All others were mad in some particular foreign fashion; but
he alone was mad in his own way . . . there was a method in the old
knight's madness.' Indeed there was. But half the impact of Soane's
genius stems from the genius of J. M. Gandy, whose illustrations to
Soane's Royal Academy lectures provide historians with their most
eloquent commentary on the roots of Regency taste.
Gandy himself adopted an eclectic viewpoint. Imitation he
denounced as 'unworthy of modern genius'; 'a comprehensive
mind', he explains, 'will select from all sources'. Classical architects
had limited themselves to 'one particular style'; we 'moderns [must]
prepare a system selected from all tastes . . . [culled from] the
beauties of every climate and every age'. In the whole spectrum of
historic styles, Gandy believed, there must be some unifying bond;
some explanation of that elusive link between style and culture.
Without it there could be no hope of finding that architectural
philosopher's stone: a new style for a new age. Hence his diagram-
matic fantasy, Comparative Architecture (1836), an attempt to
decode the mnemonic power of style by a codification of all styles.
Here, in effect, Gandy was attempting to find a future in the past; to
trace the mystic symbolism of architectural form back to its organic
roots, back to its Natural Model (1838). Out of what he calls the
primeval 'protocol of architecture', that new style would one day
emerge, 'a symbolic system . . . perfect, durable, and universal.'
Alas, it did not emerge in Candy's own architecture. Some of his
villa designs do indeed possess a prophetic simplicity, and as such
they appealed powerfully to the Modernists of the 1930s. But in his
executed work, Gandy - just as much as any of his generation - was
locked into the Picturesque system.
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By 1844, one commentator, John Weale, was able to identify the
problem: Neo-Classicism had fallen victim to the Picturesque. In its
abstract geometry, Neo-Classicism had suggested - negatively
speaking - a way out of the historicist jungle. 'A feeling for what was
termed "classic simplicity" pervaded every art', writes Weale, 'even
our tea caddies became mere cubes of wood'. But, with the graphic
revolution, 'The introduction of our richly illustrated ANNUALS
administered more and more to that taste for picture which had
already existed; and. . .what may be termed the romance of
architecture obtained a considerable influence on the public [Sal-
vin's stables and laundry at Mamhead, Devon, 1828—33, are an
extreme example]. . . architects were now induced to leave the
academical formalities of their Greek and Latin Grammars, and to
cultivate . . . picturesque effects'. Hence 'the triumph of picture over
geometry - the conquest of poetry over mathematics'. He meant the
victory of imagination over reason; the victory of atectonic criteria
over structural harmonies; the triumph of the eye over the mind: the
triumph of the Picturesque.
The legacy of the Picturesque aesthetic was a stylistic jungle, in
which Victorian architects wrestled with the dilemma of style. The
Modernists hoped to resolve that dilemma once and for all, by
hacking down the jungle of historic form. But our instinct for
familiar images of the structural process, for ornament, for semiotic
codes, for essential inessentials, was not so easily abolished. As we
enter the Post-Functional age, the dilemma has surely returned.
NOTE
J. Mordaunt Crook, The Dilemma of Style: Architectural Ideas from the
Picturesque to the Post-Modem (London: John Murray (publishers) Ltd,
1987; paperback edn. 1989), from which all quotations in this chapter are
derived.
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Parle style on atteint au sublime: thé
meaning of the term 'style' in French
architectural theory of the late eighteenth
century
CAROLINE A. VAN ECK
Style has been a somewhat vexed topic in architecture since the
classical style, based on the treatises of Vitruvius, Alberti, and
Palladio, lost its monopoly at the end of the eighteenth century. 'In
which style should we build?' was the way the German architect
Heinrich Hübsch formulated the problem in 1828, and even now his
question has lost nothing of its force.1 When we read Hübsch's
pamphlet, we are confronted with a phenomenon that occurs time
and again in nineteenth-century architecture: the demand for a new
style, which for Hübsch should be the result of climate, available
building materials and the state of technology, and which ought to
possess the same eternal and universal validity as the classical style,
is not fulfilled. Instead, we receive the dusty answer of a revival of
Romanesque architecture.
How did this situation arise? What had happened since the time
when the choice was not so much between several styles of building,
but rather between architecture and non-architecture, because the
paradigm of the classical tradition reigned supreme?2 Studies of the
dilemma of style in the nineteenth century usually explain the
erosion of the classical tradition and the subsequent rise of stylistic
pluralism by drawing attention to the consequences of Renaissance
individualism and of the Picturesque movement in British aesthetics
at the end of the eighteenth century.3 Also, Wittkower has drawn
attention to the importance of the rise of Empiricism with its stress on
the subjective, sensational character of beauty for the loss of under-
standing of the philosophical background of Renaissance aesthetics.4
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However, another way of understanding the erosion of the
classical tradition as the only architectural paradigm and the rise of
architectural pluralism, which I wish to explore here, is to take a
closer look at the way the notion of style itself developed in the years
from 1750 to 1800. This is a new way approach: usually, in studies
of the role of style in nineteenth-century architecture, the meaning of
that central concept is not questioned. It is used in the usual art-
historical way of designating period styles on the basis of formal
characteristics. Here, rather than starting from generally received
notions about style as they were formulated at the end of the
nineteenth century, I will concentrate on eighteenth-century sources.
In doing so, I will concentrate on the theoretical writings of Germain
Boffrand, Jacques-Francois Blondel, and Antoine-Chrysostome Qua-
tremère de Quincy, whose work has received comparatively little
critical attention. What did these late eighteenth-century architects
and architectural theorists themselves understand by the term
'style'?
When we try to give an answer to this question, it turns out that
style was understood not primarily in visual or constructional terms,
or in the sense of historical style, but in poetical or rhetorical terms.5
Thus, Boffrand stresses the close parallel between poetry and
architecture, which enables him to use Horace's Ars Poëtica as a
precept for architecture. And Blondel's use of the word 'style' in his
Cours d'architecture of 1771 shows a striking resemblance to that of
the article in the Encyclopédie of Diderot and d'Alembert, which
offers a rhetorical elucidation of style.6
Therefore, I will defend the following two theses: in the first place,
the awareness of the rhetorical content of the term 'style' suggests a
new approach to the downfall of Vitruvianism. I will argue (in
section II) that the rhetorisation of architecture, as it manifests itself
in the meaning attached to the term 'style' may very well have been
an important, but until now neglected, factor in the gradual erosion
of the classical doctrine. Wittkower for instance in his seminal work
on the architectural principles of the Renaissance completely
ignores the role of rhetoric, both in the formation of these principles
and in their subsequent erosion. For example, although he mentions
that Daniele Barbaro, who published an important edition of
Vitruvius, was very well versed in Aristotelian rhetoric, he comple-
tely ignores the role of rhetoric in Barbaro's commentary, although
he does discuss the Aristotelian and Platonic elements in it.7
My second thesis is that we can observe a fundamental change in
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the meaning of the term 'style' in the last quarter of the eighteenth
century: from the rhetorical meaning we find in Boffrand and
Blondel to a view of style as character in the writings of Quatremère
de Quincy, expressing circumstances such as climate or period that
determine a building. Style thereby becomes the key notion or guide
in the interpretation of architecture (section III). In the last section of
my essay, I will try to show how these two theses are related to each
other. Thus, by looking at the way in which 'style' was introduced in
architectural theory, we are able to gain new insights into its
meaning, and into the reasons why it became so important in the
nineteenth century.
II
Filarete used the interrelated terms 'stile' and 'maniera' already
around 1460, when he spoke of style as a means to recognise an
artist.8 The term was applied to painting and sculpture from the time
of Poussin onwards.9 The very first mention of the term in an
architectural context probably occurred in 1578, in documents
related to the completion of San Petronio in Bologna.10 A century
later, Guarino Guarini uses the term 'ordine' ('ordine gotico' for
instance) in his discussions of Gothic architecture, when he talks
about architecture alone, but 'style' when he places architecture in
the context of the other arts.11 The term started to be employed
frequently in architecture probably as late as 1714 in the United
Kingdom, and in France from 1750 onwards. An instance of the
British use can be found in the writings of Sir Christopher Wren,
who used terms like 'style' and 'manner' in his proposal for the
completion of Westminster Abbey: for instance, when speaking of
Gothic building:
This we now call the Gothic Manner of Architecture (so the Italians called
what was not after the Roman Style) tho' the Goths were rather Destroyers
than Builders; I think it should with more Reason be called the Saracen
Style.
And:
I have made a Design, which will not be very expensive but light and still in
the Gothic Form, and of a Style with the rest of the Structure, which I would
strictly adhere to, throughout the whole Intention: to deviate from the old
Form, would be to run into a disagreeable Mixture, which no person of a
good Taste could relish.12
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Well into the eighteenth century, different types of architecture
were described in terms of the architectural 'order' rather than in
terms of style. In France, Cordemoy's Nouveau traite' de toute
l'architecture (1714) does not contain an entry on 'style' in the
glossary attached to it. Instead, terms like 'goût', 'manière' or 'genre'
were used. And Montesquieu spoke in the same vein in his work on
Gothic architecture of the 'goût' or 'ordre gothique'.13
It is not before Germain Boffrand's Livre d'architecture (1745) that
we find the term if not applied to, at least closely associated with
architecture:
The arts and sciences are so closely connected, that the principles of one
group are the principles of the other; Architecture, although it seems that its
object is the use of matter only, is capable of different genres that make the
parts (so to speak) animated by the characters it makes perceptible. A building
expresses by its composition as if on a stage, that the scene is pastoral or tragic
. . . These various buildings must announce their destination to the spectator
by their structure, by the way they are decorated; if they do not do this, they
sin against expression and are not what they should be.
It is the same with Poetry: there are various genres, and the style of one
genre is not convenient for another genre.14
Boffrand, who was a nephew of Quinault and wrote plays in his
youth, compares architecture with theatre sets. Thereby it becomes
parlante, and part of a literary genre. He even speaks of the orders as
if they were literary genres:15 'The Orders of Architecture used in the
works of the Greeks and the Romans are for the various categories of
buildings, what the various poetical genres are in the various
subjects of poetry.'16
It then seems a small and logical step to apply to architecture the
same rules as to poetry or drama: the precepts of rhetoric. An
example is the stress on the appropriate use of ornament, in
accordance with the genre of caractère of the building. This is
comparable to the rhetorical attention, guided by the notion of decor
(that which is fitting or appropriate),17 to the correspondence of the
styles of speaking (the genera dicendi) with the occasion, purpose,
and audience of the speech.18
This should not be confused with what Peter Collins calls 'the
linguistic analogy' in his Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture.
Collins is concerned with the notion that the parts of a building can
be compared to the parts of speech, or that architectural styles can be
compared to languages since they both possess a syntax and a
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vocabulary. But my concern here is not with interdisciplinary
analogies, but with the (consequences of) the application of the
terminological apparatus of rhetoric to architecture, and especially
with the consequences for Virtuvian theory of the importation of the
rhetorical significance of the term 'style'. Also, in my opinion
Collins exaggerates when he says that Boffrand 'extracted a whole
theory of architecture from Horace's Ars Poëtica'. Boffrand's theory
is firmly based on the Vitruvian theory of the orders (see his
Introduction); he uses Horace only to make his precepts of design
explicit.19
Boffrand is part of a tradition that goes back to Alberti when he
stresses the theatrical character of architecture. We find the same
view of architecture as a stage setting for public life in Alberti's use
of the triumphal arch for the facade of S. Andrea in Mantua.20
Because Boffrand is convinced of the similarity between poetry
and architecture, he applies the precepts of Horace's Ars Poëtica to
the latter.21 He tacitly translates linguistic terms such as 'words'
(verba) and 'syllables' (syllaba) with architectural terms such as
'parts' (parties) and 'profiles' (profils). Also, he compares the
decorative parts of a building (profiles, mouldings - profils,
moulures) with the words of language. In this as well, he follows a
practice that can be traced back to Alberti, who transposes the
terminology of literary composition to the field of painting. For
instance, he defines composition, originally a rhetorical term, as
'that procedure in painting whereby the parts are composed together
in a picture. The great work of the painter is the "historia"; parts of
the "historia" are the bodies, part of the body is the member, and
part of the member is a surface.'22
Also, he quotes with approval Horace's famous tag si vis me flere
to stress that every building should be designed in accordance with
its nature and function. Music rooms should be smiling by their
layout, lighting, and decoration; but mausoleums should be treated
in a serious and solemn manner; because 'nature has made our heart
sensitive to these various impressions, and it is always moved by
harmony'.23
A clear example of what this means in practice is Bofffand's most
famous work, the Rococo decorations for the apartments of the
Princesse de Soubise in the Hôtel de Soubise (now Archives
Nationales) in Paris dating from 1735 to 1736.24 These can be
considered as an exponent of the movement away from the
formalities of the Court of Versailles to the greater informality of the
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hôtels particuliers which was one of the contributing factors of the
rise of the Rococo style (of which Boffrand was one of the creators).
They are an example of the new 'style pittoresque' in which the first
concern was not for correct proportions, but for the effect of the
decorations on the visitor, and on the expression of the informal,
private character of the apartments.
The first direct application in French architectural theory of the
term 'style' to architecture occurs in Blondel's Cours d'architecture
of 1771, and here we can see very clearly that style is understood in
rhetorical terms:
By Style in Architecture is meant the true genre which one must choose,
with respect to the motive which led to the construction of the building.
The style in the ordonnance of the façade, and in the decoration of the
apartments, is properly speaking the poetry of architecture, which alone
contributes in making all the compositions of an Architect interesting; it is
the style, proper to every kind of building that brings with it that infinite
variety in buildings of the same kind, and of different kinds. The style can
equally well paint the sacred genre, the heroic and the pastoral genre; style
can express in particular the character: regular or irregular, simple or
composed, symmetrical or varied; and finally by the style one arrives at the
sublime.25
For Blondel 'style' seems to have a rather 'interdisciplinary'
meaning. It is the poetry of architecture, but it can also paint the
genre and character of the building. In calling style the poetry of
architecture, Blondel perhaps echoes similar remarks Trévoux had
made on the function and the 'poetry of style'. Style, according to
Trévoux, is the 'soul of the discourse', through which the writer
attracts the attention of the mind. In the same way, for Blondel the
style attracts the eye and the mind of the beholder.26
Style plays a guiding and unifying role: once the architect has
decided upon the style of the building - in relation to the purpose or
reason of the building - all the further decisions on the articulation
of the facade and the choice of ornament have to be determined in
harmony with this style.27 But the style not only determines choices
in formal design; it also regulates the impression the building makes
on the beholder, in painting the genre - sacred, heroic, or pastoral -
and in giving expression to the character.28
Now let us pause for a moment to consider the implications of
Boffrand's and Blondel's view of style. It is striking to see how both
Boffrand and Blondel take a literary and rhetorical view of style.
Boffrand closely associates poetry and architecture. Both have
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different genres: poetry can be tragic, comic, or bucolic, and
architecture can be pastoral or sacred; in architecture, these different
genres are expressed by the orders. Of course Boffrand is not the first
one to make this association: Alsted for instance says in his
Encyclopedia of 1630 that 'columns are to the architect, what the
modes are to the musician and the genres (carminum genera) to the
poet'.29
All this is perfectly in line with the rhetorical division of the
creative process in inventio, dispositie·, and elocutio (architecture of
course is not concerned with memoria and actio), and with the
central place that rhetoric gives to considerations of the character,
goal, and audience of a speech. The material and the means of
expression must be ordered by reference to decor, the overall notion
of what is appropriate to the situation, the public and the matter at
hand. When this rhetorical apparatus is transposed to architecture it
means that the design of the building, and especially the selection of
ornament, is regulated by considerations of decor. Boffrand con-
tinues a line of thought that had originated with Vitruvius and
Alberti, who both applied the terminological apparatus of rhetoric to
the theory of architecture.30 But Boffrand introduces a new element
because he gives a new interpretation of the proportions, different
from the significance they were given in the Renaissance, as a
reflection of the proportions of the universe. Instead, Boffrand allows
them to be determined by 'their character and by the impression they
have to make' (italics added).31
Blondel adds to the literary vision of architecture we find in
Boffrand a decidedly rhetorical interpretion: style, or genre, deter-
mines in architecture all the decisions in design; style gives colour
and expression to the character of the building. This recalls one of
the basic assumptions of rhetoric, the distinction of the ratio
verborum and the ratio rerum, between thought and its formula-
tion.32 But it also recalls Buffon's famous discourse on style of 1750,
in which he stresses that the choice of style should be determined by
a previously made plan of the work.
Both for Boffrand and for Blondel - and here we reach the heart of
the matter - style is a regulative and unifying notion by which the
design of a building is guided in such a way that we can recognise its
function, genre, and character. The decision on the style of a
building entails a system of possible choices of the ordonnance of
the facade, the use of ornament and the disposition of the parts of the
building. Thereby, style becomes the general concept, so to speak, by
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which the spectator is enabled to interpret or 'read' the building
correctly. The notion of 'style' seems to perform the same regulative
and unifying function in the late eighteenth century as the concept
of decor or aptum did in Antiquity and the Renaissance.33 By now,
the emphasis is entirely on the effect of the building on the
spectator. In this context a short remark of Blondel on the role of the
orders is very revealing: 'by keeping of those orders simply their
expression, which would bring on the stage now a grave and sublime
style, now a masculine and terrible genre'.34
The rhetorical view of style of Boffrand and Blondel implies a
strong emphasis on the emotional effects of architecture. For them,
style is the poetry of architecture, which alone can make a building
literally 'interesting': that is, which can establish an affective bond
between the spectator and the building.
This corresponds with the tendency (which started with Cicero) to
consider movere, exciting emotions, as the most important of the
three officia oratoris (the other two being docere, to instruct, and
delectare, to entertain or to delight). But by borrowing from rhetoric
this concentration on the emotional effects of the building on the
spectator, one part of Renaissance aesthetics, namely the notion that
beauty is based on mathematical proportions, is being overruled by
the other part, namely the rhetorical concentration on the emotional
impact of the work of art on its public.35 Whereas these two parts
existed together harmoniously in the Renaissance, the emotional
impact of a building is now preferred at the cost of its mathematical
proportions.
The dominance of the emphasis on expression is in sharp contrast
to the Classical and Renaissance attitude to architectural composi-
tion in general and to the use of the orders in particular. According
to Vitruvius, the form and structure of a building should be based on
its proportions. These are based on geometrical relations which are
everywhere present in the universe. This idea is symbolised in the
homo quadratus.36 For Alberti, the author of the first treatise on
architecture of the Renaissance, which was extremely influential,
beauty in architecture is the result of concinnitas. This is a rhetorical
term, whose original meaning could be rendered as 'elegant or
skilful joining of several things', and by transposition as 'beauty of
style, resulting from a skilful connection of words and clauses'.
Alberti used it in De re aedificatoria to refer to an inherent quality of
a building, consisting in the purposive unity of the parts with each
other and the whole, based on the 'first and absolute law of nature.'37
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Architecture should be designed in accordance with the purposive
unity that is the mark of Divine creation in the universe.38 But
architectural beauty is also based on ornamentum, in Alberti's
words 'a form of auxiliary light and complement to beauty . . . it has
the character of something attached or additional'.39 Beauty is
intellectual; ornament appeals to the senses. Now what happens in
the eighteenth century is that with the increasing concentration on
movere, beauty based on ornament gained the upper hand at the cost
of the notion of mathematical, inherent, intellectual beauty.
Therefore, the emphasis Blondel gives to the expressive role of style
in architecture enables us to approach the downfall of Vitruvianism
from the new angle. Usually, this process is explained by pointing to
the crucial role in it of the representationalist epistemology of British
Empiricism. When beauty, according to Empiricist philosophy,
evidently belongs to the category of secondary qualities (which are
not present as such in the object, but only as dispositions), it can no
longer be maintained that beauty is an inherent property of buildings,
based on mathematical proportions.40 Burke for instance remarks that
'if proportion be one of the constituents of beauty, it must derive that
power either from some natural properties inherent in certain
measures, which operate mechanically; from the operation of custom;
or from the fitness which some measures have to answer some
particular ends of conveniency'41 and then proceeds to refute all these
possibilities. And Hogarth considers the cause of beauty to lie in the
mind: 'The active mind is ever bent to be employ'd. Pursuing is the
business of our lives . . . The eye hath this sort of enjoyment in
winding walks, and serpentine rivers . . . that lead the eye a wanton
kind of chace, and from the pleasure that it gives the mind, intitles it to
the name of beautiful.'42
In this context, it is revealing to note that Blondel was greatly
influenced by British models in his own theoretical work, and that
he had an equal veneration for the works of Newton, Wren, and
Locke.43 But as we have seen, the increasing concentration on the
emotional impact of architecture, as it manifests itself in the
meaning attached to the term 'style', has probably been an equally
important factor in the gradual erosion of the classical doctrine.
Ill
The rhetorical significance of the term 'style' which we discussed in
the last section did not stay unchanged for long. We can observe a
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further, logical development of its significance in this period in the
work of Antoine-Chrysostome Quatremère de Quincy. He devoted
an article to style in the volumes on architecture of the Encyclopedie
méthodique of 1788-1825. The meaning of style changed from the
rhetorical meaning we have found in the work of Boffrand and
Blondel to a view of style as character, expressing the circumstances
such a climate or period that determine a building. Quatremère is
important in this context because he is probably the only French
author in this period to write so explicitly about style and its diverse
meanings in the context of both art history and theory. Also, in view
of the close relationships between his work and that of pioneers of
art history and archaeology such as Winckelmann and Caylus, his
writings on style are crucial to understand the development that led
to the birth of art history as a science at the end of the eighteenth
century.44
According to Quatremère, the notion of style was taken from the
arts du discours, where it has two meanings. In the first place, style
is the form a writer gives to his thoughts according to the nature of
the subject, the effect he wants to produce, and the harmony
between the goal he has set himself and the means to reach it. This is
traditionally the domain of rhetoric, and Quatremère refers the
reader to reference books on rhetoric for more details.
In the second place, style is the expression of individuality of a
work of art, of its caractère:
According to the second point of view, the word 'style' signifies, in a much
more generally accepted sense, that typical and characteristic form, which
very general causes impress on products of the mind . . . Style, as we say,
becomes synonymous with character, or with the individual manner (la
manière propre) of the distinctive physionomy which belongs to each work
of art, to each author, each genre, each school, each country, each period.45
Style thus becomes for Quatremère the language to express character.
It is perfectly natural that the visual arts have taken over this
rhetorical or literary notion of style, because the visual arts have to
be considered as a language or a way of writing anyway: they are
always trying to give a material, tangible form to ideas, to intellectual
relations, moral affections or to the products of the imagination.
Therefore, by a process of metonymia, the idea of the mechanical
activity of a writing instrument is transferred to an activity of the
mind, namely the 'art of expressing one's ideas in the signs of
writing'.46 Thus, style refers to the most mechanical as well as to the
most spiritual of human activities: on the one hand, it signifies the
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instrument that gives tangible form and colour to our thoughts by
means of graphic signs, but on the other it signifies the conception of
ideas and the art of putting them into words.
Although architecture at first sight seems to have very little in
common with the art of writing, the rhetorical meaning of the term
style, concerned with the formal choices the artist makes to give
material form to his or her ideas, is nevertheless very apposite,
because architecture is so much concerned with giving material
form to ideas.47
Herein resides the new element of Quatremère's view of style: on
the one hand he still adheres to the traditional, rhetorical notion of
the form of the content, the material clothing of thought, but on the
other hand, he identifies it with character, which for Quatremere is
the expression of the circumstances that are attached to every work
of art. But style is the language or vocabulary of forms with which
character can be expressed. It is therefore no longer the guiding and
unifying notion, operative in the design process, that it was for
Boffrand and Blondel, but it acquires a new function: that of the
chief instrument of historical classification. In the rising science of
art history, works of art began to be studied with the aim of
classifying them chronologically and geographically on the basis of
characteristics that are the result or the expression of the circum-
stances, such as climate or the availability of certain materials that
contributed to their creation. Now these characteristics are identified
by Quatremere with the style of a work of art.48
In my view, Quatremere occupies a very central and somewhat
Janus-faced position in the development of the pluralism of
architectural styles which started after 1800. On the one hand, in
his rhetorical interpretation of style as a codification of the ways
of giving a tangible form to ideas he looks back to the rhetorical
tradition; but on the other hand, by his identification of style with
character, he makes possible the art-historical use of style as an
instrument of historical classification. And, perhaps the most far-
reaching consequence of this identification, he has shown that
style in architecture can no longer be the same, eternal, un-
changing Vitruvian aesthetics of proportion: it has to be the
individual expression of the age, the country and even the climate.
Thereby he completes a development that began with the use by
Alberti of rhetoric in the theory of the visual arts, which led in the
eighteenth century to an increasing stress on the emotional, and
therefore subjective and contingent, impact of architecture at the
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cost of an eternal, universally valid beauty based on mathematical
proportions.
IV
And so we have reached the point at which we started: Hübsch's
concept of style as a contemporary expression of the country, the
climate and the indigenous materials, which would lead after 1800
to the unfulfilled need for a style that would be an adequate and
zeitgemäß alternative to Vitruvianism. To conclude, I will try to
shed some light on the relations between my two theses. The first
one concerned the rhetorical significance of 'style' in the work of
Boffrand and Blondel and its role in the downfall of Vitruvianism;
the second one was about the change of meaning of the term 'style'
in the work of Quatremere. At first sight, they may seem to
contradict each other. The rhetorical significance of style can be seen
as a contribution to the erosion of the classical tradition, which
regards architectural beauty as timeless and unchanging. By the
increasing stress on the subjective character of beauty, architectural
beauty becomes contingent, changeable, and subject to history and
taste.
The increasing stress on the subjective character of beauty can be
explained by drawing attention to the influence of British Empiri-
cism on aesthetics, but also, as I have shown, by taking into account
the role of rhetoric in the theory of architecture with its stress on the
emotional impact of a building at the cost of the importance given to
mathematical proportions as the cause of beauty. This may seem to
make architectural beauty a matter of individual taste, irreducible to
the general concepts and categories of art history. But it can also be
regarded as the connection with the art-historical use of style by
Quatremere as the major instrument of the historian of art. Since
style no longer seems to be a part of the classical theory of art that
regards beauty as based on timeless, universal, and eternal princi-
ples, but as the contingent expression of time, place, and other
circumstances that determine the work of art, style can acquire a
heuristic function for the historian of art as an instrument of
classification. Thus we see in Quatremere that his notion of style is
that of an instrument of historical classification. By its style, a
building expresses the circumstances that led to its construction. But
at the same time, the imperative for architecture to have a style also
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condemns it to acknowledge the contingent character of that style,
subject to the changes of time and taste.
Therefore, the nineteenth-century quest for a style of its own, for
which the foundation was laid at the end of the eighteenth century,
was a quest for the impossible, because the two notions of style that
were underlying it are irreconcilable. It is impossible to develop a
style which is both immutable, universal, and eternal, like the
classical style, and at the same time a historical, and therefore
changeable expression of the age in which it is developed.49
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build?' The German Debate on Architectural Style (Santa Monica: The
Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1992), Introduc-
tion,
2 Compare E. S. De Beer, 'Gothic: Origin and Diffusion of the Term',
Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 11 (1948), p. 156: 'For
the silence of the architectural authors [on stylistic terms] there is a fairly
obvious reason. They were writing for practical ends. The only style in
use was the classical (or revival classicism); anything else could scarcely
rank as architecture. Gothic was not an alternative, even if it had
occasionally to be employed. The antithesis is not so much Roman and
Gothic as architecture and non-architecture.
The only admissible explanation of the absence of stylistic terms in
these writers [viz. educated travellers in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries] appears to be that they had not met with the idea of
architectural styles.'
But there could be another possible explanation: We do find mention
of the term 'style' as early as 1460 in the work of Filarete, applied to
poetry or painting. (Compare G. Germann, Gothic Revival in Europe and
Britain: Sources, Influences and Ideas (London: Lund Humphries, 1972),
pp. 11-12) Could it be the case during the Renaissance that people
simply thought architecture not to be a discipline to which terms like
style (or maniera) could be applied?
3 J. M. Crook, The Dilemma of Style. Architectural Ideas from the
Picturesque to the Post-Modem (London: John Murray 1989 (1987)), ch.
1, 'The Consequences of the Picturesque', and especially pp. 30—1.
4 R. Wittkower, Architectural Principles in the Age of Humanism (New
York/London: Academy Editions/St. Martin's Press 1971 (1949)), pp.
150-3.
5 See for example the conclusions of W. Szambien's Symétrie goût
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occurs for the first time in France in Chateaubriand's Génie du
Christianisme (III. 8).
6 The rhetorisation of architectural theory - ut poësis architectura, so to
speak - has received very scant critical attention. An exception is H.
Muhlmann's Aesthetische Theorie der Renaissance. Leon Battista Alberti
(Bonn: Halbelt Verlag, 1981), who studies the rhetorical elements of
Alberti's De re aedificatoria. The analogies between architecture and
poetry, especially in English literary criticism of the seventeenth and
eighteenth century, have been studied by A. Fowler in his 'Periodization
and Interart Analogies', New Literary History 3, pp. 487-511, by P. Palme
in his 'Ut architectura poësis' in Idea and Form. Studies in the History of
Art (Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, N.S. 1, 1959), pp. 95-108, and in B.
Nugel's The fust Design. Studien zur architektonischen Vorstellungs-
weisen in der neoklassischen Literaturtheorie am Beispiel Englands
(Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1980). But studies on the relations
between architecture and rhetoric, comparable to the chapters in B.
Vickers' In Defence of Rhetoric (Oxford University Press, 1990 (1988))
devoted to the function of rhetoric in the development of a terminolo-
gical apparatus for painting and music are extremely rare. A synthesis of
much of the work that has been done in this field, together with many
new perspectives is C. Smith's Architecture in the Culture of Early
Humanism. Ethics, Aesthetics, and Eloquence 1400-1470 (New York/
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992).
7 See Wittkower, Architectural Principles, pp. 66 ff.
8 'E cosi d'ogni facultà si conosce lo stile di ciascheduno'. See Germann,
Gothic Revival, pp. 11-12. The quotation can be found in Filarete's
Treatise on Architecture, Being the Treatise by Antonio di Piero
Averlino, Known as Filarete, translated with an introduction and notes
by J. R. Spencer, 2 vols. (New Haven and London: Yale University Press,
1968), vol. I. p. 12, corresponding to book I, fol. 5v. Compare also J.
Onians, Bearers of Meaning. The Classical Orders in Antiquity, the
Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Cambridge University Press, 1988), p.
163.
9 E. Panofsky, Idea. Ein Beitrag zur Begriffsgeschichte der älteren
Kunsttheorie (Berlin: Wissenschaftsverlag Volker Spies, 1960 (1924)), pp.
115η. 224.
10 Germann, Gothic Revival, pp. 12-13.
11 Ibid., pp. 16.
12 Ibid., p. 24.
13 See J.-L. Cordemoy, Nouveau traite' de toute l'architecture ou l'art de
bastir (Paris: n.p., 1714 [1706]) and Szambien, Symétrie goût caractère, p.
200 n. 4 (= Montesquieu, De la manière gothique in Œuvres complètes, 4
vols., vol. I, p. 966, Paris: Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, 1951).
14 Boffrand, Livre d'architecture (Paris: G. Cavelier père, 1745), p. 16: 'Les
sciences & les Arts ont un si grand rapport, que les principes des uns sont
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les principes des autres; l'Architecture, quoi qu'il semble que son objet
ne soit que l'emploi de ce qui est matériel, est susceptible de differens
genres qui rendent les parties, pour ainsi dire, animées par les différents
caractères qu'elle fait sentir. Un Edifice pas sa composition exprime
comme sur un Théâtre, que la scène est Pastorale ou Tragique . . . Ces
différents Edifices par leur disposition, par leur structure, par la manière
dont ils sont décorés, doivent annoncer au spectateur leur destination: et
s'ils ne le font pas, ils pèchent contre l'expression, et ne sont pas ce qu'ils
doivent être.
Il en est de même de la Poesie: il y en a de différents genres, et le stile
de l'un ne convient pas à l'autre'. (As with all other eighteenth-century
quotations in this chapter, I have left Boffrand's somewhat inconsistent
spelling unchanged.
On Boffrand see L. Hautecoueur, Histoire de l'architecture classique en
France, T. III (Première moitié' du xviiie siècle. Le style Louis XV) (Paris:
Auguste Picard, éditeur, 1950), pp. 124-40 and M. Gallet and J. Garnis
eds., Germain Boffrand (1667-1754). L'Aventure d'un architecte indé-
pendant (Paris: Herscher, 1986). See also a passage in J.-F. BlondePs
Cours d'architecture, ou traité de la décoration, distribution et construc-
tion des bâtiments, 7 vols. (Paris: Desaint, 1771-7), vol. II, p. 231; 'en ne
retenant de ces ordres que leur simple expression, qui ameneroit sur
scène, tantôt un style grave et sublime, tantôt un genre mâle ou terrible'.
Notice how he uses the terms of the rhetorical genera dicendi (gravis,
sublimis, tenuis) to define styles.
15 Boffrand does not compare the Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian orders with
the three rhetorical genera dicendi (gravis, tenuis, and sublimis) or styles
as some authors do, such as K. Borinski in his Die Antike in Poetik und
Kunsttheorie (Leipzig: Dieterich, 1914), pp. 143 ff. As Mühlmann has
pointed out in his Ästhetische Theorie (p. 86, n. 101), this is impossible
because the distinction between the lowly (tenuis) level of style and the
sublime or elevated level cannot be made when speaking of the orders of
architecture. By their use a building is ipso facto transposed into the
sphere of the genus sublime. On the analogy between building types and
literary genres see Fowler, 'Periodization and Interart Analogies', pp. 502
ff.
16 Boffrand, Livre d'architecture, p. 24: 'Les Ordres d'Architecture em-
ployés dans les ouvrages des Grecs et des Romains, sont pour les
differens genres d'édifices, ce que les différents genres de Poésie sont
dans les différents sujets qu'elle veut traiter'.
17 See for instance Aristotle, Rhetoric, 3.7.1-5 (1408a).
18 The juxtaposition in this passage by Boffrand of genre, which here recalls
the rhetorical meaning of genus dicendi, in Greek: χαρακτήρ, and caractère
might shed some new light on the interpretation of the last term: might it
be the case that the origins of its use in architecture do not lie exclusively
in psychology, or physiognomy (such as Lavater's theories), as is
suggested by Szambien, Symétrie goût caractère, p. 178, or in the
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attention to character in biology at that time, but in rhetoric? In order to
answer that question, we would have to determine the relation between
the Greek term χαρακτήρ and the Latin genus, and we would have to
determine whether writers on architecture from the Renaissance
onwards were familiar with this Greek equivalent for genus dicendi.
Another fact however that points in the direction of a rhetorical origin of
caractère is that the original meaning of the Greek equivalent of the Latin
decor/decorum, το πρέπον, based on the Greek verb πρέπώ, is something
like 'to be seen clearly, to be conspicuous', and hence came to refer to
what is characteristic in a thing. See J. J. Pollitt, The Ancient View of
Greek Art: Criticism, History and Terminology (New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1974), pp. 341-7. However, to go into this would
far exceed the bounds of the problem here at hand.
19 P. Collins, Changing Ideals in Modern Architecture (London: Faber and
Faber, 1965), pp. 173-82. The passage on Boffrand occurs on p. 174.
20 Mühlmann, Ästhetische Theorie, pp. 106-7 and 138. The same concen-
tration on the theatrical or stage-setting aspects of architecture can be
found in N. Le Camus de Mézières' Le Génie de l'architecture ou
l'analogie de cet art avec nos sensations (Paris: chez l'auteur, 1780), pp.
4 ff. See also R. Sasselin, 'Architecture and Language: The Sensation-
alism of Le Camus de Mézières', British Journal of Aesthetics 15 (1975),
pp. 239-53.
21 Boffrand, Livre d'architecture, p. 17: 'quoiqu'il n'ait jamais pensé à
l'Architecture, il m'a paru qu'ils y avoient tant de rapport, que j'ai crû
qu'on pouvoit les y joindre, et en faire une très-juste application à ceux
qui nous ont été donnés pour l'Architecture par les Anciens et les
Modernes, & qu'ils pourraient encore les enrichir d'un caractère plus
sublime'.
22 See L. B. Alberti, On Painting and Sculpture. The Latin Texts of De
Pictura and De Statua, edited with a translation and notes by C. Grayson
(London: Phaidon Press, 1972), p. 72 and Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric,
p. 342.
23 Boffrand, Livre d'architecture, p. 27: 'la nature forme notre cœur
susceptible de ces différentes impressions, & il est toujours remué par
l'unison'. In this he seems to be very close to the ideas of Le Camus de
Mézières, who used the motto 'Non satis est placuisse oculis, nisi pectora
tanges / C'est peu de plaire aux yeux, il faut émouvoir l'âme' for his Le
Génie de l'architecture.
24 See Gallet and Garnis, Germain Boffrand, pp. 46-7,108-9 and 221-35.
25 Blondel, Coure d'architecture, vol. I, p. 401: 'Par Style en Architecture,
on entend le véritable genre dont on doit faire choix, relativement au
motif qui fait élever l'édifice. Le style dans l'ordonnance des façades, et
dans la décoration des appartements, est proprement la poésie de
l'Architecture, qui seul contribue à rendre toutes les compositions d'un
Architecte véritablement intéressantes: c'est le style propre à chaque
espèce de bâtiment qui amène cette variété infinie dans les édifices du
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même genre, et de genres différents; le style peut peindre également le
genre sacré, héroïque et pastoral, exprimer en particulier le caractère
régulier ou irrégulier, simple ou composé, simétrique ou varié; enfin par
le style on atteint au sublime, on parvient à la convenance, à l'expression;
en un mot à ce degré de perfection du ressort de toutes les productions
d'un Architecte. See also vol. I, pp. 183 and 391-2. On Blondel see R.
Middleton, 'Jacques-Francois Blondel and the Cours d'architecture',
Journal of the Society of Architectural Historians 18 (1959), pp. 140-8.
26 See the Dictionnaire de Trévoux (Paris, 1771), quoted in P.-E. Knabe,
Schlüsselbegriffe des kunsttheoretischen Denkens in Frankreich von der
Spa'tklassik bis zum Ende der Aufklärung (Düsseldorf: Schwann, 1972),
s.v. Style.: 'Le style . . . est en quelque sorte l'âme du discours, l'attrait et
le charme qui soutient l'attention de l'esprit.'
27 According to Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, p. 366, decorum performed
a comparable unifying function in music.
28 This passage is one of the longest and most explicit on style in French
architectural theory of this period. Brief mention of style is also made by
Blondel in a passage in which he juxtaposes style and character: 'Nous
allons donner l'idée précise que doivent produire à l'imagination des
spectateurs tous les divers membres de l'Architecture . . . C'est par le
secours de ces nuances imperceptibles qu'on parvient à mettre une
distinction réelle dans les projets des deux bâtiments du même genre
mais qui néanmoins doivent s'annoncer différemment, en préférant dans
l'un un style sublime . . . dans l'autre un caractère naïf, simple, vrai (vol.
I, p. 373).
29 Quoted by U. Schutte, ' "Als wenn eine ganze Ordnung da stünde . . . "
Anmerkungen zum System der Säulenordnungen und seiner Auflösung
im späten 18. Jahrhundert', Zeitschrift für Kunstgeschichte 44 (1981), p.
32, n. 89. See also G. Pochât, Geschichte der Ästhetik und Kunsttheorie.
Von der Antike bis zum 19. Jahrhundert (Köln: Dumont Verlag, 1986), p.
311.
30 See on the role of decor for instance Vitruvius, De architectura libri
decem, VI.5. 1-3 and Alberti, De re aedificatoria, IX, 157v-159v and
170V-172. The application of rhetoric to the theory of architecture by
Vitruvius is based on the conviction, which he shared with Cicero, that
the sciences and arts, including architecture, share the same roots. See
Vitruvius I.i.12 and Cicero, De oratore ΠΙ.νΐ.21. and Pro Archia 1.2. We
find the same conviction in the Renaissance: Daniele Barbaro for instance
in his edition of Vitruvius gives a detailed analysis of the key notions of
Vitruvian theory to show that they are really identical to those of
rhetoric: p. 23 of the Latin edition (Venice: apud Franciscum Francis-
cium Senensem, &· loan. Crugher Germanum, 1567). Barbaro also
published, with a commentary, the Latin translation by his uncle
Ermolao Barbaro of Aristotle's Rhetoric in 1544. See A. Horn-Oncken,
Über das Schickliche. Studien zur Geschichte der Architekturtheorie I
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(Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), pp. 100 and 110 ff., and
Wittkower, Architectural Principles, p. 66.
31 Boffrand, Livre d'architecture, p. 25: 'Ces ordres d'Architecture . . . ont
des proportions relatives à leur caractère & à l'impression qu'elles
doivent faire'.
32 See for instance Cicero, De oratore III.55-73.
33 See for example the way the notion of decor functions in Horace's Ars
Poëtica, 100-6,115,156 ff.
34 See note 14.
35 See Vickers, In Defence of Rhetoric, pp. 346-51 and 362.
36 Compare for instance Vitruvius, De architectara, III.i.3-9.
37 De re aedificatoria IX.5 and VII.5 quoted from J. Rykwert, N. Leach and
R. Tavernor trans., Leon Battista Albert}. On the Art of Building in Ten
Books (Cambridge, Mass/London: The MIT Press, 1991), pp. 302 and
199.
38 In proposing purposive unity rather than the use of modular proportion
as the defining characteristic of concinnitas, I differ considerably from
generally accepted interpretations - such as Wittkower's or Orlandi's
and Portoghesi's - of that central term in Alberti's philosophy of
architecture. See van Eck, Organicism in Nineteenth-Century Architec-
ture. An Inquiry into its Theoretical and Philosophical Background
(Amsterdam: Architecture & Natura Press, 1994), pp. 43-57 for an
extended defence of my interpretation.
39 Alberti, De re aedificatoria VI.2, quoted from the translation by Rykwert
etal.,p. 156.
40 See for a development that is comparable to the influence of Empiricism
on British aesthetics Szambien, Symétrie goût caractère, p. 177: 'M.
Briseux est le premier qui a cru que le beau essentiel de l'architecture
consiste dans ses sensations'. Up to then, 'essential beauty' (the structure
of the building) was thought of as belonging to the domain of primary
qualities. See Cl. Perrault, Ordonnance des cinq espèces de colonnes
selon la méthode des anciens (Paris: J. B. Coignard, 1683), pp. vi-vii: '[la
beauté positive est] fondée sur des raisons convaincantes . . . [les beautés
arbitraires] dépendent de la volonté qu'on a eu de donner une certaine
proportion, uniforme et une figure certaine . . . et qui ne sont point
rendues agréables par les raisons dont tout le monde est capable, mais
seulement par l'accoutumance et par une liaison que l'esprit fait de deux
choses de différente nature: car par cette liaison, il arrive que l'action
dont l'esprit est prévenu pour les unes dont il connaît la valeur, insinue
une estime pour les autres dont la valeur est inconnu.'
41 E. Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of our Ideas of the
Sublime and the Beautiful, edited with an introduction by J. T. Boulton
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1987 (1757)), p. 93.
42 W. Hogarth, The Analysis of Beauty, with the Rejected Passages from the
Manuscript Drafts and Autobiographical Notes, edited with an introduc-
tion by J. Burke (Oxford University Press 1955 (1757)), pp. 41-2.
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43 See Pochât, Geschichte der Ästhetik, p. 398, and Blondel, Cours
d'architecture, vol. Ill, p. 423.
44 On Quatremère de Quincy see A. Vidler, The Writings of the Walls.
Architectural Theory in the French Enlightenment (London: Butterworth
Architecture, 1987), 'From the Hut to the Temple: Quatremère de Quincy
and the Idea of Type', especially p. 220, notes 22 and 26; and T.
Rowlands, Quatremère de Quincy: The Formative Years 1785-1795 (Ph.
D. thesis (unpublished) of the University of Evanston, 111.).
45 A. Chr. Quartremère de Quincy, Encyclopédie méthodique, 3 vols. (Paris:
Pancoucke, 1788-1825), vol. III, p. 411: 'style . . . devient synomyme de
caractère, ou de la manière propre de la physionomie distinctive qui
appartient à chaque ouvrage, à chaque auteur, à chaque genre, à chaque
école, à chaque pays, à chaque siècle'.
Compare Hübsch, In welchem Style sollen wir bauen?, p. 6: 'Die
Gestaltungsmomente [des Styles] sind im Allgemeinen Clima und
Baumaterial'; and p. 23: '[der Styl] muß nicht aus früheren, sondern aus
der gegenwärtigen Beschaffenheit der natürlichen Bildungsmomente
hervorgehen'.
46 Quatremère de Quincy, Encyclopédie méthodique, vol. Ill, p. 410: 'On
appliqua par métonymie à l'opération de l'esprit, dans l'art d'exprimer
ses pensées avec les signes de l'écriture, l'idée de l'opération mécanique
de la main, ou de l'instrument qui trace ces signes.'
47 Ibid., pp. 412-13. 'Et pourquoi cette métaphore ne lui seroit-il pas aussi
justement applicable, s'il est vrai que, selon l'esprit qui constitue le genre
de son imitation, cet art, par tel ou tel choix de formes et de proportions,
sait rendre intelligibles aux yeux, telles ou telles conceptions abstraites,
telles ou telles combinaisons de l'intelligence; s'il est vrai que par un
emploi diversement modifié de parties, de membres et d'ornemens, il
sait, comme à l'aide des signes de l'écriture, faire naître en nous des
idées déterminées.'
48 See Vidler, The Writing on the Walls, p. 129 for a discussion of the
character of the then nascent science of art history in relation to archi-
tecture.
49 Wolfgang Herrmann's recent collection of nineteenth-century German
writings on the question of style in architecture, including Hübsch's
essay, contains much interesting material bearing directly on the topics
discussed here. Rudolf Wiegmann's 'Bemerkungen über die Schrift: In
welchem Styl sollen wir bauen? von H. Hübsch' of 1829 clearly
documents the persistence of rhetorically informed concepts of style in
the nineteenth century (see Herrmann, in What Style should we build?,
pp. 104-12, and especially pp. 105-6). For its continued relevance in the
work of Semper and Viollet-le-Duc see van Eck, Organicism in Nine-
teenth-Century Architecture, pp. 228-9 and 239.
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LAMBERT WIESING
The philosophical endeavours of the present day are characterised
by resignation: the hope that one might some day arrive at a single
true and complete description of the world, as expressed by the
metaphysical tradition, appears increasingly to be unrealisable and
is as a consequence no longer unanimously shared. Scepticism and
critique have brought to ruin those attempts that were designed to
grasp the essence of the world. It has become questionable whether
truth can, through philosophical methods, be given a compelling
and substantial grounding in reality at all. The very conception of a
'unit' of being has lost its persuasive power. The 'real' reality, to
which truth was thought to refer, cannot be found in the numerous,
ontologically equivalent worlds of interpretation, each of which has
its own specific way of world-making. With the growing realisation
that the world consists as much of appearances as of being — if not
more so - a crisis in our understanding of reality has ensued such
that our confidence in a traditional concept of truth, referring to a
single reality, has diminished.
As a result of this situation the concept of style has become central
to postmetaphysical philosophy. Style - it is hoped - will be able to
offset as much as possible the loss of reality; style is thought to be
capable of occupying the place vacated by the concept of truth. A
preference for 'style' as opposed to 'truth' also constitutes the
distinctive feature of the 'Stil statt Wahrheit' programme, which
arose in philosophy and art alike in the first half of the twentieth
century and which allows one to establish a systematic link between
the works of the artist Kurt Schwitters and those of the philosopher
Ludwig Wittgenstein despite the apparently unrelated nature of their
concerns.
My chapter is divided into three parts: firstly, I shall show how the
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artist Kurt Schwitters constructed, in the form of an artworld, a
Utopia in which style serves as a substitute for the concept of truth.
Secondly, I shall show how in the works of the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein the human being comes to be regarded as a being of
style. My contribution deals with two theories, each of which
proceeds from a different starting-point but which converge at a
common centre. Schwitters starts with art and extends the concept
of style so as to include that of truth. Wittgenstein starts with
philosophy and analyses the concept of truth in terms of the concept
of style. In the third part I shall explain why the concept of style
common to both Schwitters and Wittgenstein must at the same time
lead to a very similar conception of philosophy.1
SCHWITTERS AND THE CONCEPT OF STYLE
Schwitters coined the neologism merz in order to designate his
conception of an aesthetic form of life. Merz represents a departure
from the traditional conception of a work of art in that it attempts to
communicate the whole of life into art. The theoretical reflections
accompanying Schwitters' efforts to conceive of life as art can be
made fruitful for contemporary philosophy in so far as they develop
a perspective which affirms the loss of absolute truth described at
the beginning of my paper. Unlike the leading intellectual figures of
an earlier generation, Schwitters no longer regards the loss of
absolute truth as a loss. Indeed it is worth remarking that the
sceptical attitude of Schwitters toward all forms of validity-claims,
though everywhere present in his work, at no point assumes an
accusatory or critical character. In this respect he is fundamentally at
odds with nineteenth-century philosophy and with many of his
artistic contemporaries, for example the dadaists, for one of whom
Schwitters is often (mistakenly) taken. Here Schwitters succeeds in
dissociating himself from a then widespread intellectual malady,
which has in fact dominated our culture up to the present day — the
anguish caused by a lack of orientation. This lack of orientation,
itself brought on by the absence of definite values, has been
described as 'a suffering from decadence'. The dadaists are the
forerunners of this modern attitude, which has been strongly
influenced by Nietzsche. Through their artistic campaigns they
pilloried the decline of values, which they saw manifested in the
wholesale slaughter of the First World War. The sceptical world-
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view, which they displayed in deliberate attempts at provocation,
was for the dadaists a diagnosis of fear.
The basic attitude that we find expressed in Schwitters' works is
entirely different. He converts what was formerly an assertion of loss
into an assertion of gain. Thus Schwitters is able to claim that 'the
happiest day of my life was when I discovered that everything is
really indifferent.'2 This sentence from the year 1929 may be
regarded as an early document of postmodern thinking in so far as it
expresses a new perspective - new, at least when compared with the
dadaists and the general attitude of the nineteenth century. As the
postmodern theorist Wolfgang Welsch has recently argued, it is
precisely in such a shift of attitude that the change of an epoch must
be seen: 'As long as the dissolution of totality continues to be
experienced as a loss, we still remain situated in modernity. Only
when a different perception of this "taking leave" of totality - i.e., a
positive one - has arisen, can we make the transition to postmoder-
nity.'3 Such a conversion can, in fact, already be found in the works
of Schwitters, for example, in the course of a letter where he writes:
'Not only are all things true but their opposites as well. Therefore I
agree with everyone so as to preclude in advance the possibility of
discussion.'4
This is the crucial point: if everything or nothing is true, then it no
longer makes sense to erect a worldview on the basis of discussion
or, more abstractly expressed, to construct a discursive philosophy.
The loss of truth opens for Schwitters the way to an aesthetical form
of philosophising, which from a purely discursive point of view
would have seemed nonsense. This alteration in viewpoint is what
Welsch is alluding to when he writes: 'Postmodernity is precisely
that epoch, in which the positive side of what could previously be
experienced and practiced only as decadence is grasped and under-
stood.'5 Gottfried Benn's famous aphorism, 'Nihilism is a feeling of
joy', attests to a transformation which was already taking place
within Schwitters' generation.6 The new attitude towards life may be
expressed as follows: 'It depends on what one is prepared to make
out of one's nihilism.'7
The concept of style contributes decisively to a positive revalua-
tion of the traditionally lamented loss of truth. Schwitters is only
able to accept the inscrutable nature of truth because he has made
style the fundamental principle of orientation in life. 'No more
eternal truths!' he writes. 'There is only a truth of our age just as
there were truths of other ages.'8 The 'truth of an age' is for
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Schwitters its style. For anyone who believes in a unique and
abiding truth, the relativisation of truth to the 'truth of an age,' i.e., to
a phenomenon of a particular space and time, is totally unaccep-
table. But for all those who regard the search for truth as having
failed to arrive at its object, the concept of style opens up the
possibility of a new concept of truth: for Schwitters, truth does not
represent the correspondence of idea and thing but only the self-
manifestation of a form, the form's showing of itself. Style becomes a
concept of truth with the possibility of being pluralised: whereas
singularity and universality are peculiar to truth, plurality and
particularity are characteristic of style.
Thus style, which unlike truth does not lie hidden behind a veil of
Maya, enjoys the favour of those who had been disappointed in their
search for a traditional concept of truth. Owing to its ability to
combine surface with sense (or meaning), the concept of style could
be developed into a fully fledged programme by artists and
philosophers - and not only by Schwitters. In this context it is only
appropriate to mention the 'De Stijl' movement with whose
members Schwitters co-operated intensively. Many artists looked
upon style as a principle which could provide them with a means of
orientation without at the same time laying claim to the status of a
discovered truth. Benn expresses the point quite succinctly: 'Style is
superior to truth; it carries within it the proof of its own existence.'9
This substitution of style for truth is the clear expression of an
intellectual attitude which regarded as banal and idle the attempt to
combat scepticism with the hypothesis that there is a reality which
has only to be discovered. Confronted with a surfeit of uncashable
validity-claims, one turned away from the profound and, as Benn
describes the situation, 'dedicated oneself to the elimination of truth
and the foundation of style'.10
To put it briefly the programme became one of 'style instead of
truth'. In this way the concept of style comes to signify a Utopia for a
generation which had come to terms with the impossibility of
achieving eternal truth in life. As Schwitters emphasises, 'The word
"style" is worn out but still it signifies better than anything else the
type of artistic striving that is characteristic of our age.'11 In other
words, the goal of art is no longer to be considered truth but rather
style, for style at least appears to be attainable. As a result Ernst
Jünger and others come to see in style the primary task of man: 'We
believe that in the cultivation of a new style is concealed the only
sublime possibility of making life bearable' (Strahlungen, preface).
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This, in turn, corresponds to Schwitters' own conception of the 'Stil
statt Wahrheit' programme: 'We hope that in the foreseeable future
our efforts to make known the enormous lack of style within our
culture will give birth to a mighty will and a great yearning for style.
Then we will turn against dada and campaign only for style.'12
Without doubt Schwitters must be counted among those artists
who were largely responsible for having pursued the 'style instead of
truth' programme to its logical conclusion. Through merz he is able
to design a Utopia in the form of a style-world. In order further to
characterise this Utopia, Schwitters once again introduces a new
concept — that of 'deformalising' (entformeln). With the word
'deformalise' he designates a method which he hopes will enable the
artist to found a world of style. 'Deformalising' is nothing other than
the organising principle of a collage. A collage depends for its
success on the 'deformalising' of all materials employed in its
composition. This process consists in liberating these materials from
the sense or meaning with which they are normally endowed in
everyday life and reducing them to pure elements of form.
Schwitters understands the artistic process expressis verbis as a
destruction of life-world connotations. This thesis implies that the
context of sense is disrupted by the artistic composition of two
mutually extraneous things in such a way that the individual
components appear to human beings as pure impressionistic
elements of form. With respect to a pear and an elephant which had
been pasted together, and their relations to one another rearranged,
so as to form a work of art he says, 'Of the elephant only colour
remains and of the pear only colour as well; colours can only enter
into relationships with other colours.'13
This method is for Schwitters the basis of every artform.
Schwitters' poetry is pure 'sound painting' (Lautmalerei), by which
is meant that meaningful words are converted through the process of
artistic composition into meaningless material. Such works of art are
to have no sense or meaning but only surface. For Schwitters this is
equivalent to the claim that they consist purely of style. It seems
almost as if he had hoped to fulfil with such a concept of style the
well-known desire of Gustave Flaubert, who wrote in a letter to
Louise Colet dated 16 January 1852: 'What I mean by beautiful, what
I myself would like to create, is a book about nothing, a book lacking
all manner of support apart from itself, a book which through the
sheer inner force of its style maintains stability, just as the earth
hangs in the air without support, a book that would be practically
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devoid of theme or in which at least the theme would remain
invisible.'
Yet Schwitters' artform merz cannot be said to be almost lacking
in thematic content: it is absolute in its renunciation of every form of
content. In this way Schwitters radicalises Flaubert's original intent:
rather than satisfying himself simply with creating themeless works
of art, be they novels or collages, he strives to design a themeless life.
The goal of Schwitters' art is to create a world which would remain
true to Flaubert's novel. Merz is the Utopia of a life conceived as pure
style. Schwitters' main pronouncements are 'merz is form' and 'I am
merz', which apply the claims of art to his own person.
Guided by this conception of 'deformalising' (entformeln) Schwit-
ters envisions in a type of Utopian excess the task of making merz
out of the whole world. In other words he would like to deliver the
world from values and the accompanying possibility of the tragic.
This is the reason why Schwitters is so captivated by the vision of a
world of style without values. Since every claim of truth or value is
for him synonymous with the possibility of introducing tragedy and
chaos into life, he rejects them in their entirety and raises the maxim
'no values, no tragedy' to the status of a postulate. If all values and
every meaning (or sense) is destroyed in merz art, then life can no
longer be suffused with, or be a harbinger of, the horrible, for it is
only with respect to values that one is able to experience something
as terrible. In this way Schwitters initiates the aforementioned
postmodern revaluation, which he describes in terms of his
discovery that the happiest moment of his life was when he noticed
that everything is really indifferent. A similar worldview underlies
Benn's exclamation as well: 'Nihilism is a feeling of joy.'
But unlike Benn and many postmodern theorists, Schwitters
recognises that only art is capable of bringing about such a refuge of
senseless tranquility. That is why he broadened the scope of his
concept of art. For Schwitters it is not the reshaping of traditional
works of art that is here at stake but rather the reshaping of life itself:
'Merz is capable of transforming sometime in the not too distant
future the entire world into a giant work of art ... in the meantime
merz produces sketches for a collective reorganization of the world,
for a universal style. These sketches are the merz-pictures.'14 'Merz
means establishing connections, preferably among all things in the
world.'15 The things of the world 'are torn from their old context,
deformalised [entformeln], and placed into a new, artistic context;
they become fragments of form . . . and nothing more'.16
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With the words '. . . and nothing more' we come at last to the gist
of the matter. The world is nothing more than, as Schwitters says, a
universal style. Without doubt merz is an artificial and historically
outdated position. But nevertheless we find here the roots of a
problem and a thesis, both of which have in our day acquired a new
actuality. Merz is the idea of an aesthetic Utopia brought to its logical
culmination, and the well-known expression of Jean Baudrillard,
'the agony of the real', applies to it in the full range of its meaning.
At this point it becomes clear why Wolfgang Welsch feels compelled
to assert - rightly, I believe - that 'our lifeworld can be understood as
the exoteric cash-value of the once esoteric modernity of the
twentieth century'.17 This thesis can be confirmed by pointing out
the similarity between Schwitters and Baudrillard. The work that
Schwitters viewed as remaining to be done if the world was to be
'deformalised' appears to Baudrillard to have already been to a large
extent achieved: 'there is no truth, no reference, and no objective
ground but only a single era of similitude brought on by the
liquidation of all referents'.18 What for Baudrillard is reality is for
Schwitters a dream.
Schwitters would doubtless have regarded such an epoch as
having its origins not in something called 'postmodernity' but in
merz. Nevertheless he himself would not have recognised this epoch
as having already begun, since for him it is only possible to realise
such a Utopian and meaningless world in a work of art. In a properly
constructed mere-world it should be possible, according to Schwit-
ters, to stage the collision of two locomotives without the cata-
strophe amounting to more than a play of light. But obviously we are
not yet living - nor will we ever live - in such a fictitious world. In
this respect style represents for Schwitters, as Albert Camus
expresses it in one of his reflections on style, 'an impossible demand
given expression and form'.19
WITTGENSTEIN AND THE CONCEPT OF STYLE
At this point we may turn to Wittgenstein and the second part of my
chapter. Wittgenstein's approach to the phenomenon of style is
different from that of Schwitters. He does not want to translate the
style of collages into that of life but to analyse life, as it presents
itself to us. Still he comes to conclusions that are remarkably similar
to those of Schwitters. Wittgenstein and Schwitters agree in their
positive valuation of the formal. Both refuse to recognise a sense, an
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essence, or a reality behind the appearance. In certain respects
Wittgenstein's thesis regarding style is simply an amplification of
this anti-essentialist position. The manner in which Wittgenstein
comments on the famous dictum of Buffon shows that for him the
human being need not live in an artistic utopia in order to realise his
being as style. On the contrary, in assessing the relative merits of two
alternative formulations of the maxim usually ascribed to Buffon,
Wittgenstein indicates that a man is always already defined in terms
of his style: ' "Le style c'est l'homme," "le style c'est l'homme
même". The first sentence has a cheap, epigrammatic tersity. The
second and more correct sentence yields a wholly different
perspective. It says that 'style is the image [Bild] of man'.20
According to this interpretation style is not simply a matter of
rules of convention which would merely be supervenient on, or
remain external to, a person's way of behaving, but style is
indistinguishable from the person himself. As Karl Kraus (for whom
incidentally, Wittgenstein had great respect) has pointed out, 'style
is man himself implies that 'style is not the expression of what one
means but rather the formation of what one is' (Die Fackel, 1921; 65).
With respect to Wittgenstein this must be understood to mean that
style is the formation of man's image of himself. If we are to follow
this train of thought, we must have recourse to a reflection from the
year 1938 in which Wittgenstein explains the relation between
picture or image (Bild) and expression:
If, for example, one were to set up for a given group of people certain
pictorial (bildhafte) propositions as dogmas of thought which would fully
determine not their opinions as such but the form of expression they receive,
this would have a curious effect. The people would live under an
unconditional and palpable tyranny, without however being able to say that
they are not free. I believe that the Catholic Church operates in a somehow
similar fashion. For a dogma is as much a form of expression as an assertion,
and there's nothing that can be done to undermine it, and so every practical
opinion can be made out to accord with it, naturally some more easily than
others.21
This reflection explains why Wittgenstein has chosen to elaborate
upon Buffon in such a manner that style for him becomes the image
(Bild) of man. A picture (Bild) can govern, or determine, the
behaviour of man in more subtle, but also more radical ways, than a
dogma: pictures do not lay down concrete prohibitions but are
responsible for selecting among various 'possibilities of expression'.
Pictures are for Wittgenstein forms of expression or, in other words,
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possibilities of representation. The expression is the visible and
external being, the pure behaviour, of a person; the appearance of a
person is thus to be contrasted with his inner state of mind, of which
it is only the representation. To phrase the same point in the
classical terminology of philosophy: the opinion yields the content
and the expression the form. Similarly, aestheticism was defined by
Gottfried Benn, one of its main adherents, as 'the giving of meaning
to all content solely through form'22 - which, of course, represents
an inversion of the traditional point of view. Wittgenstein accepts
the consequences of this aesthetical inversion in all their radicality:
the content of a dogma is always such as to leave ample room for
interpretation. In the above passage, which is manifestly related to
the famous rule-following passage (§201) of the Philosophical
Investigations, Wittgenstein is claiming that practically every
opinion can be made out to accord with a dogma as long as the latter
is understood only with respect to its content, for the content of a
doctrine alone does not suffice to determine univocally the beha-
viour of a person. Here the question of content has already been
reduced to relative insignificance when compared with the multi-
plicity of its forms of expression, but it is still possible to ascribe to
the opinion a content which exists beyond, and resists assimilation
to, its outward form.
In the case of pictorial forms of expression, however, the type of
control to which the person is subject is even more extreme. These
are capable of exerting, as Wittgenstein notes, an 'unconditional
tyranny'. Pictures are able to govern the behaviour of a person,
regardless of his state of mind. As a result the dualism between
content and expression vanishes completely: content ceases to have
any function at all in the expression of a person's style. Wittgen-
stein's thesis amounts to the claim that the external and not the
internal conditions, or governs, life. His anthropological and
aesthetic reflections are characterised by the same form of thinking
as the analytical philosophy of language of his later period. Thus
what Wittgenstein has to say about language applies with equal
validity to human beings, 'for nothing is concealed . . . For nothing
is hidden'.23 'Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to
explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us.'24
These are sentences which could just as easily stand, without need
of further supplementation, in the pages of any merz manifesto.
More importantly, however, these passages point to certain
structural affinities which link Wittgenstein's own reflections on the
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relation between content and expression to those of the art historian
and philosopher of art, Heinrich Wölfflin. In a lecture entitled 'The
Problem of Style in the Graphic Arts' held in 1912 Wölfflin had
reacted with great animosity to attempts 'to interpret style primarily
in terms of expression'.25 By 'expression', however, Wölfflin under-
stands, somewhat misleadingly in the context of the present discus-
sion, what has been described above as the content, and not the
various possibilities of representing this content. For him the most
important aspect of style by far is that which can be discovered 'as
soon as one abstracts from the matter, i.e., the material, of style and
concentrates only on the method of composition, the way in which
the seen is given form . . . Here one encounters a more primitive
layer of concept-formation . . . These are concepts which bear no
direct relation to those of "temperament", "disposition", and the
like but are exclusively related to a certain mode of representation
. . . Every expression is tied to an optical possibility which is
different for every epoch. The same content could not at different
times have been represented in the same manner, not because the
emotive temperature had changed but rather because the eyes had
changed.'26
These reflections of Wölfflin led at the beginning of this century to
a new valuation of the phenomenon of style. Style acquires a supra-
individualistic and epochal validity. Once the level of representation
(or form) was distinguished from the level of expression (or content)
what was originally a psychological phenomenon became a logical
problem. The new task for Wölfflin's theory of style is to develop for
the forms of representation a logic whose laws would explain,
independently of the content of representation, the formal con-
straints (Zwänge) to which each human being is subject. Indeed
Wölfflin's well-known Basic Concepts of Art History pursues no
other objective than to develop just such a logic. This new point of
view amounts to a change of paradigm within the investigation of
style, and it exerted a correspondingly great influence on the ways of
thinking about style that ensued. 'If one does not treat the value of
expression as the criterion of style', wrote Hans Freyer in 1928, 'then
style must be understood in terms of a system of mutually
extraneous elements and contexts of form and thus as bound to
opinion . . . all possible manner of contents can be clothed in such a
language of form, as in a garment, and the unity of our entire culture
consists in nothing other than in their being so clothed.'2'
Here we see prefigured Wittgenstein's later reflections on style.
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There are 'forms of representation'28 which fix, as Wittgenstein has
said in the passage cited, the expression of an opinion irrespective of
its content. These forms of expression are for Wittgenstein the
'pictorial sentences' (bildhafte Sätze] which constitute a person.
This is why he asserts in the course of his commentary on Buffon's
sentence that style is the image or picture (Bild) of man. The identity
of a person is grounded in these pictures in so far as they determine
the style of that person, and this, in turn, is only possible because a
picture (or image) is a form of expression. For Wittgenstein the unity
of a person is a phenomenon of style - just like the unity of an epoch
for Wölfflin or that of a culture for Freyer. In defining the identity of
a person in terms of style, Wittgenstein applies to anthropology a
concept of style which was first developed in the field of art history
and which sees the distinctive characteristic of that history in a
supra-individualistic logic of representational forms. The constraints
(Zwänge) of representation determine human being; the 'human
being', formerly conceived as a rational animal, is now regarded as a
being of fantasy. Style makes the man, or to express the same idea in
terms of my opening statement, style instead of truth is constitutive
of human beings.
Wittgenstein goes so far in his reflections as to extend his account
of the phenomenon of style not only to personal behaviour but also
to thought itself. Even the question of the validity of individual
propositions is converted to a question of form or style. Wittgenstein
writes, 'For the physicist causality stands for a style of thinking. One
might compare it to the assumption of a creator in religion . . . The
same applies to Creation as well: God is one style; the nebula the
other. A particular style may give us satisfaction but one style is not
more rational than another.'29 If one takes Wittgenstein seriously
here, then a critic of religion can at most assert what Gottfried Benn
was indeed later to say, namely, that 'God is a poor principle of
style.'30 For Wittgenstein, to argue that a proposition be regarded as
'true' is equivalent to the claim that the proposition can be
subsumed stylistically in a system. A proposition is 'true' when it
can be made to fit into a language-game. In order, however, for the
proposition to fit into a language-game, the style of the language-
game itself must be preserved. As a result it only makes sense to talk
of truth within certain 'systems'. Nevertheless for the individual
participants in a given language-game style remains an invisible
norm. Thus the aesthetic character of truth is not present to them
qua aesthetic.
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THE SELF-REFLECTIVE TURN TO STYLE IN THE WORKS OF
SCHWITTERS AND WITTGENSTEIN
With this explanation - although there is still much more that could
be said - I come to the third and last point of this chapter. As we
have seen, the predominant characteristic of Schwitters' as well as of
Wittgenstein's mode of thinking may be expressed in terms of a
preference for 'style rather than truth'. Divergent as their respective
starting points may be, the conclusions that they reach involve
similar conceptions of philosophy. This much at least can be said to
be unproblematic: if philosophy has traditionally been regarded as a
discipline which is concerned with the truth-claims of propositions,
then our conception of this discipline can hardly remain unaffected
once the concept of truth has been subjected to such radical change.
The views of both Schwitters and Wittgenstein are, in fact, marked
by this conviction.
Both attempt to dissolve in their work the opposition of art and
philosophy, Schwitters transforming the artistic task into a philoso-
phical one, whereas Wittgenstein converts the philosophical task
into an artistic one. In both cases this transformation leads to a
postmetaphysical conception of philosophy, which is, in the manner
of its expression, as aesthetic as it is theoretical. Clearly Schwitters'
merz texts cannot be regarded as examples of discursive argumenta-
tion. This is the reason why his contribution to philosophy has not
been appreciated sufficiently in the corresponding academic circles,
although he himself was aware of the great importance his work has
for philosophy. He thought that merz itself would suffice to bring
about 'a renewal of philosophical thinking'.31 The guiding principle
of this philosophy is to 'show', or illustrate, one's statements. Thus
Schwitters not only asserts that 'merz is form' but also gives an
example of this assertion by showing through a mixture of nonsense,
banalities, and extravagant typography that the phenomenon in
question is of an aesthetic, and not a theoretical, nature. A merz text
is about merz and is at the same time merz. Schwitters sees in the
style of his texts the appropriate medium for presenting his
programme. A discursive form of argumentation would not have
allowed him to outline his programme, since such an argument
Would presuppose a claim to truth. But it is precisely this pretension
to truth against which Schwitters inveighs and which he hopes to
substitute with the concept of style.
The same self-reflective turn to style as a medium of philosophy
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can be found in Wittgenstein, most obviously in the Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus, which in its motivation is thoroughly aes-
thetic. Wittgenstein writes of the book in the preface: 'Its whole
meaning could be summed up as follows: What can be said at all can
be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak, thereof one must be
silent.'32 The central problem of the book is to draw a boundary. The
realm of what can be meaningfully said must be marked off from that
of the unsayable. But if this problem is to be resolved, then it is
necessary that both areas be accessible to our thought, 'for in order to
draw a limit to thinking we should have to be able to think both
sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what
cannot be thought)'.33
As a result Wittgenstein finds himself confronted with the task of
discovering an alternative medium to discursivity. His solution to
the problem is based on a recognition of the fact that what cannot be
said can nevertheless be shown. For, as Manfred Frank has pointed
out, there is indeed 'a phenomenon on the boundary between the
sayable and the unsayable, and this third thing is style'.34 Style can
be a medium for the unsayable in so far as style illustrates and
'shows' (or reveals) its sense: 'There is indeed the inexpressible. This
shows itself, writes Wittgenstein.35 The logical consistency of
Wittgenstein's thought is reflected in the fact that in his own attempt
to draw a boundary to the unsayable he has recourse to this medium
of self-showing or self-manifestation. This is why he says: 'I believe I
was summing up my own attitude toward philosophy when I said:
Philosophy should in fact only be composed.'36
These two aspects of Wittgenstein's work — the stylistic and the
discursive - are not for him of equal significance. He is clearly more
interested in the medium of the unsayable: 'What I meant to write
then, was this: My work consists of two parts: the one presented here
plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part
which is the important one.'37 This is an unequivocal evaluation of
the Tractatus, which can also be found in the Tractatus itself: the
content of the written is to be considered secondary because it is in
the first instance meaningless. Wittgenstein writes not for the sake of
the sentences themselves but in order to reveal something through
what is said: 'My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who
understands me finally recognises them as senseless.'38 This is the
form of thinking which underlies the entire Tractatus and for which
Schwitters coined the expression merz. Sentences which divulge
their real meaning only to the extent that they are recognised to be
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nonsense are not therefore senseless, since in the words of
Schwitters 'there is a sense in nonsense'.39 This sense in nonsense
manifests itself not discursively but in the form which the content
takes. In the words of Wittgenstein, 'the unsayable is contained
unsayably in the said'.40 The style becomes the bearer of meaning
(sense) for the unsayable in so far as style in its role as bearer of
sense is able to show (or reveal) the sense without itself having to
embody it.
I hope it has become clear in the course of this chapter that the
image of humanity (Menschenbild) which Wittgenstein and Schwit-
ters share is embedded in a philosophy which both regarded as a
kind of aesthetic work. The thesis that style is to be identified with
man himself leads in the thinking of both to an aesthetic form of
philosophy, which cannot help but appear nonsense from a
discursive point of view. The descriptions which Wittgenstein and
Schwitters give of this form of philosophy may easily be substituted
for one another without giving rise to confusion. 'Indeed don't be
afraid to speak nonsense! Only you must be prepared to pay heed to
your nonsense.'41 This according to the 'artist' Wittgenstein. The
'philosopher' Schwitters says, 'Because you do not see the logic in
art you are disturbed by the absence of what is understandable.'42
For both Schwitters and Wittgenstein, philosophy must abandon its
self-imposed claim to discursivity in favour of an exercise in style. If
style is to be seen as an alternative to unprofitable claims to truth,
then style can no longer be for philosophy a mere decoration or
superficial trapping but must instead be recognised as the original
task of philosophy. Philosophy becomes an advertisement for style.
This is the consequence which is implied in the 'style instead of
truth' programme and which we find realised in the works of
Schwitters and Wittgenstein: 'I am in a sense' - said Wittgenstein -
'making propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another
. . . How much of what I do involves changing a style of thinking and
how much of what I do involves persuading people to change their
style of thinking!'43
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SALIMKEMAL
We feel a justifiable repugnance towards mere style. It is without
substance - perhaps the last refuge of an isolated and ineffective
personality. In an age of total administration and the penetration of
market forces into every aspect of our lives, style allows us to
reinvent ourselves every morning in determinate spaces as wearers
of Armani suits, consumers of L. L. Bean hunting shoes, or as readers
of Penguin Paperbacks. It is a superficial gloss which, rootless in
itself, breeds relativism, subjectivism, and solipsism.1
One philosopher at least would respond to these criticisms by
conceding them, yet without denying seriousness to the matter of
style. In my chapter I shall explore his use of style, arguing that
Nietzsche redeems the concept by relating it to issues of interpreta-
tion. He proposes to choose between interpretations on the grounds
of their fullness and strength, without depending on a commitment
to absolute and eternal values; and his arguments show that the
pursuit of style engenders a radical and healthy community of
creators.
STYLE AND GENEALOGY
Nietzsche rejects 'substance' and 'being', subverting their ponder-
ousness by remembering that their power over us comes from our
forgetting that we created them.2 By this genealogical construal,
values are not universal, absolute or objective. They are all,
including the items we valorise as knowledge, interpretations3 — an
order of preferences constructed by us from some position in an
underlying structure of power and domination.4
To explain this constructive nature of values as interpretations,
Nietzsche talks of the style and creativity of values,5 of philosophers
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becoming 'poets of our lives',6 and of associated notions including
'taste', 'seeing', 'the artists' victorious energy', and 'satisfaction'.
Taste is an activity of organising elements.7 Because they have taste,
agents have an economy in which they can give significance and
order to different elements. To have taste of a particular kind, to
construct an economy of a particular kind, is to have a particular
style.8 Actors without style lack taste and therefore have no sense of
economy. Since they are without any sense of order, they cannot
have aims or plans, cannot distinguish means from ends, and only
pursue their most immediately pressing impulses. Yet satisfaction of
the latter fails to ameliorate their needs because their desires lack all
limit or order. Only style introduces the possibility of satisfaction
because it generates preferences. It allows for the distinction
between plans and means, and requires reflection on the order of
pursuits. Thereby it allows actions to be free rather than random,
and for Nietzsche 'one thing is needful: that a human being should
gain satisfaction with himself, whether it be by means of this or that
poetry or art; only then is a human being tolerable to behold'.9
Style and aesthetic redemption
Nietzsche's use of aesthetic concepts like style to explain the
construction of values may seem significant in the following way. In
Birth of Tragedy, for example, he argues that life and order are
justified only as aesthetic phenomena.10 Perhaps his use of style to
describe values is meant to reinforce the aesthetic redemption of
values. That is often the justification given of style: that the kind of
order we give - our style - is serious and significant because there
we make ourselves, display our personalities, our mode of living,
our sensitivity to the requirements of a good life, and give as
beautiful an order as possible to the material of our lives.
In other words, our style 'itself evaluates through us when we
establish values.'11 For example, a system of values that opposes
humanity to a God-given goodliness and value is committed to a
'declining, debilitated, weary, condemned life'.12 That spiritualised
morality enacts a conception of humanity whose specific impera-
tives assume that humanity is inferior because it lacks the attributes
of divinity. By contrast, a human morality would have a different
style because it enacts values that conceive of us as actors capable of
living with our mortal existence.13 Style here is an economy of
preferences which constitutes actors. In accepting a style, actors
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value an hierarchy of preferences, and so commit themselves to a
particular conception of mankind and life. And so far as Nietzsche
seeks an aesthetic redemption, in adopting particular styles we
become artists of ourselves, and our styles are better the more
beautiful they are.
However, Nietzsche's further analysis of aesthetic value denies
this last claim. The more thoroughly he develops criteria for
grasping values as construction or art, the more clearly he allows us
to analyse aesthetic values as constructs. Just as we see moral or
cognitive order as interpretations,14 similarly we can examine
aesthetic value to identify its origin in the needs it serves. That is,
Nietzsche can now 'envisage the aesthetic problem [itself] from the
point of view of the artist (the creator)' and his or her production of
value rather than of the spectator who responds to experiences of
beauty.15 Since beauty itself needs to be explained in terms of the
aesthetic need it satisfies, Nietzsche will reject any attempt to give
refuge to style in its traditional harbour of aesthetic justification. Yet,
if style cannot claim this aesthetic redemption, it is not clear what
other justification it can have recourse to, to make its use in
genealogical analyses viable.
We may find a clue to answer this issue by looking at the positive
thesis underlying Nietzsche's genealogical analyses.
STYLE, VALUE, AND CREATIVITY
The positive thesis underlying Nietzsche's analysis of moral and
other values may be expressed by saying that genealogy rests on a
creativity that is redeemed by its style.16 In his writings he seems to
think of creativity as the activity of producing original works rather
than merely following rules, where the works have only the status of
interpretations precisely because they are created, where the results
of the activity do not serve as rules for others but are at best models
for the activity of other genealogists. Although there is no occasion
where Nietzsche explicitly states and defends this conception of
creativity, it seems intrinsic to the nature of genealogy.
Nietzsche's stress on creativity is already apparent in the explana-
tion of genealogical analysis. Genealogy does not operate by
following given rules but by producing order. In each case that we
diagnose the style of a value and identify its basis, we produce an
interpretation of that value. Genealogy not only supposes that the
construction of value is a creative act but, where it subverts falsely
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idolised values, it is also the construction of a value - moreover of a
value conscious of its own basis. And because it brings about this
new value — that is for creating this new value - genealogy is itself a
creative act.
Such values cannot be made to serve as universal rules that
legislate over other actors and their actions. As interpretations the
values have no more reality than other interpretations. Instead,
interpretations serve as examples, as particular instances displaying
what can be done from one point of view. Others may adopt that
viewpoint and, by grasping that example, give scope and practice to
their own desire to create. But to create they have to produce their
own interpretations, at most using the examples as models rather
than as repositories of rules to be followed. Genealogical analyses
sustain the creative activity of others, in that others can understand
the product only by approaching it as an interpretation, having a
certain style and constructed out of a viewpoint. Only another
genealogist, aware of its nature and origin, can engage with it, not by
following it but by reconstructing it so as to develop his or her own
creation of values.
This activity of interpretation embodies the creating will, which
for Nietzsche is inescapable. As he says at the end, 'Man would
rather will nothingness than not will.'17 So long as we strive to bring
order by generating universal rules and moral values, and suppress
the fact of their style of construction, we will continue to find every
value inadequate and thereby be forced into nihilism. Only when we
live in full cognisance of the creation of values do we escape the
force of nihilism.
A PROBLEM FOR STYLE: CAN WILLING BE A VALUE?
It may seem now that a preference for this willing - the possibility of
generating change — is itself a value we need, but which Nietzsche
cannot defend because he has precluded appeal to any deeper
foundation for justifying the choices of the will generally. I want to
suggest that in an important sense willing is not value-laden; but
again, in another sense, it is, although that need not be a problem.
Willing is not a choice we have but the basis for any intentional
action or the realisation of a choice. Values result from the exercise
of our will. Nietzsche's diagnosis of values reminds us how the
ability to will has been realised but subverted because those values
have suppressed the will, leading us to nihilism as an alternative to
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'giving up' the ability to will. Against this background, to say we
value willing is to say we create values.18 Consequently, willing is
value-laden in the sense that it enacts values. And if this claim
incurs the reminder that genealogists therefore have some value-
commitment, then everyone has that commitment to the exercise of
the will - including the nihilists who, when they question why we
should act, exercise this ability in even raising the question. The
genealogist's stance is inescapable if we are to raise the issue of
values at all. Even those who propose a universal viewpoint or value
must accept the presence of the will at work in any value. For
although they do not often articulate its presence, and while they
may pretend that it does not lie in the active power at the basis of the
universal values they espouse, nevertheless, without that even their
promises will remain unfulfilled and ineffective. Given the need for
this willing, arguably our identifying it as a normative claim is not a
criticism. It says only that we are dealing with the domain of
normativeness, in which willing is crucial.
The preference for interpretations
This explanation also suggests why Nietzsche's account of willing,
styles, and values is not self-defeating and why this understanding of
will gives us reason to prefer some interpretations over others. Styles
and interpretations embody the power of the will, carving out an
area where individuals' choices become available and meaningful -
where they create and re-create values.
Nietzsche proposes that some styles allow for the exercise of the
will, and are more successful for that empowering. He uses the
vocabulary of 'health', 'nature', and 'strong will-power'19 to identify
the style of interpretation that makes possible a will that does not
thwart itself but allows for other perspectives and wills.
A style and interpretation that allows for willing also empowers
other styles. It works to form a substantive community of mutually
compatible creators whose activity opens up room in their present
context for future exploration. His vocabulary of healthy willing
distinguishes the style and empowerment homologous with the
continued production of values from conceptions that find diverse
and disguised ways of constraining and subverting the will. The
latter will always prove self-defeating because they serve only to
prevent development. By contrast, the more acceptable interpreta-
tions will promote further discovery and a relation between creators
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that is inclusive because it is not limited by the inadequacy or
dogmatism of its members. The latter signifies that subjects have
willed an inefficacious order.
Problems with 'inclusiveness'
This stress on inclusiveness means neither that we cannot have any
rules or style nor that the positive rules will never prove inadequate.
If we think of efficacity in terms of inclusiveness, it may seem that
the most inclusive willing is also the least useful. Every style
requires order and restriction, with some economy of significations,
by which some events are peripheral and others central. Here, as a
standard for efficacy, inclusiveness threatens us with meaningless-
ness since it must reject every order, including that which generates
meaning, because it is restrictive in some way. Only the least well-
defined order will be compatible with every other potential order.
And that is no increase in refinement.
For Nietzsche that inclusiveness is not simply a matter of
generality or universality. Willing always has an object, and its
efficacity can never be a matter of holding off from acting and
creating values in the hope of arriving at some more inclusive
formulation. Further, genealogical analysis does not use universality
as a criterion. A 'white supremist', for example, restricts his own
ability to develop by disallowing other conceptions of himself. He
fails to 'become', in the sense Nietzsche contrasts with 'being', by
restricting himself to whatever the style of 'white supremist' may
imply. Commensurately genealogy will diagnose the possibilities in
that distribution, thereby showing how the given conception is
inefficacious.
Moreover, genealogical analysis will have more purchase against
restrictive formations than against those formations which are
compatible with others. The latter are more efficacious because their
values will not exclude agents from other styles and modes of
willing. The subject who generates these values is able to will other
compatible values and is not constrained by the needs of the
restrictive formations. As a corollary, the open production of values
will be inclusive because of the particular formations it is comfor-
table with rather than because it satisfies some overarching or
universal viewpoint or generality.
Of course, eventually, these styles too may be found less than
inclusive, so they do not claim any permanence. Their failure will be
129
Salim Kemal
specific, and will be the more interesting because it cuts into a
greater range of styles which were formerly thought compatible.
Nietzsche talks of this, in one sense, as the grand style, which
embodies 'the artists' victorious energy'20 over arbitrariness. In a
greater freedom stronger resistances have been overcome, in which
it costs more effort 'to stay aloft'.21 In another case, while criticising
modernity, he characterises the failure of styles in terms of
establishing a tradition. 'Having lost all the instincts out of which
institutions grow . . . we are no longer fit for them . . . ' For
institutions to exist there must exist 'a will to tradition, to authority,
to centuries long responsibility, to solidarity between succeeding
generations backwards and forwards in infinitum'. Where we lose
this instinct, we lose the impulse 'out of which the future grows'.22
The great failure of this style is commensurate with its depth - the
tradition or compact between generations and individuals it
portended. The institutions we produce, the traditions we establish,
are fully capable of change, but that development is no mean effort.
Without constraining others in the future they will create,
Nietzsche clarifies that the most interesting work remains that of
willing new styles of value, whose greatness shows itself in the
willing they allow. The greatness of these styles should redeem
creativity and interpretation from sheer solipsism by making
possible a community of creators. If we accept that individuals
create and act by their own lights and, even if they relate to other
creators, do so only to produce their own work rather than follow a
rule, then the distance between them seems great. Genealogists seem
never to compare their understanding of another form with the self-
understanding of that form, by which they might claim superiority
for their own conclusions, because they never have access to that
other form independently of their own stance. Particular analyses
can only serve as instances which other genealogists go beyond in
their own creative acts. Only those unable to create will treat the
genealogists' analyses as a rule for themselves and so escape
solipsism. But they are not genealogists. Little objectivity results
from such independent behaviour, and the membership of common
practices and interactive forms of life, that are usually invoked in
talk of community, seem non-existent - so much so that a commu-
nity of creators seems empty of content. We have no guarantee that
our interpretations and constructs will coincide with or enter into
others' constructions, and we lack any basis for demanding such an
interaction.
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Despite these difficulties, I shall suggest that we generate a
community of creators, making available a relation between inter-
prétants that will sustain the validity of some styles. The claim may
seem counter-intuitive in the face of Nietzsche's references to
creators ravishing the herd and nature.23 But he also uses the
vocabulary of health, strength of interpretations, and fullness of
style. These concepts promote a community of creators, providing a
positive reading of objects and actions without bringing in any
metaphysics. The politics of this community, I suggest, must be
radical.
Through this analysis, we shall see that a rejection of 'being' and
of a single shared system of symbols anchored in some eternal
values need not lead to chaos. Every crisis produces its own
cockroaches who think themselves prophets and appeal for a return
to those atavistic values. Nietzsche's concept of style shows that this
regressive step is not our only choice. Even without 'being', we can
still construct a healthy, progressive, and creative community of
stylists.
THE POLITICS OF PRODUCTION
By recasting the story in terms of our active construction of values,
Nietzsche raises also an issue of the kind of community that is
subtended by genealogy. We must draw out the implications of the
kind of relentless creation of values that Nietzsche has suggested,
considering the relation between subjects which becomes possible -
we must examine the politics of this kind of production.
To characterise the community of genealogy Nietzsche proposes
an equality of creators for whose future actions no present
universalisable imperative can be binding. Genealogy makes clear
that every imperative has a standpoint, and Nietzsche does not
expect his present preferences to circumscribe the future that agents
shall produce. Both these issues about the character of community
and its normative force are deeply political. Together with his stress
on the subject, these commitments are part of a more rational and
free political order that genealogy promotes.24
We can develop this conception by proposing two claims: firstly,
genealogy cannot be politically conservative; secondly, it uses a
distinctive and coherent political vocabulary to constitute its
community of actors.25 Genealogy is a politics of subjects who are
agents. We saw that value was always only a means for preserving a
131
Salim Kemal
particular kind of subject. Genealogy reveals the conception of the
subject at work in any value to allow us to substitute another
understanding of the subject as active agent. In other words,
genealogy recognises that ' "the subject" is ... a created entity, a
"thing" like all others.'26 We misconstrue the 'subject' as 'something
given', for it is 'something added and invented and projected behind
what there is'.27 His suggestion is that we construct the subject in
our construal of values, and some styles of value generate a subject
who is open to development while other forms only calcify the
power to act. Genealogy, then, lays bare the style and economy by
which a work constructs its subject, thus opening a false 'being' into
a 'becoming'. We saw also that we had reason for preferring the
styles and values that facilitate the exercise of the will, empowering
other styles and values.
Such genealogy cannot be conservative. If we understand con-
servatism as the desire to preserve the results of our natural
judgement, then genealogy will corrode conservatism's basis.28 In
other words, firstly, genealogy plays a critical role by maintaining
the following: where conservatives insist that natural judgement or
our natural sense of beauty provides a standard for values, so that
what satisfies nature is good and what is bad is unnatural, genealogy
questions the origin and nature of this conception of nature. It
proposes that this conception itself enacts values; and by displaying
the origins of the values involved in that conception, it dissolves
their justification.
Secondly, we can take as examples, Hume, who introduces an
experimental method of reasoning into value to discover what
causes give rise to values as effects,29 and Burke, who argues that
aesthetic and social values result from countless adjustments too
complex to understand, control, or tamper with.30 By contrast,
Nietzsche maintains that by providing a genetic account of values
these philosophers show the sources of value, and even identify the
values being enacted but, in doing so, also open up, without
answering, issues of justifying those enacted values.31 As Hume and
Burke do not have the resources for raising issues of the origin of
values in enacted forms of life, style, economy, etc., they cannot
even begin to examine the political implications of their own
positions and genetic justification. Instead, the genealogical ap-
proach shows that their genetic explanations are inadequate because
they do not consider their own bases. So far as conservatism is a
politics of human judgement or nature that seeks to preserve what is
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'best' about a 'natural' order, genealogy is progressive because it
identifies the latter as a value-laden assumption and, pointing out its
style and basis, dissolves its justification. No conservative claims to
legitimacy will escape this kind of questioning, and any progressive
theory that depends on similar accounts of human nature will also
fail.32
Similarly, a politics based on subjects reasoning out the morality
of their actions and projects, which they justify by bringing their
actions under rational and universalisable rules, will not receive
succour from genealogy. Such imperatives seem inadequately
grounded. These values depend on an implausible conception of
humans as rational beings and therefore reduce value to an etiolated
sphere separate from any engagement with reality. They suppose
that all moral or beautiful things share some common feature,
regardless of the historical or political position of works, their
construction, and reception, and maintain that we can cut through
these latter contingencies to grasp value, in its universal language,
addressed to a universal subject, who underlies all the 'contingent'
historical and political forms of individual existence. Morality and
beauty thus become a matter of subjects' distinctive responses to
only particular features of objects and events; and the construction
of value, the notion of a subject which it subtends, the style and
economy implicated in this conception of beauty, all become lost to
analysis. In this context, genealogy is progressive first by reminding
us of the basis of values and secondly in dissolving that value by
presenting its sources - by showing the incomplete notion of the
subject that this conception of values implies.
A radical right fares little better. If we understand a radical right as
the attempt to maintain a group or policy in power for the sake of
that power, without any attendant claims to legitimacy, then
genealogy rejects its claims. It denies that power any legitimacy, just
as it denied legitimacy to conservatism; and where power does not
seek legitimacy, genealogy condemns the unhealthy form of life that
its style portends. For this form of life, even if it holds on to power
without apology, must still will an order, and that willing is the
object of Nietzsche's analysis. By his account, we may argue, values
that serve only to keep a few in power lose their richness and
complexity. Value becomes necessary only to legitimate a concep-
tion of a subject and power; yet because a radical right does not seek
to justify itself, it has no need for values, and so impoverishes our
ability to will.33 But the radical right cannot do without willing as
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such, and where it wants to reserve power for a few, it must either
suppress others' ability to will or must control it. But if it suppresses
others' wills, it makes its own power ineffective. It now no longer
dominates other agents because there are no longer any agents
possessing wills: by suppressing their wills, this naked power only
thwarts itself. On the other hand, if it only seeks control of other
wills, then it fails ever to gain a grand style, with the attendant sense
of balancing strength and weakness that we saw, earlier, was
essential to the exercise of strength in willing. Its interpretation and
basis in power thus become impoverished.
Now, the last rejection of power may seem futile because
genealogy's condemnation of the radical right does not bring about
its abolition. But that is a general condemnation of any methodology
because, in the face of an irrational or unapologetic pursuit of power
for its own sake, no rationalisation can succeed. Yet at least
genealogy is effective in bringing out the limitations of that brutal
power, for this radical right grasp of power must establish and
perpetuate itself in some way at least among those who exercise it.
Against such a grab for power, a theorist of democracy who does not
grasp the genealogy of democratic forms in domination and power
will have recourse only to the democratic forms of opposition. But
these, because they do not thematise the undemocratic mechanisms
that can bring about democracy, can oppose a shameless exercise of
power only with mere moral incantations. By contrast, Nietzsche's
genealogy defends a 'community of creators' because it depends on
the very willing which underlies every exercise of power. Nietzsche
can suggest where the defence begins to develop, for his exploration
of irrationalism allows him to recognise that a community of creators
must be prepared to counter violence and barbarity. That is, the
community of creators may form as a counter to a despotism that
limits willing. And because we recognise the sources of rational
forms, we can thematise that countering by developing an account of
the community of creators.
The community of creators
To defend this claim for Nietzsche, we must look more carefully at
the 'community of creators'. Given Nietzsche's descriptions of their
ravishing the herd and nature,34 it is not clear that these creators can
form a community. This difficulty arises also because Nietzsche's
stress on creativity, given the differences in our abilities to create,
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seems to preclude the kind of balance between parts involved in talk
of a community. But Nietzsche also uses the vocabulary of richness,
health, strength of interpretation, etc., that provides a positive
reading of objects and actions without bringing in any metaphysics.
This leads us to recognise that even if Nietzsche does not provide an
analysis of political structures, he does give insight into the politics
of values.
The community of creators is not an impossibility. It only seems
so from the point of view of a resentment that seeks control of every
action by clamping it under already given rules. By contrast with
some agents, who use categorical imperatives as a mechanism for
controlling moral creativity and our exploration of the complexities
of new moral situations, Nietzsche stresses the latter, showing we
generate new rules in our actions. Rather than consider the fact of
judging or responding to actions, he examines the matter of acting.
His is a community of actors rather than a community of responders,
where the former community develops out of a relation of actors to
acts and not of responders to acts. A work or action provides an
example that other actors can take up not as a rule to be followed but
as an example they use to produce their own work. The community,
then, is an interaction of producers and their objects, of rules
generating new rules, of interpretations giving rise to new interpreta-
tions, and not a matter of including only those events that satisfy a
universalisable rule. In other words, we may still talk of a commu-
nity even though it is a group of creators who respond to each others'
works and actions by creating their own, or create their own
independently.
Individual and community
Nietzsche sees no contradiction between such creative individuality
and community. For example, he proposes that the 'host of
conventions' which lie at the basis of mature art give substance to
the community that shares this language and set of conventions. Nor
does such convention offend against creativity. Nietzsche sees
convention as a condition for our activity, 'not an obstacle'.35 We do
not condemn those who produce values as uncreative because they
use linguistic and social conventions to construct a work. Conven-
tions are means for making ourselves and our creative products
understood, and they no more interfere with creativity than the rules
of logic prevent us from uttering truths.36
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Only the community that seeks to overpower the individual in the
name of some social rule also opposes the creative individual. That
oppressive community Nietzsche is happy to condemn; yet this does
not deny all community, and Nietzsche also pleads the need for a
creative and social individual. And such creative and social
individualism, we may expect, will likely rebel against extraneous
formal rules and such conservative values as either seek control or
oppose the individual to all forms of community.
An objection and a reply
While this sense of a community based on actions can stand further
detailing, even at this general level we can raise an objection that
typifies others. A community of creators, a critic may argue, is
impossible. A community suggests a balance in which every
individual is necessary to the whole and, so, equally important. But
different subjects are creative to different degrees, and surely some
individuals will stand out over others. Their greater importance to
the community will cause inequality, and make the community of
creators politically questionable. Genealogy then still only results in
another arbitrary grouping of unequal actors. Yet progressive
thought must surely liberate us from hierarchies, making possible a
free and equitable relation between agents,37 and showing how any
present imbalances in such things as wealth and creativity do not
preclude equity in worth. Yet creativity does not sustain such
liberation.
The reply to this kind of objection is straightforward. Possession of
the ability to will and create is not a source of inequality: the
democratic community no more institutionalises individuals in
hierarchies by reference to variations in their intelligence than a
community of creators need exclude agents by reason of variations
in their ability to create. More importantly, the criticism uses an
evaluative conception of creativity, treating it as an ability to
produce values that only some specially gifted agents possess. That
is not Nietzsche's conception - the herd does not lack creativity, it
merely fears to exercise it or prefers to control it.38
Of course, Nietzsche does not provide any analysis of the political
structures and institutions that will sustain creative activity. His
sense of politics is wider than such an institutional analysis, and it
implicates a progressive political relation between creators. This
community of creators does not exclude any subject from its politics.
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And though he does not give us an analysis of political institutions
as such, Nietzsche suggests that we have a tool for excluding those
who would introduce conservativism. He talks of the richness of
interpretations,39 of their health,40 and of the strength in styles, as
we saw earlier, that provide a criterion for politics through a notion
of inclusiveness. We can exclude interpretations that impose
limitations and exclude possible actions and actors.41 People who
promote, say, a community of only white males have a poorer ability
to act, impoverishing themselves by insisting on the validity and
incorrigibility of certain rules and having to suppress others because
they can find no reason to oppose them. Yet the very insistence that
white male society constitutes the only legitimate community
already makes him redundant in the light of the richer experience,
interpretations, and forms of life available from another perspective.
Without exhausting all possible viewpoints within the compass of
a single moral fable or eschatology, Nietzsche moved that the richer
interpretation is better because it empowers us better to act and
construct healthy, future-seeking forms of life. For genealogists it is
important to keep open the future, seeing every interpretation and its
form of life as a willing. And for sustaining the ability to act, for
empowering us in a form of life, we value that creativity. Its contrast
is with a form of life that imposes redundant boundaries of class,
race, sex, position, and so on, on our will and style. We prefer the
style of life that promotes our willing.42 And so far as genealogy
makes this possible, it is a politics of production and creativity.
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substance-like residue that allows it to unify its diverse appearances as
accidents under some single rubric. The will and its exercise gain
meaning from their context. Of course, Nietzsche has a more complicated
notion of the will than many others do - for instance, he allows that it
hides its search for power under different guises - but it still shows itself
only in the way it hides its aims. And by pointing to these guises of the
will Nietzsche is pointing out that when people have taken to
metaphysics it is precisely a result of their ignorance of the operations of
the will. Were they to recognise those claims as constructions from a
viewpoint, they would not credit them with the authority that engenders
a metaphysics.
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Metaphor and paradox in Tocqueville's
analysis of democracy1
FRANK ANKERSMIT
INTRODUCTION
No theorist of democracy has received more praise than Tocqueville.
But although Tocqueville's views have been so very influential, it is
surprisingly difficult to summarise his theory of democracy. This is
all the more surprising since the major textbooks appear to have
little difficulty in identifying convincingly a few central theses in
Tocqueville's political philosophy. One can think here of Tocquevil-
le's insight into the strained relation between freedom and equality,
his thesis about the continuity between the Old Regime and the
Revolution or about democracy's inclination to develop into a
'tutelary despotism'. Yet the more detailed one's analysis of
Tocqueville's work becomes, the less happy one will be with these
and similar summaries. Summarising Tocqueville seems inevitably
to result in some stale and relatively uninteresting truths and to
reduce the intellectual depth of his thought to the level of trivial
conversation. It is, in one word, as if the essence of his œuvre is that
it does not have an essence; as if we could not better summarise his
work than by saying that it cannot be summarised.
One might infer from this state of affairs that, despite appearances,
Tocqueville has no 'theory of democracy' in the proper sense of the
word to offer to his readers; it may seem that his work is not an
attempt to lay bare the hitherto hidden essence or nature of
democracy. Or, to put the same idea in a more positive, possibly
truer and certainly more interesting way, it might be that we ought to
interpret Tocqueville's œuvre as saying that, in fact, no 'theory of
democracy' is possible and that precisely our effort to 'theorise'
about democracy will prevent us from seeing what is really new and
interesting about democracy.
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It will be my main purpose in this chapter to demonstrate the
plausibility of such an 'anti-theoretical' interpretation of Tocquevil-
le's texts.
I hope to make clear in this chapter that it is only by focusing on
Tocqueville's style - or, rather, on the styles adopted by Tocqueville
- that we can grasp both the nature and the significance of the
Tocquevillian insight that of democracy no theory is possible.
Tocqueville adopts a style enabling him to develop an analysis of
democracy that could never be expressed in a prose drawing its
principle of organisation exclusively from the purported organisa-
tion of the subject-matter represented by it. Style and content are not
merely closely interrelated in his writings - as surely is the case in
any great achievement in historical writing or in social and political
theory. Style here even dominates content in order to discourage any
attempt to 'compress' or to epitomise content within the narrow
confines of a merely theoretical account of democracy. In Tocque-
ville's œuvre we see how and why the category of style thus has
precedence over both theory and content. Hence, to the extent that
we allow ourselves to be convinced, or even only intrigued by
Tocqueville's analysis, Tocqueville's texts embody an implicit
suggestion about which style or form we should adopt if we wish to
say anything revealing about democracy. In a curiously oblique way
Tocqueville's texts show that its anti-theoretical, anti-metaphorical,
and paradoxical style is our only key to the secrets of democracy -
that best-known but least understood political system. In contrast to
relatively crude political systems like feudalism, aristocracy, or
absolutism, the political and social web woven by democracy is so
subtle and intricate that we will tear it apart if we approach it with
an unsuitable stylistic apparatus. Thus, before starting to think or
write about democracy, we will have to make up our mind about the
style to adopt for doing so; reversing that order will inevitably make
us blind to its most interesting features.
METAPHOR
Metaphor is the trope that comes naturally to both historiography
and political theory.
Historical discourse presents us with a text which - when taken as
a whole — does not refer or correspond to reality in the way this can
be said of the constative statement. One cannot compare a historical
representation of the past as given in the text as a whole to a
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historical reality as we can do with the statement. Instead, we
should conceive of this historical text as a substitute, present for us
here and now, for an absent past. Instead of an objective and
publicly accessible and perceivable historical reality that is given to
historians when they speak about and discuss the past, we have the
historical representations historians have proposed as its substi-
tutes. This may explain the essentially metaphorical character of
historical representation. For just as the historical representation is
used for speaking about the absent historical reality that is
represented, so metaphor proposes the metaphorically used expres-
sion (and the semantic field that is commonly associated with it) for
speaking about the subject of the metaphorical utterance. And there
is an additional reason for the historian's reliance on metaphor. For
what makes metaphor especially valuable in historical discourse is
its capacity to organise knowledge. A simple metaphor like 'the
earth is a spaceship' effects an organisation and hiérarchisation of
hitherto not or insufficiently integrated knowledge we have about
the earth, the pollution of the ecosystem, about the biosphere being
a closed system etc. A good metaphor may be so successful at
organising knowledge that it even suggests a certain course of
action - the metaphor given just now is a good example. Metaphor
achieves such an organisation of knowledge because it proposes a
point of view or perspective on (historical or political) reality. As is
suggested by the notion of perspective or point of view, metaphor
effects a distancing from the reality metaphorised and thanks to the
distance thus created a hiérarchisation of knowledge, of what is
important or unimportant, can take place. Similarly, because of its
metaphorical character, the historical text will show its reader what
is of central and what is of merely peripheral significance for
understanding the nature of a particular part of the past. Depth,
distance, relief, a textual clair obscur, a contrast between fore-
ground and background, hiérarchisation of the important and the
unimportant, a differentiation between centre and periphery, and
above all, narrative organisation are all achieved if the historian
makes use in his text of the resources of metaphor.2 Moreover, at
the same time we discover here the political uses of metaphor. For
all political action requires a point of application, so to speak, from
where social or political reality is changed or influenced. And
metaphor offers both the political theorist and the politician such a
point of application. Obviously, the point of view proposed by the
historical text or a political analysis is closely related, if not
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identical to, the point where political thought and action are
applied to reality.
Against this background we would not be astonished by the
metaphoricity of Tocqueville's analysis of democracy and of its
historical origins. And indeed, we do find metaphors in his work. To
be more exact, we can discern in Tocqueville's work both an
acceptance of metaphor as a formal principle for organising the text
and the proposal of a quite specific and crucial metaphor. I shall
start with Tocqueville's use of metaphor as a formal principle.
Nowhere is metaphor as a formal and organising principle more
freely embraced by Tocqueville than at the end of the first volume of
Democracy in America.3 He offers there a characteristic of his
enterprise with the following words:
I am approaching the close of my inquiry . . . my present object is to
embrace the whole from one point of view . . . I shall perceive each object
less distinctly, but I shall describe the principle facts with more certainty. A
traveller who has just left a vast city climbs the neighbouring hill; as he goes
farther off, he loses sight of the men whom he has just quitted; their
dwellings are confused in a dense mass; he can no longer distinguish the
public squares and can scarcely trace out the great thoroughfares; but his eye
has less difficulty in following the boundaries of the city, and for the first
time he sees the shape of the whole. (Dem. I, 447)
A similar acceptance of metaphor and of the organising capacities of
metaphor is found in Tocqueville's other great book, The Old Regime,
where Tocqueville argues that at the time the work was written,
humanity found itself at that precise point in the course of the
evolution of western history and society from which one can best
perceive and pass judgement on the French Revolution (AR, 61). For it
was at that time, some sixty years after the outbreak of the Revolution,
that the Revolution stood out clearer than ever before or after against
the encompassing background of French and European history.
In both these cases Tocqueville appears to allot to metaphor the
task metaphor ordinarily performs in historical and social scientific
writing. However, if we take a closer and more careful look at the
text, we shall discover that Tocqueville's use of metaphor is
curiously self-contradictory or paradoxical. A first indication of
Tocqueville's paradoxical use of metaphor, a use of metaphor in
which metaphor annuls itself, can be found in The Old Regime and
the Revolution. As has been pointed out by several theorists of
historical writing, notably Louis O. Mink,4 the metaphorical point of
view is ordinarily used by historians for organising and expressing
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historical change. The narrative account of historical change and
evolution requires the metaphorical point of view from which such
narrative accounts are organised. However, in his book on the
Revolution Tocqueville succeeds in adopting a metaphorical point
of view that by contrast destroys narrative and obliterates historical
change. Metaphor is turned against itself. Thus, in a brilliant
analysis of The Old Regime and the Revolution Linda Orr has argued
that the Old Regime and the Revolution are so intimately tied
together in it, that they can be so little dissociated from each other,
that the Old Regime becomes a duplication of the Revolution and
vice versa.5 And the result is that narrative and temporal order are
destroyed. It was the notion of centralisation that enabled Tocque-
ville to pull the Old Regime and the Revolution so close together that
any distinction between them becomes a mere historical and
misleading pedantry. Misleading, because the attempt to see
differences invites us to see differences where it is essential that we
do not see them. From the point of view of centralisation there is no
difference between the Old Regime and the Revolution. As Ms Orr
succinctly puts it, the book would have been better entitled L'Ancien
Regime est la Révolution than L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution.6
Thus centralisation was indeed used by Tocqueville as his metapho-
rical point of view, but, in sharp opposition to how metaphor is
ordinarily employed by historians, the metaphorical point of view
paradoxically serves the purpose here of eliminating temporal and
narrative organisation.
Democracy in America presents us with a roughly similar picture.
At the beginning of this book it looks as if Tocqueville intends to
write a narrative history of how democracy developed in America.
Thus Tocqueville declares at the outset that American freedom and
American democracy can only be understood if seen as the result of
a complex historical evolution, and he assures his readers that he is
going to tell them that history. Nations will always bear 'the marks of
their origin' (Dem. J, 28) and a narrative account of American history
will contain 'the germ of all that is to follow and the key to almost
the whole work' (Dem. I, 29). But, having said this, Tocqueville
immediately abandons the narrativist programme. For apart from a
few incidental remarks about Puritanism and the tradition of
municipal government, historical references are virtually absent in
the two volumes of Democracy in America. Thus a pseudo-
narrativist opening merely serves as a Tocquevillian ploy for
entering into the non-narrative analysis developed in the rest of the
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book. And if the book does not have a beginning in the proper sense
of the word, neither does it have an acceptable ending. It is even
somewhat comical to see how the book ends several times, only to
be taken further again each time. The book already ends twice in the
first volume. Then the book ends for a third time with the
anacoluthon of the third book of the second volume. Lastly, as if he
had himself become impatient with his inability to find a suitable
closure, the book ends for a fourth time with the resounding
kettledrum beat of the short fourth book. So, just as was the case in
The Old Regime a narrative, metaphorical organisation of the
subject-matter is turned here against itself. In both cases the
metaphorical style is paradoxically pitted against itself.
I shall now turn from these formalist considerations to a material
one and discuss the central metaphor proposed by Tocqueville in
his analysis of democracy. And once again we will encounter here
the paradoxical use Tocqueville tends to make of metaphor. The
metaphor in question is that of the democratic state as the 'guardian'
('tuteur') of the democratic citizen. Although it was already used by
Tocqueville at the end of the first volume, the metaphor only makes
its real appearance in the fourth book of the second volume, but
from there it casts its long and sinister shadow over the whole of the
text preceding it. The metaphor is introduced by Tocqueville in the
following way: 'when I consider the petty passions of our contem-
poraries, the mildness of their manners, the extent of their
education, the gentleness of their morality, their regular and
industrious habits, and the restraint which they almost all observe in
their vices no less than in their virtues, I have no fear that they will
meet with tyranny in their rulers, but rather with guardians' (Dem. II,
336).
There are two aspects to this metaphor which require our
attention. Firstly, it should be observed that this metaphor does not
correspond to democracy itself, but rather to a degenerate form of
democracy, that is, to a democracy that has changed into a
benevolent and over-centralised form of despotism. Above the
democratic multitude, writes Tocqueville, 'stands an immense and
tutelary power, which takes upon itself alone to secure their
gratifications and to watch over their fate. That power is absolute,
minute, regular and mild' (Dem. II, 336). Metaphor truly realises
here its political potential: metaphor's capacity to organise and to
unify a chaotic manifold has become here a political reality. Yet, the
important thing to note is, that if metaphor here does realise itself
146
Metaphor and paradox
politically, the result is not democracy itself, not democracy in its
true form, but the bastardisation of democracy in the form of some
new and unheard-of kind of despotism. Once again, Tocqueville's
text denies to metaphor in practice the task it theoretically ought to
perform by giving us a grasp of democracy.
Nor is this all. We must note that it is generally the task of the
guardian to identify with the interests and the point of view of the
persons entrusted to his guardianship. More specifically, the
guardian ought not to pursue his own interests if these are hostile or
detrimental to those of his wards. Since the relationship between the
state and the citizen is constructed by Tocqueville in such a way that
a conflict of interests between the state and the citizen is far from
imaginary, this puts the state in a highly ambiguous and even
paradoxical position. So the metaphor of the state as guardian is
what one might refer to as a most paradoxical metaphor -
paradoxical in the sense that it requires the state to reconcile the
incompatible interests of itself with those of the citizen. Even in
Tocqueville's characterisation of degenerate democracy, therefore,
metaphor has to yield to paradox. And, of course, what is the notion
of a 'benevolent despotism' other than a powerful political paradox?
Let us sum up our findings about the role of metaphor in
Tocqueville's political thought. Metaphor is present in both a formal
and material sense in Tocqueville's work. In this respect Tocquevil-
le's analysis of democracy does not differ stylistically from more
traditional accounts of democracy and of its historical origins. Yet it
must strike us that metaphor in Tocqueville's text is nowhere
allowed to occupy the central place so naturally assigned to it in
historical and social scientific texts. Metaphor only makes its
appearance so that it can be marginalised again.
PARADOX
Few texts in the history of western political thought have so much
'personality', are so immediately recognisable and possess such
extraordinary rhetorical vigour as Tocqueville's books on American
democracy and on the nature of the French Revolution. So if it is not
metaphor with its affinity with unity, hierarchical organisation, the
dominance of the centre over the periphery, with its reliance upon
narrative and chronology and causal relation, then what did
Tocqueville choose as his stylistic code? It will be my thesis that
Tocqueville's break with the historiographical traditions of his (and
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our own) time mainly consists in his abandonment of metaphor in
favour of paradox. And surely we may expect a 'penchant' for
paradox in an author who, like Tocqueville, presents to his readers
the French Revolution as being, in fact, no revolution at all or who
describes democracy as being, in fact, a despotism of the multitude
and as a political system that is essentially conservative (the last
paradox undoubtedly being the most amazing of the three to
Tocqueville's contemporaries). In each of these three examples it is
Tocqueville's strategy to present a historical or political thesis by
means of its opposition to an accepted truth; the rhetorical strength
of his argument is derived from this opposition, which is carefully
upheld in the text.
And, indeed, we find paradoxes on nearly every page of
Tocqueville's books; every time he reaches a conclusion that pleases
or interests him it is moulded in the form of paradox. Since much of
my argument in this essay rests on this replacement of metaphor by
paradox, I may be expected to be generous with examples. To begin
with, Tocqueville, considering himself, notes the paradoxes of the
human heart: 'I need not traverse earth and sky to discover a
wondrous object woven of contrasts; of infinite greatness and
littleness, of intense gloom and amazing brightness, capable at once
of exciting pity, admiration, terror, contempt. I have only to look at
myself (Dem. II, 80). Next, in the years before 1848 notions of right
and wrong, good and bad seem to have become confused in the
paradoxical turmoil of his mind. In desperation he cries out: 'where
was truth? Where was falsehood? On which side were the evil ones?
And on which side the well-intentioned?' (Rec., 84). The character of
nations and of peoples is no less paradoxical: thus the Americans are
'at one constrained and without constraint' (Dem. II, 229); America
is the country 'where the precepts of Descartes are least studied and
best applied' (Dem. II, 4); and in spite of all their Cartesianism and
their confidence in their own resources, Americans are more gullible
than any other people (Dem. II, 11). Even more paradoxical is the
French national character: the French care about property but not
about their lives; they are 'equally bent on reasoning and on being
unreasonable' (Rec., 114). And a two-page list of the paradoxes of the
French national character is drawn up as a kind of afterword to The
Old Regime (AR, 320, 321).
But what most catches the eye and contains, moreover, a good
deal of the essence of Tocqueville's argument are the sociological
and political paradoxes he uses when discussing democracy. It is
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true that the pre-revolutionary period is not completely free of
paradoxes - thus in aristocracy 'some actions have been held to be at
the same time virtuous and dishonourable; a refusal to fight a duel is
an instance' (Dem. II, 242) - but the number of paradoxes increases
quickly when Tocqueville starts to discuss democracy, so much so
that it seems impossible for Tocqueville to describe democracy
without an appeal to paradox. Thus with the rise of democratic
equality landowners remain unaware of social levelling because rents
tend to rise in this phase of history (Dem. I, 198). Equality fosters a
kind of 'virtuous materialism' (certainly an oxymoron in Tocquevil-
le's eyes) and, what is more important, 'the democratic nations that
have introduced freedom into their political constitution at the same
time when they were augmenting the despotism of their adminis-
trative constitution [a condition typical of democracy F.A.] have been
led into strange paradoxes. To manage those minor affairs in which
good sense is all that is wanted, the people are held unequal to the
task; but when the government of the country is at stake, the people
are invested with immense powers; they are alternately made the
plaything of their rulers, and his masters, more than kings and less
than men' (Dem. II, 339). Furthermore, American democracy offers
the paradoxical spectacle of possessing freedom of the press 'without
independence of mind and real freedom of discussion' (Dem. I, 273)
and political power will both 'be more extensive and more mild' in a
democracy than in other political systems (Dem. II, 335). Nothing is
more common in democracy than to 'recognize superior wisdom in
the person of one's oppressor' (Dem. II, 12). But in contrast to this
paradox Tocqueville elsewhere presents the paradox that in democ-
racy power increases when authority diminishes and vice versa. But
of all the characteristics of democracy that are 'most formidable but
least foreseen' (Dem. II, 348) surely democracy's most surprising feat
is to have created a society in which everything changes and yet
everything remains the same (Dem. II, 239).
If we wish to understand the meaning of Tocqueville's exchange
of metaphor for paradox, it will be necessary to devote some
attention to the similarities and dissimilarities of the two tropes. In
both cases, in metaphor no less than in paradox, we have to do with
semantic deviance, with an apparent conflict at the semantic level.
Both metaphor and paradox interrupt the easy flow of literal
language. But the way in which semantic conflict is solved is
different in each case. As we have seen at the beginning of this
chapter, metaphor solves semantic conflict by the identification and
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fixation of a semantic point where the conflict disappears and
significant meaning originates. In the case of historiography this
semantic point is the point of view from which we are invited to see
the past.7 It must be noted, next, that such points of view are outside
and independent of historical reality itself, and this is no coinci-
dence. For metaphorical historiography requires of the historian a
movement of estrangement from historical reality (a movement often
associated by historians with the pursuit of the state of objectivity); it
is a movement that results in the opposition of, on the one hand, a
now 'objective' or even Objectively given' historical reality and, on
the other hand, a metaphorical point of view whose preferably
maximum distance from that objective reality guarantees that an
objective survey or account can be given of it. One must realise,
then, that in metaphorical historiography historical truth comes into
being only thanks to this movement of withdrawal from what is to
become historical reality. Historical truth is achieved when the
distance between the past and the point of view is infinite (and yet
all the details are respected and still clearly visible), so that all
perspectivism thus seems to have been eliminated.
Paradox favours a movement that is precisely the opposite of that
of metaphor. Take for instance Tocqueville's paradox of the
governments that have succeeded that of the great Revolution: 'the
governments it [i.e. the Revolution] set up were less stable ("plus
fragiles") than any of those it overthrew; yet, paradoxically, they
were infinitely more powerful ("plus puissants")' (OR, 9). Semantic
conflict exists, as in metaphor, in the paradoxical notion of a
government that is both more fragile and more powerful than the
government that preceded it; language resists this conjunction of
concepts. Yet, and this is essential, paradox does not invite us (as
metaphor does) to resolve the conflict at a linguistic level, but
requires us to look at historical reality itself in order to find that both
halves of the paradoxical assertion are true. Postrevolutionary
governments are both more fragile and more powerful than those of
the Old Regime and we are misguided by language in presuming a
conflict here. What paradox lays bare, therefore, is the betrayal of
language (if I may put it in this slightly paranoic way); paradox
teaches us that language erroneously makes us see oppositions or
incompatibilities where, in reality itself, they do not exist. Metaphor
trusts language unconditionally; all the possibilities of linguistic
friction, of linguistic double play that language offers, are even used
confidently for the cognitive purposes of the historian and the
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politician. Paradox, by contrast, firmly turns away from language
and redirects our attention to reality itself. It is deeply aware of the
shortcomings of language and of the blind alleys language may lead
us into. As we saw a moment ago, metaphor effects a movement of
redoubling in which (metaphorical) language and reality are set
opposite to each other, but in such a way that the former determines
the nature of the latter; paradox, on the other hand, effects a
rehabilitation of reality in its relation to language. Paradox shows us
that reality is stranger than language suggests.
At first sight paradox and irony do not seem to lie too far apart.
What is known as 'Weltironie', 'cosmic irony' or the 'irony of
events'8 expresses the insight that there is often a paradoxical
relation between what we intend to do and what is actually the
result of our actions. Political thinkers such as Mandeville, Adam
Smith, Hegel, and indeed, Tocqueville himself, have pointed out the
paradoxical workings of cosmic irony. It is therefore not surprising
that Hayden White should see Tocqueville's œuvre as dominated
primarily by the trope of irony.9 But there are two differences
between irony and paradox that we cannot afford to ignore. Firstly,
when being ironical we say one thing but mean the contrary of what
we say (just as in cosmic irony the effects of our actions are contrary
to our intentions). We expect the hearer or reader to see our point
and to exchange what we say for what we really intended to express.
But here irony differs from paradox. For, as we have seen, in the case
of paradox semantic opposition should not be obliterated - as irony
expects us to do - but has to be respected. At most one could say that
paradox and so-called 'romantic irony' come quite close to each
other. For theorists of romantic irony such as Friedrich von Schlegel
(romantic) irony is a precarious and momentary equilibrium
between two opposites and the secret of romantic irony, like that of
paradox, lies in the requirement that neither of the two opposites
should yield to the other.10 The second and perhaps more important
difference between irony and paradox is that an understanding of
the former always depends upon additional knowledge (knowledge
that is not provided by the ironical assertion itself). One must have at
least some acquaintance with Viscount Bolingbroke's most dubious
political career in order to appreciate (or even recognise) the irony of
Samuel Johnson's remark that 'he was a holy man'. The irony is, in
fact, an interplay of the ironic utterance itself with the associations
we already possess with the subject of the utterance. Hence, like
metaphor, irony tends to keep on the level of language and thought,
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on the level of associations and knowledge we already have.
Paradox, on the other hand, is the trope that inexorably sends us
back to reality after the holidays we have spent at the linguistic level
in the company of metaphor and irony. It demonstrates the short-
comings of our knowledge and our system of associations. Metaphor
and irony are a celebration of language and are given to idealistic
patterns of thought, paradox is a celebration of reality - in its
insistence on redirecting our attention to reality and in its effective-
ness in doing so, it is even more persistent than the literal statement.11
But, more importantly, it is perhaps the supreme paradox of all of
Tocqueville's paradoxes that he has the courage to posit the
sublimity of democracy, of that apparently so homely, so petty and
so utterly lustreless political system. Surely Shiner is right when he
writes that for Tocqueville the advent of democracy meant the final
triumph of pettiness over 'grandeur',12 but the exactness of this
assertion might make us forget that, according to Tocqueville,
precisely democracy's love of well-being, of petty pleasures and of
petty details, has unleashed a political force that makes those of
aristocracy and of the Old Regime dwindle into mere insignificance.
More than any other previous political system, democracy is not
what it seems. It mobilises every potential source of political
strength and action in society - nothing will be allowed to remain as
it was before the advent of democracy. Democracy has given us a
'providential, and creative power' (Dem. II, 309) of the same
sublimity as the raging seas or the distant stars that so deeply
impressed Kant.
This is how we ought to interpret Tocqueville's famous character-
isation of the birth of democracy as 'a providential fact' (Dem. I, 6),
as a historical event that must fill our minds with a kind of 'religious
awe' (Dem. I, 7). Tocqueville could be so sensitive to the sublimity of
democracy itself and of the historical process to which it owed its
birth because he looked at democracy with precisely the peculiar
and paradoxical mixture of feelings that the sublime awakens in us.
Consider the confession found among Tocqueville's papers after his
death: 'j'ai pour les institutions démocratiques un goût de tête, mais
je suis aristocrate par instinct; c'est à dire que je méprise et crains la
foule. J'aime avec passion la liberté, la légalité, le respect des droits,
mais non la démocratie. Voilà le fond de l'âme'.13 Tocqueville hated,
or better, feared democracy, but at the same time he was prepared to
recognise that democracy will realise the equality which 'the Creator
and Preserver of man has set as man's highest historical goal' (Dem.
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H, 351). When Schiller describes the sublime as 'dieses einzige
Schreckliche was er [i.e. man F.A.] nur musz und nicht will'
(Schiller's emphasis)14 and which evokes in us the contradictory
feeling of both 'Wehsein' and 'Frohsein',15 this captures exactly
Tocqueville's paradoxical attitude towards democracy and towards
its entrance on the scene of world history.
CONCLUSION
In a penetrating and intelligent commentary Jon Elster has written of
Tocqueville: 'il faut le dire très clairement: il n'y a pas de grand
penseur qui se contredise aussi nettement, aussi souvent, sur des
questions aussi centrales'.16 Confronted with the contradictions and
paradoxes in Tocqueville's work, Elster develops a number of
'principes de décodage' that will enable him to straighten out these
contradictions. It is his expectation that these 'décodages' will give
us both a Tocqueville more true to his own manifest intentions and a
better and more responsible theory of democracy. It would certainly
be quixotic to go to war with this interpretative strategy. Elster's own
study not only demonstrates that this strategy results in new and
interesting sociological insights, but, even more so, that the
Tocquevillian text certainly contains a number of inconsistencies it
can do without. Yet, for all his assiduity, even Elster has to concede
that 'ces opérations de sauvetage ne réussissent pas toujours, et
d'ailleurs elles ne réussissent jamais entièrement'.17 I agree with
Elster, but would rather reverse the emphasis in his approach to
Tocqueville's writings: what is really interesting in Tocqueville, in
my opinion, is not what lends itself to a reduction to consistency,
coherence and logical argument, but rather the paradoxes and
inconsistencies that resist such a reduction.
Tocqueville's inconsistencies and paradoxes are not merely a
regrettable defect in his argument (if only because Tocqueville, not
being quite the most obtuse of political philosophers, would
undoubtedly have been capable of avoiding them if he had thought
that their presence might interfere with the nature of his enterprise).
I therefore propose to see these inconsistencies and paradoxes rather
as marks or signs of the brakes provided by the text itself to resist
any Elsterian attempt to force it willy-nilly into a coherent and
consistent 'theory' of democracy or social action. Moreover, if it is
recognised that the major and real purpose of these inconsistencies
and paradoxes is to discourage the construction of a 'theory' of
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democracy, the question by what textual means this purpose
actually is achieved in individual cases becomes uninteresting.
Hence it would be mere pedantry to distinguish between contra-
dictions (on the linguistic level), inconsistencies that might arise
between two statements against the background of Tocqueville's
acceptance of a third statement that is compatible with only one of
the two, paradoxes in the proper sense of the word etc. For the
precise logical nature of these problematic conjunctions is largely
irrelevant: what counts is that they all point in one direction —
avoidance of 'theory' and a recognition of the sublime character of
the democratic system. The text does not offer a 'theory' or if one
would prefer to put it that way, it is at most a 'theory' saying that no
theory of democracy is possible. For as soon as one starts to theorise
about democracy, this ever so elusive political system will make us
see only the reflection of the theorist behind which it will carefully
hide itself.
The tradition of western epistemological thought generally
upholds the distinction between form and content, between what we
say and the reality we talk about. The idea that language and thought
should somehow mimic their content is rejected within this
tradition. In our undergraduate years we have all been taught the
naivety of the idea that the description of something round should
be round itself. Yet here we are confronted with an example that is
in conflict with this common epistemological wisdom. We should
not describe democracy, nor develop 'theories' about it, but
democracy must be represented or 'depicted'; and as the depiction of
a tree always ought to share some structural features (for example, of
form and colour) with the tree itself, so there should be some
resemblances between democracy and the text about democracy.
More specifically, if Tocqueville is correct in saying that democracy
has no centre, that it has neither essence nor nature of its own, this
requires us to adopt a style that bestows on the text exactly the same
characteristics. For if we opt for metaphorical analysis, as almost all
contemporary historical, sociological, and political writing does,
democracy will remain invisible forever. As the last chapters of
Democracy prove, metaphor will provide us with a theoretical
model that is no longer a model of democracy itself; it will inevitably
present us a political system possessing a centre. Metaphor always
and inevitably generates centres. It is only the trope of paradox
therefore that will give us access to sublimity of democracy and that
will respect the anti-essentialism and centrelessness of democracy.
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Already in his own time Tocqueville was rightfully considered to
be the greatest thinker on democracy. Now that democracy at the
end of the millenary seems to be beginning its triumphal procession
over our entire globe, Tocqueville is still our best guide if we wish to
understand democracy. Tocqueville has an undeniable right to such
praise since no other political thinker has been more deeply aware of
the paradoxes and the sublimity that are forever the glory of
democracy.
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The formation of styles: science and the
applied arts
JAMES W. MCALLISTER
STYLE AND REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE
On traditional models of scientific practice, whenever there arise
two or more incompatible theories purporting to explain the same
domain of phenomena, scientists choose one from amongst them by
applying criteria of empirical adequacy. These criteria attribute
value to empirical virtues of theories, such as their predictive
accuracy and scope, their ability to generate novel predictions, and
the degree of their simplicity.
Certainly, this model of theory-choice is still capable of
accounting for very many notable episodes in the history of the
sciences. However, the realisation has grown that, in order to
achieve even better agreement with the historical record, the belief
that scientists decide choices among theories by examining their
empirical qualities needs to be supplemented by reference to extra-
empirical, and particularly to aesthetic, criteria which scientists
use. There is now little doubt that scientific communities choose
among available theories not only for their empirical performance,
but in part also on the application of aesthetic criteria of
assessment.1 It appears that these evaluations are guided by what
may be considered 'stylistic canons', often holding across an entire
scientific community, in which given aesthetic features of theories
are attributed positive values. Examples of such features are the
form of a theory's simplicity (such as 'ontological parsimony', or
'arithmetical simplicity'), its symmetry properties, and its suscept-
ibility to particular analogical interpretations (such as by mechan-
istic analogies).2
The following is a model of the mechanism by which these
aesthetic or stylistic canons are constructed and revised.3 On this
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model, the mechanism is inductive. A community constructs its
stylistic canon at a certain date from among the aesthetic features of
all past theories by attributing to each feature a weighting propor-
tional to the degree of empirical success scored up to that date by the
theories which have embodied that feature. (The degree of empirical
success scored by theories is, of course, judged by the application of
the community's empirical criteria of theory-evaluation.) The collec-
tion of aesthetic features and weightings thus assembled forms the
community's stylistic canon.
For an illustration of this mechanism, imagine the following
scenario. A scientific community looks back over the recent history
of a particular branch of its physical science. It perceives that several
of its past theories, which have been empirically very successful,
exhibited ontological parsimony to notable degree; and that certain
other past theories which it had entertained, which supported
mechanistic analogies, scored on the contrary little empirical
success. Both 'ontological parsimony' and 'tractability by mechan-
istic analogies' are, on this model, aesthetic qualities of theories. In
consequence of the empirical success of the ontologically parsimo-
nious theories, ontological parsimony will obtain an increased
weighting in the aesthetic canon of theory-evaluation which the
community will hereafter apply in the relevant science. On the other
hand, the property of being tractable by mechanistic analogies will
receive a lowered weighting in the canon, in virtue of the scarce
empirical success of recent theories which displayed this property.
Of several implications of this inductive mechanism, two are
worthy of note here.
Firstly, the mechanism ensures that stylistic canons in science are
conservative: they will tend to attribute greater value to, and to
recommend for adoption, theories which are stylistically similar to
past theories, in duplicating the aesthetic features embodied by the
empirically more successful theories of the recent past. This
phenomenon can be described by saying that scientific activity
traverses periods in which a certain style is dominant.4 For instance,
successive theories in the principal physical sciences from the end
of the seventeenth century onwards showed a unifying 'Newtonian
style': they exhibited (among other aesthetic features) the form of
simplicity embodied in Newton's theory of gravitation, in seeking to
resolve all problems into the effect of radial forces.5
Secondly, while the inductive process is of itself continuous, in
the sense that under its operation any change in the composition of a
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stylistic canon is achieved continuously or gradually, it is easy to
envisage situations which might prompt the discontinuous substitu-
tion of one stylistic canon by another in the community. Consider
the following two cases.
Continuous development of a stylistic canon will be obtained
while the canon's rate of evolution roughly maintains pace with the
evolution of the aesthetic features exhibited by the sequence of
theories which come to be embraced by the community. This is the
situation in which theories embodying new features appear infre-
quently enough, or demonstrate their empirical power gradually
enough, that the stylistic canon is able to reshape itself so as to come
to value highly the particular aesthetic features which the theories
exhibit. In this situation, in other words, the stylistic canon is able to
renew itself as fast as the style of successive empirically successful
theories changes.
If, on the other hand, the aesthetic features of the theories
progressively adopted by the community evolve too fast, the
community's aesthetic evaluative canon will no longer be able to
renew itself sufficiently quickly to reflect those changes. The canon
will lag behind developments, continuing to attach the greatest
weight to aesthetic features which were exhibited by the commu-
nity's former best theories, but which are not shown by the current
best theories. In these circumstances, in order to remove conflict in
theory-choice, some members of the community will see no
alternative but to suspend their allegiance to the established
aesthetic canon, and to conduct theory-choice on empirical criteria
alone.
An illustration both of the inherent conservatism of aesthetic
canons, and of a decision by the progressive members of a
community to suspend allegiance to aesthetic commitments, is
offered by the early history of quantum physics. The decision to
formulate non-deterministic theories of atomic phenomena was
taken by several scientists in the early decades of the twentieth
century in order to solve empirical problems which were defeating
the resources of classical physical theory. However, conservative
scientists like M. Planck and A. Einstein soon came to oppose the
new quantum mechanics, on grounds which are most accurately
described as aesthetic and metaphysical: Einstein opposed the
theory not because of any empirical deficiency of it, but because he
felt it depicted a universe lacking harmony and beauty. More
progressive colleagues of his, most notably N. Bohr, chose on the
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contrary to abandon the commitments they may have had to
aesthetic preferences entrenched by exposure to classical physics,
and embraced quantum mechanics in virtue of its empirical
successes.
By this route one reaches an interpretation of the notion of
'scientific revolution', as a suspension of a community's aesthetic
evaluative canon (after which a fresh aesthetic canon is of course
formed by the postrevolutionary community, through the renewed
operation of the inductive mechanism already described). There are
several well-known transitions in the history of science which on
this model are interpreted as revolutions. For example, the pre-
ference for interpreting the planets' path as circular was deeply
entrenched in Ptolemaic and Copernican astronomical theory up to
the seventeenth century. It prompted initial resistance to J. Kepler's
theory, which attributed to the planets elliptical rather than circular
orbits. However, Kepler's theory gradually demonstrated its predic-
tive superiority, contributing to the overthrow of the previously
long-held aesthetic and metaphysical commitments, and leading to
the formation of a new canon of theory-assessment in planetary
astronomy. Because of the discontinuous change in the community's
aesthetic evaluative canon which this episode witnessed, it counts
on the present scheme as a revolution.6
While this model of theory-assessment enjoys good accord with
data on several episodes in the history of science, the suggestion that
the canons of theory-assessment constructed by the inductive
mechanism are indeed aesthetic canons, rather than canons of some
other sort, has attracted some scepticism. In response, this chapter
seeks to support the idea that aesthetic evaluative canons may be
constructed in scientific practice by roughly the mechanism
described above. This aim will be pursued by pointing out that
aesthetic or stylistic canons are in some of the applied arts
constructed by a similar sort of mechanism. It will be argued that the
similarities between the manner of formation of styles in science and
of styles in the applied arts are sufficiently striking for us to
conclude that the same processes underlie both phenomena, and
hence that the evaluative canons in science discussed above are as
'aesthetic' as those in art.
The following treatment of some episodes of the history of
architecture and other applied arts draws on the idea that, roughly
speaking, a certain new material or technique of construction can
foster the establishment of a new aesthetic or stylistic canon, once
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resistance grounded on pre-existing stylistic canons has been
overcome. (For present purposes, a known material used for the first
time in a new activity or context counts as 'a new material'.)
THE ARCHITECTURAL USE OF CAST IRON
Before 1750, cast iron had been used very little in construction in
Britain, chiefly in railings, fire-backs, and other decorative and
domestic fittings, rather than in structural roles. The greatest
familiarity with the material had been gained not by architects
schooled in aesthetics, but by engineers trained in the technical
aspects of foundry. Because of this, the first structural uses of cast
iron in building were prompted primarily by non-architects, and
motivated by practical rather than aesthetic concerns.7
One of the building sectors in which practical concerns were most
prominent was the construction of bridges. Masonry was still the
customary material for bridges towards the end of the eighteenth
century, but ironmasters and engineers began then to suggest that
cast iron be used, partly in the effort to obtain long spans. The
ironmaster J. Wilkinson recommended the use of iron when plans
were drawn up to bridge the River Severn at Coalbrookdale in
Shropshire, the county at the centre of pioneering work in iron
casting: his efforts resulted in 1779 in the world's first cast-iron
bridge, by the ironmaster A. Darby.8 The civil engineer T. Telford,
who was county surveyor to Shropshire, built no fewer than five iron
bridges in the county. The first of these, over the River Severn at
Buildwas (1796), was of particular importance, since it contained
notable improvements over the design of the Coalbrookdale bridge,
thanks to which it achieved greater economy in its use of iron.
Another engineer, J. Rennie, erected several iron bridges, including
one over the River Witham at Boston, Lincolnshire (1803), and the
Southwark Bridge over the Thames in London (1819). The tradition
whereby the design and construction of bridges in cast iron fell to
civil engineers rather than architects was carried forth by I. K.
Brunei, among others. By his time, iron bridge-building was firmly
established in France as well as in Britain.
Another practical concern which prompted the recourse to iron in
building was fireproofing. Fire was a great concern in the eighteenth
century wherever people assembled in large numbers either for
work, as in factories and warehouses, or for entertainment, as in
theatres. Textile mills in both Britain and France traditionally had
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internal structures of heavy timber beams and columns. Since they
were lit by naked flames, and the machinery which they housed
used inflammable lubricants, they were very vulnerable to fire. In
the last years of the eighteenth century, several mills burned down
with great losses, and it became imperative for mill owners to find
ways of making their buildings incombustible. Cast-iron-framed
mills were developed largely in response to this need. Their
designers were primarily not architects but, as were the designers of
the early iron bridges, engineers: often the same engineers who were
simultaneously using cast iron in developing jennies and looms of
new designs and the steam engines which would power them. The
engineer W. Strutt and R. Arkwright, the inventor of the spinning
jenny, erected a six-storey cotton mill at Derby in 1792-3 which had
iron columns (though still retained timber beams, protected by
plaster sheathing) and was described as fireproof. The engineers who
perfected rotary-motion steam-engines, M. Boulton and J. Watt,
constructed a much-imitated seven-storey cotton mill in Salford in
1801 which employed not only cast-iron columns but also I-section
cast-iron girders to carry the floors.9
These applications of iron by engineers allowed the new material
to demonstrate its potential in solving structural problems in
building, and encouraged architects to contemplate exploiting it.
However, the early uses of iron by architects reveal misgivings about
the material's aesthetic acceptability which the engineers had not
felt.
Where engineers used iron to solve what they regarded primarily
as engineering problems, they tended to be unconscious of or to
ignore architectural styles or mannerisms evolved for use with
previous materials: it was this insulation which helped them to
produce the remarkable examples of original design embodied for
instance in the early iron bridges. However, largely because of
professional demarcations, the designs of bridges and industrial
buildings produced by engineers were not considered to enter the
scope of architectural-aesthetic concerns. It is not of course that
these structures had no style, merely that their style went unrecog-
nised as such. By contrast, the work of members of the architectural
profession fell - virtually by definition - within the scope of
aesthetic canons. Because of this, the architects who first came to use
iron in structural roles often felt the need to be 'architectural'. In
their eyes, this meant continuing to apply prevailing aesthetic
guidelines, despite the fact that these had been evolved before the
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arrival onto the architectural scene of iron structures and drew their
justification from the aesthetic potentialities of pre-existing and
familiar materials, such as masonry. Architects could not prevent
engineers from designing whatever structures they chose outside the
architectural domain, but intended that within their domain the
established canons should be retained.
The architects' established styles frequently led them to conceal
any iron structures which they or engineers had designed behind
claddings and trimmings in some traditional material, and shaped in
some traditional style. Among the earliest architect-designed build-
ings which incorporate cast iron in structural roles is H. Labrouste's
Bibliothèque Ste-Geneviève in Paris (1843-50).10 The graceful
vaulting of the library's reading-room could have been achieved only
through the use of slender iron columns and arches: to this extent,
the form of the building is determined by the new material. The iron-
frame structure is visible within the reading-room; however, the
library has a facade of masonry in a generally conventional Neo-
Renaissance design, which completely hides the internal iron frame
from public view.
The same lack of aesthetic conviction is apparent in several mid-
eighteenth-century railway stations in Britain. The design of stations
was often the outcome of collaboration between architects and
engineers, and sometimes the resulting edifices reflect an uneasy
compromise between the professions. For instance, in St Paneras
Station in London (1864), the engineer W. H. Barlow erected a cast-
iron train-shed of which the elegant pointed arch had the widest
span ever achieved; but this was entirely concealed from the
approach to the station by the massive Gothic head-building in
traditional masonry designed by Sir George Gilbert Scott.11 The
aesthetic ambivalence of this kind of marriage has been illuminated
by J. Gloag's remark that in the mid-nineteenth century in Britain
engineers saw themselves as 'putters-up of structures', while
architects were 'putters-on of styles'.12
Clearly by this time it had not yet been accepted by many
architects that iron, for all its technical advantages, was worthy of
aesthetic acceptance as a material for public display. Some still tried
to confine the use of iron to 'utilitarian', 'non-architectural' build-
ings. As late as 1863, the influential German architect G. Semper was
declaring that while iron was a suitable material for railway stations,
in view of their impermanent nature, stone was the only true
material for monumental art, including libraries.13
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Gradually, however, some critics began to call for the open and
visible use of iron in buildings of all categories. In the 1860s, E. E.
Viollet-le-Duc retraced the failings of many current architectural
projects to a lack of authenticity, deriving from the fact that the
forms actually imposed on buildings were not those most appro-
priate to the materials or techniques of construction employed:
We construct public buildings which lack style, because we attempt to ally
forms bequeathed by certain traditions to requirements which no longer bear
relation to those traditions. Naval architects and mechanical engineers do
not, when building a steamship or a locomotive, seek to recall the forms of
sailing-ships of the time of Louis XIV or of harnessed stage-coaches. They
obey unquestioningly the new principles which are given them and produce
works which have their own character and their proper style.14
Viollet-le-Duc demands two things: that any materials of construc-
tion used in a building should appear openly, not hidden by
cladding, and that structures should follow the stylistic principles
most suited to their materials, rather than mimic forms appropriate
to other ages. If cast iron is used in the frame of a building, for
example, firstly it ought to remain visible from the exterior, and not
clothed in masonry or stucco, and secondly the style impressed on
the entire building should be the one which permits the fullest
exploitation of the technical capabilities of iron.
By the end of the nineteenth century, Viollet-le-Duc's call for
authenticity was answered within his profession, and architects felt
able to use cast iron openly in public buildings. A particularly
influential demonstration of the uses of iron was given in two
buildings erected for the Paris Universal Exhibition of 1889.15
In the Galerie des Machines, by the engineer V. Contamin and the
architect F. Dutert, which was an exhibition pavilion boasting a span
of over one hundred metres (demolished in 1910), iron and the
forms appropriate to its use were not so much displayed as flaunted.
The building's gross structure was constituted by a number of
trusses or arches, each made up of two symmetric halves, which
touched at a point along the centre-line of the roof. Each truss
thinned noticeably towards the ground, unlike stone or masonry
columns, which generally taper upwards. This building's design
embodied distinctive architectural-aesthetic principles, permitted by
the characteristics of iron, and not seen in buildings designed with
earlier materials in mind: for instance, the separation between beam
and column had vanished, so that it was no longer possible to
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distinguish between load and support. The effect of the gallery was
described by C. Schädlich:
All the aesthetic ideas associated with stone buildings have been turned on
their head in one instant. With the point-like bearing surfaces for the great
masses, the seemingly floating vaulting, and the transparency of the whole
construction, in similar fashion to the related station halls, new aesthetic
laws are postulated which, understandably, not all observers readily accept
as a legitimate architectural medium. The architecture lives by its own laws
of completely integrated and visibly composed iron design.16
In this building, in short, no style had been applied to the structure,
other than the one which arose naturally from the structure's
material.
The second notable building erected for the 1889 exhibition was,
of course, the three-hundred metre iron tower by G. Eiffel. At first,
this was commonly considered a hideous monster. Even before its
completion, the Artists' Protest of 1887, instigated by C. Gamier, the
architect of the Paris Opera House, and signed by the writers G. de
Maupassant and E. Zola among others, requested that the tower not
be retained beyond the close of the exhibition, on the grounds of its
ugliness.
In the face of this criticism, the commonplace early defence of the
tower was to enumerate its utilitarian justifications, such as the
benefits it offered for communications and scientific research (in
physics and meteorology, for instance). This manner of justifying
iron structures, hinging entirely on their utilitarian advantages,
virtually concedes the aesthetic ground to the conservatives, as if it
were too much to argue that a structure like the Eiffel Tower could
ever be considered beautiful. Soon, however, iron buildings began to
acquire also an aesthetic defence, in virtue of the fact that the
architectural aesthetic had begun to be remoulded by the forms
characteristic of the new material. Thanks to this evolution of
aesthetic canons, the Eiffel Tower outgrew its perception as a
monster, acquiring in time the status of modern icon.17
By the end of the nineteenth century, cast iron (and later its
structurally similar replacement, steel) was admitted into the
vernacular of civic architecture. This evolution threw into the
shadow some of the materials which had earlier dominated
architectural style. According to J. K. Huysmans, for instance, the
contrast with iron made stone appear 'played out, exhausted by its
repeated use' in the buildings erected for the 1889 Paris exhibition.
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'It could only produce better disguised or more skilfully linked
borrowings from old forms.'w
The design innovations prompted by cast iron made their
appearance at different times in different countries. For instance,
Vienna came to know the iron structures pioneered in such
centres as London and Paris only late in the nineteenth century
and in a tamer form. Designing the stations of the Vienna city
railway system in 1894-1901, O. Wagner allowed iron beams and
arches to emerge to the exterior, but he remained under the spell
of the traditional impulse to architectural beautification, which led
him to incorporate such features into quasi-Baroque stone
facades.19
f In the gradual introduction and acceptance into architecture of
cast iron, three partially overlapping phases may be discerned. In
the first, iron was still foreign to architectural work. Engineers
progressively demonstrated its utilitarian advantages by employing
it in structures outside the commonly accepted scope of the
architectural aesthetic, such as bridges and industrial buildings. In
the second phase, architects began to exploit iron for its utilitarian
attributes; however, the pre-existing stylistic canons in architecture
- centred upon the use of masonry — still forbade the new material a
place in aesthetic constructions, and architects felt the continuing
need to conform to these canons by concealing iron structures
behind more conventional claddings.
In the third phase, towards the end of the nineteenth century,
misgivings at the lack of authenticity involved in this masking
prompted more open uses of iron; gradually, the material began to
reshape architects' stylistic canons. The opinion grew in strength
that architectural canons ought no longer to hinder the exploitation
of iron: whereas in the earlier stages the manner of using iron would
have bowed to the requirements of architectural canons, it was
increasingly felt that from then on the architectural canons ought to
reflect the usefulness of iron. As the German critic A. Gurlitt wrote
in 1899: 'The question . . . is not how to mould iron to make it
conform to our taste, but the much more important one, how to
mould our taste to make it conform with iron?'20 It was in
consequence of this appreciation that iron structures began to be
regarded as susceptible of holding aesthetic value. When this stage
became established, architects working in iron were no longer
imposing alien styles onto iron structures, but allowing the struc-
tures to find the styles most appropriate to them.
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THE INTRODUCTION OF REINFORCED CONCRETE IN
ARCHITECTURE
The stages through which cast iron gradually established itself in
architecture as a material with not only utilitarian benefits but also
aesthetic dignity were traversed also, with a lag of a few decades, by
reinforced concrete.21
During the twentieth century, concrete came to be appreciated as a
material offering the possibility of architectural forms self-evidently
different from those of brick, stone, or iron. Its plasticity allows it to
assume any curve or other shape in which moulds can be
constructed, and its monolithicity permits traditional separations
between different building elements, such as wall and roof, to be
superseded. But the earliest types of concrete were seen merely as
synthetic stone, apt to mimic at lower cost the effects typical of the
long-established techniques of masonry construction. Stuccoed
rubble, treated to simulate masonry, was used in France as early as
the reign of Louis XVI by architects attempting to recreate the
splendour of mansions of former times for fashionable but impover-
ished clients. As long as concrete was used in no other guise, the
architectural principles which governed the practice of construction
in masonry could easily be applied to it.
Concrete grew better appreciated in Britain in the 1870s, when it
became habitual to cite to its advantage two qualities, alongside its
low cost: that it was 'sanitary' (or hygienic) and 'fireproof'. The first
quality was valued especially in workers' dwellings, and the second
- once again - in public and industrial buildings. In France,
following some destructive fires in the textile district around
Roubaix and Tourcoing in the 1890s, the great pioneer F. Henne-
bique built a number of concrete spinning mills. The possibility of
filling structural concrete frames with nothing but sheets of glass
permitted the fulfilment of a further requirement, the provision of
adequate light in multi-storey factory blocks. In short, the qualities of
concrete were found to meet some utilitarian needs of the new
industrial society.
Initially, discussions among architects and engineers about the use
of concrete were confined to its technical aspects, as if the problem
of finding pleasing and appropriate forms did not arise for such a
utilitarian material; but as its use grew more widespread, it became
apparent that the chief remaining obstacle to its full acceptance as an
architectural medium lay in the difficulties of giving it an appro-
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priate appearance. The usual tendency, reminiscent of the habit of
cladding cast-iron structures which was then gradually being
discontinued, was to follow tradition in imposing upon any visible
concrete surfaces either a cladding in some other material, or a finish
which mimicked stone.
The ambivalence of architects torn between the exploitation of
concrete for its utilitarian advantages and the concealment of the
material for its aesthetic unacceptability is illustrated by one of the
landmark buildings in concrete in California. The Leland Stanford
Junior Museum of Stanford University was designed by E. L.
Ransome in 1889-91 to have the entire wall and floor in concrete.
On the one hand, this is probably the earliest building in which
concrete is left exposed, rather than being regarded as a cheap
infilling or backing to which a fair surface had subsequently to be
applied. On the other hand, the concrete surface is deliberately
tooled to imitate masonry, to complement the building's traditional
design and classical colonnade.
The approach of concrete towards full architectural acceptance
was promoted by architects and critics who, much like Viollet-le-
Duc on behalf of cast iron, urged acknowledgment that the
characteristics of a new material ought to be allowed to dictate the
manner of its own ornament and presentation, rather than being
constricted into the idiom of some other material. The concern for
authenticity surfaced for instance in 1901 in the comments of the
critic P. Forthuny on a concrete building, designed by E. Arnaud and
incorporating both offices and apartments, which had been erected
in Paris three years earlier. Arnaud had feared public disapproval of
a bare concrete facade, and had therefore faced his building with
cement rendering of conventional form. Forthuny regrets this act as
missing an opportunity to help develop an aesthetic appropriate to
concrete:
Reinforced concrete is a new material, and has no links with the systems of
construction which preceded it; it must thus necessarily draw from within
itself its exterior aspects, which must be clearly differentiated from familiar
modellings in wood, marble or stone. How can one innovate lines and
surface modellings in domestic architecture which are in some way the
consequence of the use of reinforced concrete? . . . M. Arnaud has doubtless
not dared to risk such an undertaking . . . How much more edifying his
façade would have been had he just made the effort to adorn it in its own
way, extracting from the study of his material the elements of an entirely
personal decoration of his own design.22
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Once again, the stage of development of a new material had been
reached in which authenticity was perceived to demand its open
use, and the exploration of the aesthetic implications of such use.
Reinforced concrete achieved its aesthetic maturity perhaps in the
work of the French architect A. Perret, whose career shows an
increasingly undisguised use of concrete.23 One of his earlier works
is the well-known apartment block at 25b, Rue Franklin, in Paris
(1903). The skeleton of this building is entirely in concrete, and
consists of columns, beams, and slabs, which have the advantage of
removing from the plan of the apartments any load-bearing walls.
But the facade appears as yet unwilling to acknowledge the material
which dictates the building's form, and is clad in ceramic tiles.
Before long, however, Perret came to reject such ornamental veneers,
and displayed the concrete frames of his buildings undisguised. He
did this first in buildings such as the Admiralty Research Labora-
tories, on Boulevard Victor, in Paris (1928): these are simple
rectangular buildings with blank walls in which the structural
elements were displayed openly. While architectural innovations
might be dismissed as lacking aesthetic implications in buildings of
such utilitarian functions as laboratories for technical research,
Perret soon extended the use of bare concrete to buildings with
greater aesthetic pretensions. The deepest architectural acceptance
of a new material is perhaps signalled when it comes to be used
visibly in religious buildings: Ferret's Notre Dame du Raincy (1922)
exhibited columns and vaulted slabs of concrete framing large
expanses of glazed non-load-bearing walls.
Even at this advanced date, many architectural critics objected to
Perret's design, maintaining that, in a church, concrete ought to be
confined to vaulting and be covered by a decorative veneer, since its
appearance was insufficiently noble for the building's liturgical
functions. None the less, concrete had by that moment generally
attained architectural acceptance in virtue of its aesthetic potential-
ities as well as of its utilitarian advantages. From then, one could
begin to speak literally of the aesthetic of reinforced concrete,
meaning by that expression the aesthetic canon which sprang in this
way from the architectural use of the material.24
The stages outlined for cast iron and reinforced concrete could be
retraced for many other materials, such as aluminium and plate
glass, as well as for many construction techniques. Almost every
building material and technique has undergone a kind of aesthetic
apprenticeship, moving from the fringes of architectural activity to
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its centre, initially on the strength of its utilitarian applicability,
until it had reshaped architectural taste and expectations so as to
carve out a place for itself in the prevailing aesthetic canons.25
MATERIALS AND FORMS IN INDUSTRIAL DESIGN
The aesthetic apprenticeship served by materials in architecture is
perceptible also in other applied arts, such as industrial design.26
There too, new materials are first used to mimic styles established by
their more familiar predecessors. This mimicry is often essential in
the manufacture of consumer goods, which would fail to appeal to
aesthetically conservative householders if clothed in styles consid-
ered too futuristic or iconoclastic. Only gradually do manufacturers
allow their designers to communicate to their products those new
forms permitted by the new material; and then only gradually do
some of these forms win acceptance among consumers. Eventually,
of course, the consumers may come to expect such objects to have
no appearance other than the one made familiar by the new material.
An example of this cycle is provided by the bent steel which
became available for household goods in the second half of the
nineteenth century. Early designs for furniture using this material
tended to imitate traditional wood-inspired styles, and few designers
took steel as a prompt to develop new forms. It was only with the
advent of tubular-steel structures in the 1920s that furniture design
began to respond to the new aesthetic possibilities offered by the
material.27 Similarly, plastics, which began to appear in consumer
goods after the First World War, were initially seen only as an
economical substitute material to be used in such articles as buttons,
buckles, and combs; these objects in plastic tended to mimic the
forms and appearance of their predecessors in the traditional and
more expensive wood, horn, or ivory. Only in the 1930s did the
aesthetic possibilities of moulded plastics begin to be explored, in
such objects as portable radios, after which the new visual images
offered by plastics grew to command their own aesthetic credit.
When manufacturers give a new material, in its early phases,
traditional forms, neglecting to pursue its distinguishing aesthetic
possibilities, they reassure the aesthetically conservative public, but
often horrify progressive designers and critics, who may see in this a
kind of duplicity bordering on betrayal. One such is N. Pevsner, who
lists some of his dislikes:
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In a cardboard travelling-case made to imitate alligator skin, in a bakélite
hair-brush made to imitate enamel - there is something dishonest. A
pressed-glass bowl trying to look like crystal, a machine-made coal-scuttle
trying to look hand-beaten, machine-made mouldings on furniture, a tricky
device to make an electric fire look like a flickering coke fire, a metal
bedstead masquerading as wood - all that is immoral.28
The forms imposed on each of these articles seemingly deny its new
materials or techniques of manufacture, and mimic those most apt
for a past material or technique.
THE INDUCTION TO STYLES
The above accounts of the emergence of styles appropriate to new
materials in architecture and in industrial design echo the model of
the formation of aesthetic canons in science that I outlined at the
beginning of this chapter. These echoes can be made sharper, by
choosing similar language in which to describe developments in the
two domains. This is attempted in the following couple of
paragraphs.
The model of theory-evaluation that I outlined at the beginning of
this chapter pays regard to the evolution of three factors affecting the
community's judgement: the empirical power of each theory within
the sequence of theories embraced by the community, the aesthetic
features displayed by those theories, and the community's aesthetic
evaluative canon. The empirical power of a theory adds weight to
that theory's particular aesthetic features within the community's
aesthetic evaluative canon; in turn, this canon is used to pass
aesthetic judgements on future theories. An entrenched aesthetic
canon will cause the community to produce and esteem aestheti-
cally orthodox theories. Sometimes a theory emerges which, perhaps^]
in consequence of pursuing new approaches or techniques, shows
unprecedented aesthetic features. Such a theory is likely at first to be
resisted within the community, in virtue of the community's
established aesthetic canon. When and only when this theory, or
others similar to it, has shown sufficient empirical^_success
(especially if its success cannot seem to be emulated by theories of
more orthodox aesthetic form), its own aesthetic features gain weight
within the evaluative canon. This allows the new theory to win
aesthetic as well as empirical acceptance. The revision of the
evaluative canon ensures that credit will more likely be extended to
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future theories which embody the new aesthetic features, enabling
the community to pursue further the approach or technique which
gave rise to the new style.
Similarly, the above accounts of the origin of aesthetic canons in
architecture refer to the evolution of the following three factors:
the perceived utilitarian worth of past buildings, their architec-
tural-aesthetic features, and a community's architectural or sty-
listic canon. The utilitarian worth of a past building adds to the
weight attributed in the community's stylistic canon to the stylistic
elements which that building exhibits; in turn, the canon is used
both to guide and to assess the design of future buildings. A well-
entrenched aesthetic canon will cause the community to design
and esteem aesthetically orthodox buildings. This orthodoxy of
design will be maintained even in the early stages of the
exploitation of a new architectural material. When a building
showing aesthetic features made possible by and appropriate to
the new material is erected, it is at first resisted within the
community in virtue of the established aesthetic canon. When and
only when this building, or others stylistically similar to it, shows
sufficient utilitarian worth (especially if its practical applications
cannot apparently be matched by buildings of more orthodox
aesthetic form), do its own aesthetic features gain weight within
the evaluative canon, allowing buildings in the new style to win
acceptance on aesthetic as well as utilitarian grounds. The revision
of the evaluative canon ensures that credit will more likely be
extended to future buildings which embody the new stylistic
features, enabling architects to exploit further the material or
technique which gave rise to the new style.
| In both domains, then, the demonstrated empirical or utilitarian
I worth of a work (the predictive power of a theory in science, the
; utilitarian applicability of a building in architecture) is capable of
reshaping the stylistic canons by which new creations (further
theories in science, further buildings in architecture) are evaluated
and by which the line of progress of the discipline is partly
determined.
In this light, the same stages of innovation and conservatism can
be identified in the two domains. Copernicus' theory has within
early-modern planetary astronomy the position occupied by a
masonry building within mid-nineteenth-century architecture,
before the exploitation of concrete had begun: both creations fully
accord with the well-established, if soon-to-decline, stylistic canons
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in their field. The early versions of quantum mechanics, which still
won the approval of Planck and Einstein, occupy within the
twentieth-century revolution in physics a position analogous to that
of Labrouste's Bibliothèque Ste-Geneviève in the rise of cast-iron
architecture: both works contain elements of profound innovation,
but retain enough of the appearance of a long-established style to
appeal to the conservative critics who would soon part company
with the new trends.
These interpretations of the rise of stylistic or aesthetic canons in
science and in the applied arts prompt a couple of closing
reflections.
Firstly, the fact that certain evaluative canons used by scientists
originate in procedures isomorphic to those of the formation of
stylistic canons in the applied arts supports the idea that those
scientific canons are indeed aesthetic, rather than being evaluative
canons of some other nature. Here is therefore some evidence that
scientific communities subject their creations to an aesthetic judge-
ment, alongside the logico-empirical evaluations whose operation is
almost universally recognised.
Secondly, some further light is shed on the relationship between
at least some of the sciences and some of the arts. The contention of
this chapter is that the procedures in which certain aesthetic or
stylistic canons arise in sciences and in arts are identical, in that
they are both inductive. There is therefore scope here for genuine
generalisation over the two domains, perhaps via the hypotheses
that these procedures are the manifestation of the same psycholo-
gical tendency to value forms which have become associated with
utilitarian worth, or of the same mechanisms of stylistic habituation
in creative communities.
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Beyond the mannered: the question of style
in philosophy or questionable styles
of philosophy
NICHOLASDAVEY
INTRODUCTION: ON THE FATALITY OF A SPELLING
MISTAKE1
If, as Wittgenstein suggested, 'language can go on holiday', then like
all travellers it too runs the risk of taking the wrong connection. No
doubt anticipating the increasing preference amongst English
tourists for Greece rather than Spain, the English spelling of the
word 'style' has immortalised an error. The spelling with a 'y' stems
from the erroneous notion that the word reflects the Greek stulos
meaning column. Etymology, however, identifies the Latin stilus,
spelt with an 'i' meaning writing or a writing instrument, as the
appropriate root. But what would have happened if Englishmen had
decided to spell properly? 'Style' (manner, mode or fashion of
expression) would be indistinguishable from 'stile', meaning a
barrier to climb through or over. Thereby hangs a philosophical tale.
Plato and Gadamer are not the only philosophers who view the
problems posed by stilus (writing) as something stilelike (steigen) to
be surmounted. The questions raised by the issue of style in
philosophy pose formidable obstacles in the path of philosophy
remaining a meaningful enterprise.
Tchaikovsky penned in his diary, 'Nothing is true except what is
unsaid.' Re-formulated, the remark succinctly captures the decon-
structive view that 'Nothing could be true, nothing could have a
meaning, except the unsaid.' The notion of a limitless potential for
variant meanings within language, the assertion of no meaning-in-
itself, has prompted the re-emergence of the question of style in
philosophy. Though there is nothing substantive to be said anymore,
there remain ways of saying, rhetorics and stylistic conceits. Without
doubt, the emergence of the question of style in philosophy has
177
Beyond the mannered
several clear advantages. It is not without reason that Rorty comments
that nothing is so valuable for an hermeneutic inquirer than the
discovery of an epistemology in a given text.2 Once what the author is
'about' can be ascertained, it can be asked whether the expressive
idiom used is appropriate to the ideas conveyed (as in the instance of
Schopenhauer placing an existential insight in the formal dress of
Kantian transcendentalism) or whether the stylistic mode injects
nuances into the content which do not belong there (consider the
difficulties facing any formulation of flux in subject-predicate based
languages). There is, however, a significant dimension to the question
of style in philosophy which is negatively nihilistic and threatens to
incapacitate philosophy's faith in the meaningfulness of its insights.
Far from seeking a transcendental basis for a consideration of style, it
is the quasi-transcendental ground, the detachment from the experi-
ence of meaningfulness which as this chapter will argue, is the root
cause of attempts to reduce philosophy to issues of style. Ironically,
deconstructive thought embodies such a disinterested detachment. It
looks at propositions and statements not as catalysts for an experience
of meaningfulness, as invitations to think about potentialities for
enhancing our existence, but as constructs and formulations valuable
only as examples of literary feigning and stylistic decisions. Whilst
acknowledging what the analysis of style can achieve for philosophy,
the primary aims of this chapter are to identify the threat posed by the
stylistic analytics of deconstruction and to diminish it by exposing
the faulty reasoning which sustains it.
We shall now turn to the thinking which animates deconstruc-
tion's attempt to reduce all philosophical statements to a body of
rhetorical idioms or stylistic stratagems.
HOW TO BUILD A STILE
When Willem de Kooning commented that 'Nothing is positive
about art except that it is a word' and that 'right from there to here all
art became literary',3 he anticipated postmodern literary criticism
which has sought to dissolve the alleged fixed meaning of words into
a limitless horizon of semantic possibilities. Steiner remarks that as
'language knows no conceptual, no projective finality, anything can
be said and, in consequence, written about anything'.* Judgements
about what a word means are ultimately relative: 'they can be
falsified neither on formal logical grounds nor in existential
substance . . . there are no rational or falsifiable decision procedures
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. . . between . . . differing interpretations'.5 Analogous reasonings
enable Derrida to effect an extraordinary historical reversal of
philosophical orientation. Just as Heidegger inverted Platonic
metaphysics by declaring appearance (disclosure) to be the medium
of Being, just as Gadamer overturned Plato's conviction concerning
art's twofold removal from actuality by suggesting that it is precisely
art's unreality that allows it to structure and realise indeterminate
aspects of actuality, so Derrida, tracing out the shadowier linguistic
side of such logics, reveals that philosophy - the very enterprise
which Plato believed could disarm the pernicious manoeuverings of
the rhetorician - is exposed as rhetorical through and through.
Derrida's thought brings to fruition the negative import of
Nietzsche's amputation of the metaphysical. The latter's denial of
Being, his repudiation of meaning-in-itself and his resultant perspec-
tivism, left hermeneuticians wondering whether all philosophical
interpretation has collapsed into the random subjectivities of
differing rhetorics, that is into different manifestations of the will to
power. If the meaning of a word or text is in Derrida's words
'undecideable' ('n'avoir aucun sens decidable'),6 the ascription of
sense, 'the preference of one possible reading over another . . . is no
more than the playful, unstable, undemonstrable option or fiction of
a subjective scanner who constructs and deconstructs purely
semiotic marks as his own momentary pleasures, political, psychic
needs or self-deceptions bid him to'.7
Regarding the question of style in philosophy such comments
have a double edge: 'Le Roi est mort, Vive le Roi!'. On the one hand,
Derrida demolishes the formal distinction between style (form) and
its appropriacy to content for if the 'question of style must be
measured against the question of interpretation itself8 and if, in the
Words of Christopher Norris, 'meaning can never coincide with its
object in a pure unimpeded union',9 that is, if there is no
hermeneutic terminus, the problem of style is abolished. The
absence of substantive meaning suggests that 'there never has been
the style, nor the simulacrum capable of insinuating it'.10 And yet,
on the other hand, if philosophy stripped of its universal pretences
is exposed as 'conceptual poetry' at best or a naked 'conceptual will
to power which aspires to theory'11 at worst, the phoenixlike
question of style re-emerges in two respects. (A) If 'deconstruction
bids fair to overthrow the age old prejudice that elevates philosophic
truth and reason at the expense of literary feigning', philosophy
becomes susceptible to rhetorical démystification: its apparent
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'what' can be shown to emanate from its 'how'.12 The purported
differences between idealism, realism, and empiricism emerge no
less and no more than fictions produced by differing styles of
discourse. The premise of this position is a disbelief in 'philoso-
phical discourse being able to refer to anything beyond itself for
without that assumption, content could once again take precedence
over form. (B) By exploding the myth of a singular foundation for
philosophy, deconstruction opens the door to a pluralism of thought
maintained by varying styles or rhetorics. Its plausibility can only be
'shown' through the operational adoption of a polysemie variety of
Welt-Perspektiven, never by its being stated propositionally (which
would lead to self-contradiction).13 Derrida implies similarly in
Spurs that pluralistic philosophy can only insinuate never state or
propose itself: 'if the simulacrum is ever going to occur, its writing
must be in the interval between several styles'.14
Despite efforts to daub Derrida with the brush of a philosophical
terroriste threatening western culture with deconstructive semtex,
the renewed emphasis he gives to the primacy of writing in
philosophy has consolidated and extended the views of both past
and contemporary thinkers. Nietzsche not only shares Derrida's
view that 'writing is the better part of thinking'15 but also the
conviction that writing is a form of alienated speech which sets
meaning at a distance and variance from that originally intended by
the author: 'What are you after all, my written . . . thoughts'.
Nietzsche laments, but 'always only what is on the verge of
withering and losing its fragrance!'16 Gadamer, a principled oppo-
nent of both Nietzsche and Derrida is haunted by the same problem.
In Truth and Method, 'all writing', he suggests, 'is a kind of alienated
speech . . . Writing involves self-alienation' for 'in writing [the]
meaning of what is spoken exists purely for itself, completely
detached from all emotional elements of expression and commu-
nication'.17 Yet Gadamer exhibits what is for Derrida the phono-
centric prejudice of European philosophy: rather than delighting in
the endless play of interpreting the written word, Gadamer nostalgi-
cally pursues the original intimacy of the inwardly spoken word
which writing disrupts. 'Because the [spoken] meaning has under-
gone a kind of self-alienation through being written down, this
transformation back [into speech and meaning] is the real hermeneu-
tical task.'18 Recognising the importance of Derrida for the con-
temporary re-tracing of the Platonic feud between poetry and
philosophy, Berel Lang in his recent book The Anatomy of
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Philosophical Style adopts a less reductive position than Derrida or
de Man. When Lang states 'we need . . . a theory and practice of
literary philosophy for the same reason that we need philosophy', he
grants that because of philosophy's status as writing, any interpreta-
tion of philosophical texts must unavoidably 'take a position with
respect to the literary or stylistic character of those works'. Yet, by
considering the manner in which the stylistic 'how' of a philosophy
allows its 'what' to put in an appearance, he argues that the 'what' is
not reducible to rhetorical dissimulation alone.19 But here we come
to the crux: what might this 'what' be? Is there a 'zero degree style'
(Lyotard) of philosophy?
The 'zero degree style' - what Lang terms the 'neutralist view' -
asserts 'a single and common ground of philosophical discourse:
propositions which tie predicates to subjects and which ascribe or
deny existence to the variety of objects . . . that comprise the
reference of philosophical discourse'.20 This Lang denies, counter-
asserting that there is no disembodied philosophical text that can be
approached irrespective of considerations of its style. Though he
does not suggest that philosophy in its entirety should be decon-
structed, what that irreducible residue of philosophy is Lang
declines to inform us. Furthermore, Lang's distinctions place him in
a double bind. Despite opposing the zero-degree style notion of
philosophy he is plainly desirous of enforcing a demarcation
between philosophy's literary and conceptual aspects. Yet whatever
this 'other' dimension is, it will in the act of its conveyance
necessarily have a rhetorical or stylistic character in which case the
attempted differentiation collapses. Perhaps Lang's difficulty is that
like deconstructive linguistic philosophers, he tends to inadver-
tently conceive of philosophy exclusively in terms of propositions
and assertions. In so far as any differentiation between philosophy
and rhetorics will have to be spoken or written, that differentiation
unavoidably becomes susceptible to the hermeneutics of suspicion
in a deconstructive idiom. Is it possible to break out of this circle, to
climb over the stile?
The argument to be presented will suggest that an escape is
possible. One reading of Nietzsche's warning that 'when fighting
dragons one should be careful not to become one oneself might be
that since dragons can only fight dragons, an effective way of
preventing a dragon from being able to engage is to become other
than dragon oneself. Combatting deconstructive philosophy in its
own terms is futile. Any counter-proposition would by virtue of its
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use of words be itself deconstructible. Indeed, we accept the
plausibility of the deconstructive stance that there is no meaning-in-
itself and yet, despite this, refuse to accept that philosophy's content
is reducible merely to a set of fictive conceits. What is necessary is to
slip outside that ring of words in which statement and counter-
statement are locked and move from that dominant model of
philosophy as writing alone be it prepositional or narrative. The
attempt is a precarious one for the core of what we wish to suggest is
that there indeed is a dimension of philosophical awareness that
cannot be put into words and, furthermore, it is precisely an
acquaintance with this awareness that prevents philosophy's
collapse into the purely rhetorical and endlessly interprétable. This
might invoke the response that 'What we cannot speak about, we
must pass over in silence'.21 Yet, as with aesthetic experience, what
language cannot state propositionally, it can at least point to. It is
just such a 'pointing to' that this chapter wishes to attempt. That to
be pointed out is the revelatory experience of 'meaningfulness'
which when understood shows why philosophical experience
cannot universally be reduced to the rhetorical and why deconstruc-
tion's emphasis upon the analytics of style is so dangerous.
ON 'REVELATION' , THE 'MOMENT' OF UNDERSTANDING
or
PASSING THROUGH THE TURNSTILES
To dare to speak of revelation, of the profundity of an experience of
meaningfulness, is unquestionably provocative in the present
intellectual climate which places all between the devil and the deep
blue sea. The climate is formed by a meeting of two violently
opposed intellectual systems which share an animate hostility to any
talk of revelation. The positivistic inheritance with its refusal to
admit to the sense of any postulate which cannot submit to
verification and deconstruction which repudiates any claim to the
disclosure of meaning have both conspired to deny the 'revealed'
sense or legitimacy. However, neither has revelation been refuted
nor de-legitimised but merely, to borrow Foucault's terms, 'dis-
placed by dominant discourses'. What then is the experience of
revelation taken to be?
Firstly, we take revelation to be an experience, often unexpected,
of unquestionable meaningfulness. The phenomenological imme-
diacy of that experience cannot be verbally transcribed into proposi-
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tional language for it is something that one undergoes, that happens
to one. It is 'the penny dropping', suddenly coming to the realisation
of what someone is 'getting at', arriving at that point where one will
say 'now I understand what is going on' or 'my God, that's it!' or
even that sudden premonition of what is about to befall the dramatis
personae of a play or novel.
Secondly, and this is of paramount importance to our case, the
experience of meaningfulness overwhelms or renders secondary any
consideration of style or rhetoric. It is solely occupied with the 'what'
of the revealed and not with its 'how'. In his unworthily neglected
Aesthetic Theory, Adorno alludes to this point when he speaks ofthat
artistic truth which when experienced as 'truth' cancels the artwork
with its illusion.22 When that artwork 'speaks' to us, when its
truthfulness becomes apparent, we experience being addressed. We
are focused on what is being told us. That it is an artwork of a certain
medium, that certain fictions might be employed, is irrelevant for in
the moment of being addressed it is the experience of having
something disclosed to one that matters. To be sure, the revealed will
by the fact of its communication will have a stylistic mode, but as
Gadamer insists, in a successful artwork, the style facilitates the
unhindered absorption of the subject-matter disclosed. Paradoxically,
style realises itself in its abnegation.23 hi Truth and Method, he
remarks on the concept of style 'the fundamental purpose of which is
not to exist for itself but for something else, in order to fashion a place
for it within the unity of a life context'.24
The third feature of the experience of a meaningfulness is its
involuntariness, that it 'happens' to one and does not emerge as the
'bottom line' of an analytical procedure. Nietzsche noted how
thoughts come to us not when we will, but when they will. In any
discourse one can suddenly 'see something' irrespective of any
desire of illumination. What is more, what is 'revealed' can be
painfully surprising, contrary to one's expectancies. Gadamer is
accordingly prompted to attribute a certain objectivity to hermeneu-
tical insight in the specifically Kantian sense of it occurring despite
and 'beyond our willing and doing'.25
To recapitulate: the experience of being immersed in a mean-
ingfulness embraces (A) an immediate awareness of something being
'shown' one, (B) it overwhelms any deliberation about style for who,
if spoken to by a God, would quibble about accents?, and (C) it
occurs 'beyond one's willing and doing'. Having outlined what the
experience of revelation is, two qualifications are necessary. The first
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concerns the determinacy of meaning in revelation and the second,
the rhetoric of revelation itself.
(A) On the determinacy of meaning in revelation: In the
experience of illumination something is, as German etymology has
it, 'bared', laid open (Offenbarung). One has the phenomenological
experience of being offered a determinate meaning, that the novel or
sonata is saying this and not that. Now let us not fall into the
Cartesian trap of claiming that the inner certainty of what is revealed
to us is adequate ground for the claim that our experience of a
determinate meaning i's the meaning of the work itself. The
deconstructivist would be perfectly right to insist here that what is
experienced as a determinate meaning could, objectively speaking,
always have countless other possible readings. Such a move is taken
to be deconstruction's decisive blow against the 'revealed' but it is so
only if either those who experience meaningfulness lay claim to the
meaning of the work or if deconstruction supposes the experience of
revelation to be synonymous with such a claim. Neither necessarily
follows. The phenomenological fact of my experience of mean-
ingfulness does not entitle me to claim that the meaningfulness
experienced is the meaning of what I have experienced though
lacking that entitlement has no bearing upon the meaningfulness of
what I have experienced. The experience of meaningfulness remains,
untouched by the deconstructivist's quite proper insistence that
outside of my phenomenological framework, the object of my
experience has any number of meanings. Is this an instance of
'having one's cake and eating it'? Undoubtedly so for we are wishing
to maintain both the unquestionable experience of meaningfulness
and deconstruction's rightful attack on meaning-in-itself. The
experience of meaningfulness has a certain duality. On the one
hand, the experience is an experience of meaningfulness and, on the
other, the manifested meaning is (apart from my experiencing of it)
always susceptible to countless interpretations.
It has been necessary to clarify this dual dimension of revelation
in order to show that a real danger posed by deconstruction is
rhetorical. It seeks to persuade us that because of the universal
absence of intrinsic meaning, our particular experiences of mean-
ingfulness are meaningless. The oblique theologica negativo in the
deconstructivist's position is clear. Its assertion of the absence of
meaning inadvertently declares that meaningfulness would be
meaningful only if meaning in itself were present. We will be
persuaded of this only if by default we accept the claim that in order
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for our experience of meaningfulness to be meaningful there must be
meaning-in-itself. But, as is being contended, the experience of
meaningfulness does not depend on that presence and nor is it
weakened by its absence. What then does that experience rest on?
Here we turn to our second qualification of our understanding of
revelation.
(B) The contextual nature of revelation: A common under-
standing of revelation entails the idea of a sudden inspirational
insight, a view perpetuated by Nietzsche. In Ecce Homo, he writes of
revelation:
The involuntariness of image and metaphor is strangest of all; one no longer
has any notion of what is an image or a metaphor; everything offers itself as
the nearest, most obvious, simplest expression . . . [It seems as if] the words
and wordshrines of all being open before you here all being wishes to
become word.26
Though this passage supports the suggestion that the apprehension
of meaningfulness immediately transcends considerations of style, it
presents a misleadingly incomplete view of revelation. Whilst the
phenomenological occurrence of revelation might be abrupt,
breaking the ordinary or expected flow of experience, there is
nothing arbitrary let alone ex nihilo in the revealed. The experience
may be of 'a bolt coming out of the blue' but the content of that
experience is rarely if at all isolated. In this context Andrew Louth
has argued,
There cannot be pure truth of revelation: for to apprehend a truth which is
received is to relate it to what we already know, to make it one's own . . .
Truth of revelation remains inert till it has been appropriated by a human
working recognition which is hard to distinguish from that [truth] of
discovery.27
Louth points to a central tenet of hermeneutics; the dependence of
the disclosed upon a Vor-Verständnis. Whilst Gadamer articulates
how immersion in the unspoken but 'known' dimensions of a
cultural horizon is the pre-condition of any formulation of its nature,
Polyani stresses how what is explicitly understood within a field of
communicative endeavour rests upon a tacit acquaintance with its
norms and practices.28 Returning to Nietzsche's description of those
revelatory moments in which Zarathustra first appeared to him '6000
feet beyond man and time', though the force of those moments may
have 'thrown him down', what the experience crystallised was a
new formation of many of the philosophical and existential proble-
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matics which had haunted him since the writing of his first book.
The revelation disclosed something he was already deeply ac-
quainted with but presented it in a new light, not so much of a
sudden fracture but a sensing of the terrain around him to have
radically changed and yet remaining not unfamiliar. Such revela-
tions evoke, as Gadamer suggests, the Platonic notion of recognition
but with the qualification that we are not talking of regaining an
insight into a fixed truth dusty with the cobwebs of forgetfulness.29
The problematics Nietzsche was dealing with prior to the writing of
Also Sprach Zarathustra constituted an horizon of undecided and
unrealised positions amongst which was one capable of trans-
forming his understanding of those questions. And yet, though
logically entailed within his horizon, prior to the revelation it
remained phenomenologically hidden from him. The experience of
meaningfulness entails the dawning awareness that what is experi-
enced as complete and fulfilled was already tacitly known but
unrecognised. Revelation is thus not so much the disclosure of the
fixed but the well forming of what was but now no longer is
undecided and unresolved. This conception of illumination has a
Platonic ring about it because it reminds us that revelation is always
'placed' within an already established interpretive quest, within a
project whose very life is to be 'underway'. These enabling
conditions of revelation permit us to put in place that remaining
piece of our argument and thereby allow us to return to the question
of style.
THREADS OF SENSE
In 1885/6 Nietzsche remarked that 'Since Copernicus mankind has
been rolling from the centre towards "x." '30 What Copernicus did
for humanity's sense of ontological security, Derrida has done for
semantic stability. Derrida's achievement has been to reveal how
language in its transference from the spoken to the written opens
realms of possible meaning unimaginable and certainly unattainable
within the purely spoken. The question that presses itself upon us is
whether the always-imminent-logical-possibility that what a word
now means can dissolve into any number of other meanings is of any
existential import? The absence of universal meaning is a perfectly
plausible notion. Why do we not fall into the abyss? An Ancient
Sanskrit poem offers a spectacular image of the human predicament,
being suspended over a darkened snake pit by a single silken thread.
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It is likely that we do (logically) exist in a world where all meaning is
undecidable but neither do we perceive nor live in the world that
way but find ourselves curiously enveiled within a web of
perspectival interpretive threads. Habermas' reworking of Husserl's
notion of cognitive interests is pertinent. In The Philosophical
Discourse of Modernity he speaks of 'the innovative potential of art
and literature for our life-world and life-history, worlds which
assume and rely on a whole complex of functions and structures that
perpetuate and extend our life-world',31 a 'life-world' which with its
horizon of meaning serves as the basis of the cognitive interest we
take in our environment. Its interests are those umbilical threads of
sense which weave us into the constitutive projects of our histories
and traditions, projects which enable self-understanding on the one
hand and, on the other, prevent us from falling into the abyss. Where
the possibilities for meaning are inexhaustible, our cognitive frame-
works select interpretive options open to us and will not even
acknowledge others as possibilities. It is always within these fields
that our individual and collective cultural understandings are
nurtured. The answer to the question of whether deconstruction's
dissolution of meaning has any existential import, can now be seen
to be 'no' for the following three reasons.
1. If the deconstructionist is correct and there is no meaning-in-
itself, then there never has been such a meaning-in-itself. Conse-
quently, all the particular insights gained by different cultural
traditions into the human predicament remain as they are. All the
denial of meaning-in-itself does is to change our evaluation of the
status of those insights, i.e. whether we view them as different
interpretations of a predicament or the true account of that
predicament. If there is no ultimate account, the individual insight
remains. Its legitimacy will depend upon the cultural horizon it
belongs to, not upon the existence or not of meaning-in-itself.
2. Von Neurath likened our knowledge of the world to being on
board a ship, the hull of which could never be inspected let alone
overhauled.32 Similarly, our self and cultural understandings are
achieved after embarcation. There is no possibility of determining
whether our individual and collective cultural odysseys are properly
caulked let alone well founded. Logically speaking, such frame-
works can always be other than they are but, contingently speaking,
from the fact of our existential Geworfenheit, they cannot be other
than they have been. We are not free to alter the heritages that we are
born into. We are already at sea and whether deconstructive
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soundings establish a bottom to that sea or not, does not matter. We
still have to navigate ourselves down the channels that our Vor-
Verständnisse have guided us into.
3. If all meaning is relational, the deconstructivist pre-occupa-
tion with the absence of meaning-in-itself is misguided. Searle's
remark about classical metaphysicians is in this context extremely
telling: 'The real mistake of the classical metaphysicians was not the
belief that there are metaphysical foundations, but rather the belief
that somehow or other such foundations were necessary . . . that
unless there were such foundations something is lost or threatened
or undermined or put in question.'33 Mutatis, mutandis, deconstruc-
tion turns out to be an apologetics for precisely that which it denies.
For to assert the absence of meaning is to lay down the criteria of
what it would be for something to be meaningful and, furthermore,
the absence of meaning-in-itself is threatening if and only if meaning
is supposed to depend upon a foundation but who except rationalist
metaphysicians and the deconstructivists say that it ever did? It can
be argued therefore that the absence of meaning-in-itself and the
forever imminent logical possibility that one meaning can be
dissolved into another ought not really be of any existential import.
What is of considerable existential and cultural import, however, is
that in the face of logically undecidable interpretations and despite
all the possibilities, we nevertheless opt for this reading rather than
that. Why? Our opting for a specific meaning is guided by the field of
hermeneutic assumptions that form our horizon but within what we
are guided towards as plausible options, we choose this rather than
that option (or should I say it chooses us) because of a particular
fullness of meaning. What is grasped as meaningful is so not because
it is the meaning-in-itself but because it suddenly illuminates a nexus
of meanings which have shaped our individual and cultural projects.
Meaningfulness as making sense of something has nothing to do with
the presence or absence of foundations. The revelation is legitimated,
i.e. is experienced as being as authoritative as our own inner voice,
precisely by the extent to which it 'wires up' a set of interpretive
possibilities latent within our horizons in such a way as to transform
our understanding of what we might be about existentially or
philosophically. That such experiences reveal, and by revealing tie us
more tightly to the webs of meaning that constitute the unquestion-
able contingencies of our given cultural traditions, explains why,
despite the logical openness of all meaning and interpretation, we
will nevertheless choose this rather than that view of things.
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Overlooking the relational nature of meaningfulness leads both
Foucault and Derrida into a needlessly ineffectual form of founda-
tional nihilism. In The Birth of the Clinic, Foucault dismisses claims
to both the transparency and originality of meaning. The latter
'dooms us to an endless task . . . [as it] ... rests on the postulate that
speech is an act of "translation" and exegesis, which listens . . . to
the Word of God, ever secret, ever beyond itself. . . For centuries we
have waited in vain for the decision of the word.'34 But this is very
tellingly to miss the point. If meaningfulness is taken to reside solely
in words and statements, no wonder we wait in vain for, as Derrida
so competently shows, the rhetorical surplus in all words entails
meaning remaining 'ever secret', ever 'beyond itself. Yet this is to
slip into the disastrous proposition that if something is to have a
meaning, it must be statemental or propositional meaning: words
would be meaningful if they attach analytically fixed predications to
a given subject. However, what we have been at pains to suggest is
that meaningfulness in philosophy and other humanities is not the
disclosure of a fixed 'presence', not the tying of the appropriate
predicate to the chosen subject, but the extent to which within a
moment of understanding, a nexus of possible meanings is lit up and
is seen to give sense to a given field of pre-occupation. In the
posthumously published notes Zettel, Wittgenstein alludes to what
we are here describing as the relational nature of meaningfulness.
Curiously anticipating deconstruction, Wittgenstein concedes that
there is no hermeneutical terminus to the meaning of a word or
artwork. The quest for a final interpretation, he remarks, is the
pursuit not for a further sign or picture 'but for something else - the
thing that cannot be further interpreted'.35 But for him as well as for
deconstruction there is no thing which cannot be further interpreted,
no final terminus for interpretation. There is, however, a psycholo-
gical terminus. Wittgenstein explains, 'What happens [next] is not
that this symbol cannot be further interpreted but that I do no [more]
interpreting. I do not interpret because I feel at home in the present
picture.'36 Aside of this quite remarkable reinvocation of the
Hegelian concept of Einhausung,37 Wittgenstein's point is twofold:
(A) that the meaning we 'feel' at home in is not logically exclusive of
other meanings, and (B) the interpretation I accept by 'walking into
it', I accept not because of its inherent statemental properties but
because it links up with and extends the 'form of life' from which I
and my interests have developed. In other words, the decisive factor
as to why I adopt this rather than that meaning, as to where I stop
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interpreting, is precisely that point where 'sense', where that
moment of meaningfulness is achieved. Gadamer too speaks of this
as interpretation becoming 'self-cancelling'.38 Though what I experi-
ence as meaningful could always be otherwise logically, the mean-
ingfulness of what I experience is unconnected with the issue of
foundations or of meaning in itself but thoroughly bound up with
the extent to which the revealed meaning illuminates the projects,
the narratives, questions and problematics which shape and place us
culturally - for let us make no mistake about this, the threads of
sense of which we are talking are those upon which our self-
awareness, cultural understanding and spiritual growth rest. It is
precisely because the deconstructive analytics of style threatens to
tear the threads of sense which mysteriously and quite contingently
prevent us from tumbling into the abyss of absence that makes the
question of style in philosophy so important.
STILETTOS AND STYLITES
Whilst the experience of meaningfulness entails a phenomenological
involvement with the revealed, consideration of the manner or mode
of the revealed entails a stepping back, a reflective distantiation
from what is being said. 'Content' is suspended in favour of
reflection upon the mode through which it appears. The relation
between phenomenological involvement with what is said and a
reflective distanciation from the 'what' to a consideration of the
'how' has obvious advantages. It questions whether the substance of
the communication is enhanced or distorted by the adopted style.
Secondly, it can ask whether, in the instances of such thinkers as
Nietzsche, the styles (media) are the message. Thirdly, the ability to
step out of what is revealed within an experience of meaningfulness
and reflect upon the implications of what one has understood
ensures that one does not remain hermeneutically sealed within the
confines of one's own experience. In each of these instances, the
questions of style can be mediated, shaped and directed by a sense,
albeit changeable, of what a work or argument is about. Furthermore,
considering the issue of style is to hope for yet further illumination
concerning meaning. The danger posed by an extreme deconstruc-
tive reduction of philosophy to its literary modes is that the
mutually nourishing ebb and flow between questions of content and
questions of style is severed, a stiletto thrust which effectively can
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sever the arteries of sense upon which the dynamic of inner
education rests.
Deconstruction's reduction of philosophy to a mode of literary
feigning is based upon what is epistemologically speaking an
equivalent to a theologica negativa: the assertion of the absence of
meaning-in-itself which allegedly legitimates the conclusion that
there is nothing to be said in philosophy, only different styles of
pretence. Yet the conclusion is invalid since the meaningfulness of
different hermeneutic horizons is unaffected by the absence of
meaning-in-itself. The danger posed by deconstruction is thus not its
logic but its rhetoric for its reductive analytics of style rests upon the
universal claim that all fields of local meaning are meaningful if and
only if there is meaning-in-itself and that without such a foundation
all particular horizons are meaningless. Only on such reasoning can
philosophy be reduced to an analytics of style. The insidiousness of
this rhetoric is not just that it deprives us of potentialities of being by
reducing all philosophical expression to literary feigning but its
deep persuasiveness. It adopts an idiom of argument that too many
philosophers are still deeply in love with; purely abstract universal
judgements. With all the seductiveness of a theoretical form, how
could we dare contend it without the risk of being accused of being
either purely subjective (insisting upon our own insights) or being
found out as a reactionary sentimentalist secretly longing for a
metaphysics of presence! The rhetoric usurps and perverts repressed
rationalist longings in philosophy. If denying the deconstructivist
stance with an assertion of the plurality of different meaning
horizons means denying universal reasoning, better deny the
plurality of meaning and uphold universal reasoning! The cunning
of deconstructive rhetoric is to masquerade as a universal stance but
here deconstruction is doubly telling. We have seen how deconstruc-
tion is a theologica negativa: by asserting meaninglessness it ipso
facto asserts what it takes to be the criterion of meaning. However, as
meaningfulness does not depend upon universal foundations,
deconstruction only need worry us if we too - like deconstructivists
- are would-be foundationalists hankering after the certainty of a
universal foundation or guarantee for our particular meanings rather
than accepting their obvious contingency. In other words, it
inadvertently tries to persuade us that meaningfulness ought only
ever reside in what the imperious rationalist would wish: the self-
transparent statement in which meaning is clearly predicational.
Deconstruction does not deny predicational meaning, merely the
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fixity of predicational meaning and thus to deny what deconstruc-
tion denies appears perversely to deny what those with rationalist
tendencies will never deny, i.e. that meaning is predicational. The
power of deconstructive rhetoric is not that it marks the end of
metaphysics but rather that it re-awakens and is parasitic upon
longing for a universal metaphysics.
The deconstructivist nihilist believes that the repudiation of
meaning-in-itself refutes all local meaning. As this does not follow
from the denial of substantive meaning, the belief that it does can
only reflect a desire that it ought to. Like some medieval stylite, the
nihilist sits astride the pole of universal reasoning refusing the
challenge to be changed, to be opened to the possibilities for being
within localised spheres of meaning, in effect, purposely deceiving
himself that he does not have to take their regional claims seriously
because he asks of them what they cannot possibly give: namely, a
universal foundation. Deconstructive rhetoric therefore seeks to
persuade us that because there is no fixed meaning to words, no
logical finality to interpretation, the only interest it is possible to
entertain in philosophical writing is to view it as a set of stylistic or
rhetorical manoeuvres. The crucial entailment within the decon-
structive emphasis upon style alone is the propogation of the view
that given universal meaninglessness, it is necessary to disengage
from any involvement with, interest or belief in any substantive
discourse. The cultural disaster looming in the deconstructive
reduction of philosophy to an analytics of style is that it lends
rhetorical force to a quite unwarranted devaluation of those regional
spheres of meaning upon which cultural, individual insight, revela-
tion and wisdom depend. That analytics is wedded to a nihilist logic
of 'ressentiment' which perhaps because it cannot have what it
would wish - the fixity of meaning - unwarrantably dismisses all
regional horizons of meaningfulness. How might deconstruction
avoid the charge that it is the last throw of an inverted rationalist
metaphysics which, as with collapsing decadent empires of old,
threatens to take all else with it?
Were that to happen, the fault would be ours. We all experience
moments of revelation when a book, painting, or symphony
suddenly lights up a sense of ourselves. The phenomenological
intensity of such moments is unquestioned. But why do we not trust
these revelations and insights? Why cannot we accord them the
same degree of phenomenological certainty that Descartes accorded
his overwhelming sense of being? Is it because we have become so
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enamoured with that monopolistic view of philosophy as an
Objective' science, dealing only with that which can be rendered in
propositions and statemental assertions, that we are no longer
prepared to trust our inner intuitions of sense? Deconstruction is a
truly telling opponent, finding us out within our secret longings. If
we trusted our intimations of meaningfulness and resided in them,
deconstruction could not perturb us since we would accept that the
meaningfulness of our revelations stands apart from the issue of the
foundational. Deconstruction need only worry us if we have sought
to dress up our insights as universal truths rather than the truths
which appertain to a tradition but why should we have done that?
Either because our faith in our insights is weak and we seek to
bolster them by dressing them up as theoretical truths or because we
have imperialist tendencies and wish to vaunt our insights over
others by disguising them as universal truths. In either case,
deconstruction would rightly undo us. Yet if we were prepared to
accept that philosophy is not reducible to a pseudo-science of
statement and counter-statement and that it can embrace revelatory
experiences of meaningfulness which can have a claim upon us
irrespective of the question of foundations, deconstruction would be
disarmed. But it would be defeated only if we are prepared to
renounce the universalising if not imperialising tendencies of our
philosophical heritage and learn to trust once more what deconstruc-
tion's rhetoric of stylistics so threatens in its insensitive blanket
denial of all modes of meaning, namely, the regional spheres of
meaningfulness upon which both our awareness of intelligible sense
and the sense of our being rests. If we re-learn such trust and
hermeneutically de-colonise ourselves from a singular reason the
question of style might indeed be meaningfully resurrected. In
listening to our intuitive voices we will individualise, make
'subjective', as Kierkegaard might have put it, the general truths of
those regional spheres of meaning that have shaped us and in so
doing will find our own 'style' and climb over the stile of being
merely mannered.
CONCLUSION
or
'REVEALING STYLE'
Let us now clarify the specific claims and implications of this
chapter. Commenting on Richard Rorty's essay 'Philosophy as a
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Kind of Writing',39 Norris remarks that 'the central issue . . . is that
of philosophical style' for any choice of style will involve commit-
ment 'to certain operative metaphors and modes of representation'.40
Conventional philosophy 'proceeds by subjugating language to
thought, rhetoric to logic and style to the notion of plenitude of
meaning' whilst 'abnormal philosophy rejects the protocols of
orthodox linguistic philosophy in favour of a conscious, even artful
play with stylistic possibilities . . . a constant dealing in paradox and
a will to problematise the relation between language and thought'.41
Deconstruction affirms stylistic pluralities and 'rejects the appeal of
absolute knowledge' seeking to demonstrate by its analytics of style
'the delusions of systematic method'.42 Against the backdrop of
Norris' remarks the following should become clear.
Firstly, the purpose of this chapter has not been to defend 'normal'
from 'abnormal' philosophy. To the contrary, the argument pre-
sented accepts both the plausibility of deconstruction's repudiation
of meaning-in-itself and that no philosophical-cum-literary articula-
tion can be immune from further analysis and interpretation. It has
indeed been contended that there is a dual aspect to any formulation
of that which is revealed as meaningful. When and wherever I cease
interpretation and take something to mean this rather than that, it
remains the case that what I have 'closed off as a determinate
meaning necessarily remains open to other readings. Whereas
deconstruction is correctly insistent on no logical or final herme-
neutic terminus to the question of meaning, this chapter never-
theless insists that revelatory experiences of meaning suggest what
Wittgenstein terms a 'psychological terminus' or interpretation,43 a
point where despite the logical openness of all interpretation we
choose this rather than that option, because it lights up and makes
sense of the projects and concerns that define us both individually
and culturally.
Secondly, in making a case for revelatory experiences of mean-
ingfulness we are not either implying that those experiences are
immune to deconstruction or that they are in some way privileged.
Not only will the content of such experiences be endlessly
interprétable but their form too. As Steiner bids us remember,
'Structure is itself interpretation.'44 Nor is there any necessary fixity
to the forms of life within which intuitions of meaning occur. In all
these respects deconstruction represents a consistent and plausible
extension of Nietzsche's repudiation of essentialist epistemologies.
Thirdly, the argument of this chapter does take issue with
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deconstruction over the questions of (A) the actuality of meaningful
experience, and (B) the supposition that the absence of meaning-in-
itself renders regional spheres of meaning meaningless. Regarding
(A) we have argued that the meaningfulness of an insight depends
upon the extent to which it illuminates the projects and commit-
ments we are individually concerned with. Arguing for this does not
imply a wish to return to normal philosophy for, as suggested,
deconstruction as well as conventional philosophy emphasises
predicational meaning. Conventional, 'analytic' and rationalistic
philosophy to a degree all pursue precise relations between a subject
and its predicates. Because it seeks to show the unlimited predica-
tive relations that can be attributed to a subject, deconstruction too
exhibits a loyalty to predicational meaning. The 'meaningfulness' we
allude to, however, is not predicational for that which illuminates
such experiences lies outside them, i.e. those perspectival meanings
which shape our experiences and yet can never be exhaustively
given in them. Without such non-predicational meaning, the sense
of our being and its possibilities would be stifled. It might further be
suggested that deconstructive criticism is itself reliant upon such an
experience of meaningfulness. The proposal that an open pluralistic
philosophy can only ever be inferred not only suggests a meaningful
insight which is not propositional (it could only ever be 'shown')45
but also that an understanding has been reached concerning the
limitations of traditional categories of meaning. Concerning (B) the
supposition that all local horizons of meaning are meaninglessness,
we have argued that the particular danger inherent within decon-
struction is that it encourages us to stop listening to, to disengage
from and to cease to believe in the culturally contingent frameworks
of meaning upon which all past and future revelation of the
potentialities for our being depend. As Nietzsche would have
energetically insisted, the absence of meaning-in-itself is no cause
for despair (passive nihilism) since it has no bearing upon, indeed,
liberates us for a confrontation with what is meaningful-for-us.46
Fourthly, in arguing for the experience of meaningfulness which
eludes propositional capture it must be stressed that neither are we
advocating a mystical position nor a devaluation of theoretical
reflection. Mysteriously spontaneous in their emergence though they
may be, there is nothing mystical about these experiences. They are
a phenomenological fact of our being. Although theoretical reflec-
tion entails a distantiation from the content of such experiences,
reflection ensures that we do not remain sealed within the frame-
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work of our experience. The relationship between analytic reflection
and intuitive insight is of such complexity that any discussion of it is
impossible here. It suffices to say, however, that any reflective
examination of the revealed can expose nuances and implications
within the intuition which might not have been apparent in the
thralls of the experience itself. Reflective analysis is thus capable of
extending and substantiating what is revealed. What these com-
ments imply is that reflective analysis does not commence its
operations ex nihilo but is asked to examine or confirm that revealed
as meaningful. In one of his earliest philosophical essays, Nietzsche
points out that reason only ever follows the 'wingbeats' of the
imagination47 or, in our terms, the experience of meaningfulness.
Furthermore, analysis of revelatory experience encourages openness
to yet further experience. Gadamer comments that the fulfilment of
experience does not consist in comprehensive knowledge but 'in the
openness to new experience'.48 It is precisely the openness to new
experience which the nihilistic (universal) denial of the meaningful-
ness of local horizons threatens. If the very experience of mean-
ingfulness which gives direction to any analytical deepening of
experienced meaning is denied (why should one carry the analysis
out?), the critical stimulus which pushes one towards the possibility
of new insight, the patience with which one listens for yet further
illumination is shunned and with it the possibility of any cultural or
spiritual growth.
Fifthly, the threat of such a calamity exists only if deconstruction
remains wedded to the fallacious conviction that the absence of
meaning-in-itself nullifies the meaningfulness of local regions of
meaning. If deconstruction is constrained to operating only as an
analytical or critical tool, it might positively extend the potentialities
for alternative readings of a given experience of meaningfulness. As
soon as it adopts a universalistic stance which declares all horizons
of meaning meaningless, deconstruction threatens to destroy not
only the possibility of further experience but also to wither all the
roots of meaningfulness through which regional meaning and hence
individual and cultural identities feed.
Sixthly, we come to the point where the aforementioned clarifica-
tions of our argument can transform our previous discussion of the
question of style in philosophy. It has been argued that the
phenomenological immediacy of the experience of meaningfulness
renders the question of style secondary. In that experience appre-
hension is immediate and unequivocal: the question of 'how' the
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'what' of that which we apprehend puts in its appearance does not
arise. Only reflection upon that experience will lead us to consider
such refinements for in the experience itself both the 'how' and the
'what' will be fused. Once distinguished, however, two possibilities
arise. (A) If we can differentiate between the 'how' and the 'what' of
an experience, we can distinguish between its meaning and its
expression or, in Gadamer's terms, between the thing-itself (Sache
selbst) and its particular modes of disclosure.49 (B) If we can make
such distinctions we can recognise that we have experienced a
subject-matter this way rather than that way. Reflection upon this
will show the irreplaceable singularity of our instantiations of a
given field of meaning or concern. Our experiences of meaning
attest to an incorporation or reception of a general framework of
meaningfulness, which in the experience is concretised in a
particular instantiation. The combination of placedness within a
horizon of meaning and the latter's particularisation in individual
exemplars of meaningfulness is worthy of deep reflection which
sadly cannot be carried out here. What can be said, however, is that
unwittingly and with a spontaneity that is without guile and
manner, the highly personal process of translating generally
apprehended concerns and pre-occupations of meaning into the
revealed exemplars of particular experiential meaningfulness
reveals the style which constitutes our individuality. Thus, in reply
to Rorty and Norris, we maintain that as soon as it does become a
'matter of style' in philosophy — a question of what mode of writing
to adopt - then the fundamental question of style as disclosure of
individuality50 has been lost. It will remain unretrievable until we
both perceive that an adherence to the absence of meaning-in-itself
does not nullify the significance of local lifelines of meaning and
learn to trust once more those experiences of meaningfulness which
we all know and have been shaken by but can never (to art and
philosophy's advantage) fully articulate.
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CHARLES ALTIERI
Wittgenstein might begin an inquiry into our understanding of style
by asking us to imagine cases in which we were blind to style: what
aspects of our lives would no longer make sense, and what powers of
agency would we feel we had lost? We need not stretch our
imaginations very much to perform this test, since our culture's best
example may well be analytic philosophy's efforts to develop
rigorous concepts and methods precisely to afford the seductions of
style. The consequent blindness has made it very difficult for
philosophy to talk about first-person or agent-relative states. And
methodologically that blindness forces on us distinctions like that
between saying and showing, with showing quickly reduced to the
enacting of attitudes or the dialogical play of conversation. But if we
take style seriously as a question for philosophy we may be able to
show why there is considerable speculative value in attending to
what can only be shown as the exemplary mark of subjective agency.
Moreover we then take the contribution of art to philosophy beyond
the realm of moral analysis to which art is usually confined: we
make art central to the full register of expressive activities, which in
turn we can show must be central to any philosophy responsive to
first-person concerns.
Clearly style's resistance to description makes it impossible to
offer firm definitions. But simply to indicate what I take the stakes to
be I shall propose a tentative definition of personal style, then try to
show how the terms I use for that definition help make style a
significant concept for larger ethical concerns. Personal style is a
dimension of purposiveness that we attribute to what I shall describe
as dynamic intentionality. Attributions of dynamic intentionality
need not presuppose self-consciousness on the part of the agent, but
the concept of style has its greatest resonance when we come to
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appreciate the rendering of intentionality as a deliberate commu-
nicative act. Thus personal style becomes a distinctive aesthetic and
moral phenomenon when we imagine an agent treating how he or
she self-reflexively carries out some task as part of what constitutes
the action. And these self-reflexive features of style become crucial
general concerns for philosophy because they call our attention to
powers of subjective agency too fluid and too resistant to concepts to
be easily handled by traditional models of desire and judgement, or
to be easily demystified into the equation of subjectivity with
subjection now dominating literary criticism.1
Three basic steps should make it possible to elaborate some of these
powers. First I will concentrate on how attention to style affects
what we say about intentionality by making clear the limitations of
the cognitive, transcendental model of intentional agency developed
by Husserl and by demonstrating the need for another more process-
oriented version of intentionality deriving ultimately from Spinoza's
conatus. Then I will use Nietzsche and Wittgenstein to show how
aspects of purposiveness and will can be attributed to this dynamic
intentionality, thereby enabling us to talk about style without
subordinating the will to style to what Nietzsche excoriated as the
will to truth trapping us in those cognitive versions of intentionality.
Finally, I will dramatise my claims by focusing on C. K. Williams'
metaphoric use of a long line as a vehicle for combatting specular
models of personal identity and for establishing a different access to
what had been considered the deep interiority of the subject.
We need an alternative to Husserlian intentionality because that
version of agency shares with analytic philosophy a demand to cast
mental life in fundamentally third-person terms that then can be
imagined as available for any subject. For Husserl intentionality
offers a transparent relationship between noetic structures and
noematic contents, and thus locates possibilities for objective knowl-
edge at the very core of subjective life. But Derrida makes painfully
clear how this transcendental mode is purchased only by ignoring
temporality and usurping the contingent features fundamental to
there being singular first-person states. That demonstration then
sanctions Derrida's own efforts to open an alternative path for
conceiving that singular agency and its modes of taking responsi-
bility. However Derrida's deconstructive commitments force this
new path back into the old roadway because much of his account is
tied to reversing Husserlian versions of plenitude, so that the non-
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transcendental features of subjective agency get located primarily in
processes of differing and deferring which remain parasitical on
third-person models of knowledge. Derrida wants to locate expres-
sive singularity primarily in a working signature made visible by its
resistance to any single representation. Instead responsibility lies in
how responsiveness is deployed. But, as I have argued in my Canons
and Consequences (chapter 7), this leaves him without adequate
accounts of what can be expressed and how one takes responsibility
for the paths of responsiveness one sanctions. So we must try to
preserve what is important in Derrida's account by developing a
model of intentionality within which the first-person becomes a
positive dynamic force.2
Here I can only sketch the necessary case by calling attention to
the assumptions underlying the following passage from 'Afterword:
Toward an Ethic of Discussion', where Derrida is at his least evasive:
Whether it is a question of prediscursive experience or of speech acts,
plenitude is at once what orients and endangers the intentional movement,
whether it is conscious or not. There can be no intention that does not tend
toward it, but also no intention that attains it without disappearing with it.3
By stressing the dream of plenitude basic to Husserlian intention-
ality, Derrida simultaneously defines and resists two fundamental
problems in our received models of subjective agency. First, Husserl
helps him dramatise the gulf between what we might call the
knowing subject, satisfied by adapting to third-person criteria that
orient intentions, and the willing subject, which can only be
recognised in terms of a negative force establishing singular agency
against third-person expectations. In so far as an intentional agent
can realise the plenitude of an intention, and thus can name what it
has desired, it can no longer be in that regard an active singular
desire. A fulfilled intention is merely a piece of public data - desire
satisfied no longer engages a will but exists for any person, and
hence only for third-person aspects of agency. Second, the need to
distinguish between the knowing and the willing subject threatens to
divide the structure of the subject into a component that seeks peace
in knowledge and an 'other' prodigal but perhaps more 'authentic'
locus of agency not so controlled. How else can we map the
apparently inescapable gulf between knowing what is intended and
feeling forces that seem to drive intentions but that also seem to
resist any representation to which we can attribute plenitude?
How then do we keep intentionality as a first-person force?
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Derrida locates that force in processes that undermine or over-
determine what can be fixed as plenitude. Subjective agency, the
power of saying 'yes', gets located in the activity of an 'uncondi-
tionality' that refuses to submit its legislative capacities to any
determinate context, since such determinacy subsumes the subjec-
tivity of the subject under what can be known in third-person terms.
In order for the working of the subject not to be subjected it must be
able to announce itself as such only in 'the opening of context'; 'Not
that it is simply present (existent) elsewhere, outside of all context;
rather, it intervenes in the determination of a context from its very
inception, and from an injunction, a law, a responsibility that
transcends this or that determination of a given context' (LI, 152).
Even though agents define specific situations by invoking contexts -
'this is the moment of strategies, of rhetorics of ethics, and of
politics', the acts of definition only carry subjective agency to the
degree that they remain indeterminate. There must be a border or
limit or margin where the choice of context itself 'entails a clause of
nonclosure' (LI, 152-3).
But why should we accept the strict binary between determinacy
and indeterminacy on which Derrida's model of singularity's 'yes'
depends? Indeterminacy relative to concepts need not entail
indeterminacy in relation to practices or modes of perception
allowing us to locate continuities and responsibilities precisely in
how contexts are opened and controlled. Because Derrida cannot
make such distinctions, cannot allow a mode of expression that is
articulate despite, or because of, how it resists concepts, he can only
produce quite thin versions of the senses of duration and of
responsibility that seem necessary for any account of subjective
agency. His version of subjective agency can define itself as singular
only to the degree that it refuses determinate plenitude and locates
its investments in the disseminating mobility that attends upon self-
division. Similarly, for him the richest way to respond to others as
singularities is not to honour their intentions but to keep on them a
pressure that helps them remain at a tangent to the specular selves
intentionality projects. Thus the individual will not be subsumed
under some fixed idea that either the agent or an audience has of that
person, and the way is opened for the self to have the only
continuity a singularity can have within time, one that depends on
the constant adaptability of what none the less carries a signature.
The price Derrida pays is most evident when he tries to derive
ideals of responsibility from the conditions of readerly responsive-
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ness that deconstruction exemplifies. There is simply no way to
avoid having an ideal of unconditionality reduce ethics to a domain
of radical choice where claims about responsibility cannot be tied to
any specific obligations — either to oneself or to others. What is there
to be responsible to if one's singularity depends on refusing to
subsume desire under any specular image or determining idea? One
might here suggest, as Charles Taylor does, that there are conditions
of expressivity that allow us to shape identities over time, so that we
are responsible at least for relating our present to our past. But
Derrida's ideal of unconditionality has to deny the authority of
contexts derived from previous expressions: the only ideal must be
one that locates mobility in a continual swerve away from what
understanding might seize, thereby reducing all promises, commit-
ments, and obligations to a single plane of advisory conditions, from
which singularities establish particular paths.
But how do we escape such oppositions? If we cannot locate
subjectivity within the parameters of third-person knowledge, how
do we not locate it in what can remain singular by refusing those
categories? I think we need to see that many other partial
oppositions can enter our picture, so that we must negotiate different
levels of investment and modes of articulation and understanding.
And through these we begin also to recast what a full theory of
intentionality must provide. Consider first the way that Derrida
seems trapped into treating responsibility as if it occupied the same
structure of concerns that we apply to basic intentional states. It
seems as if agency too had to be understood as something we must
be able to locate within the moment, so that in principle we could
perceive it and surround it in the same way that we do an image of a
tree or a chair. Then to preserve a first person for responsibility this
agency would have to be distinguished sharply from categorical
understandings which subsume singular agency. In so far as we had
reasons for responsibility we would surrender agency to the
authority of those reasons. But I doubt that responsibility can be
conceived as something so intimately tied to specific intentional
moments. Responsiveness is something we can stop and observe as
it takes place, so it does occur within psychological processes. But
responsibility is not something we attribute to such processes.
Rather it consists in how we frame such processes and draw
conclusions from them. Responsibility depends not on how we
respond but on how we represent actions so as to involve
consequences in our relations to future selves and to other persons.
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Thus I take responsibility for these words not because I can
recuperate who I was in choosing them but because I am willing to
be judged by them before a particular community, no matter how
they emerged in my processes of writing. And whatever identity I
establish by such willingness cannot be a matter of intending an
image or plenitude, nor of a worked indeterminacy. Instead the level
of identity achieved consists in the relation one can draw between
how an act is performed and how that performance can be fitted into
certain frames and projections. We move from intentionality to
committed interpretations of what intentionality displays.
To be responsible one must be responsible for something as well
as to something. If we take this something as our discrete actions, we
can rely on traditional models of judgement. But if we imagine
responsibility as connected to truthfulness or to ongoing relation-
ships to ourselves and to others, we need a mode of self-articulation
that can be roughly determinate even though it does not submit to
the categories of understanding. We need, in other words, a model of
dynamic intentionality, whose basic features emerge by contrast
with Derrida's use of Husserl. Derrida's deconstructions require his
opposing the negational force of singularity to an intentionality that
can be located in discrete and definable events, each oriented
towards a specific plenitude. But this opposition clearly does not
account for the fact that we continue to take pleasure in and a sense
of articulate singularity from intentional states even when they do
not achieve a plenitude or presence. The trying is often enough; in
fact the trying is often preferable to the attaining.
We might explain this satisfaction by suggesting that our subjec-
tive investment in intentions has less to do with the specific ends
gained than with the sense of ongoing power that stems from the
feeling of being able to direct a life, even when intentions are not
fully realised. Moreover intentions are rarely discrete states which
stay stable enough to allow the drama of plenitude and its
vicissitudes. As Wittgenstein saw, our awareness of ourselves as
intentional agents must be located primarily in simple practices of
paying attention to what we are doing. Such intentional focus rarely
takes the explicit form in which it is plausible to think about
plenitude and deferral. Intentionality seems fulfilled or blocked
largely in terms of whether its projections manage to work linkages
from one state to another without the feeling that one has lost control
of one's actions. If we are to speak of plenitude, we must locate it
less in the achieving of specific goals than in the sense that we
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continue to feel we control our participation in a network of desires,
plans, and ongoing interpersonal relations or structured practices.
Intentions are satisfied primarily by generating other intentions. This
is why selves can value mobility without having to base that
mobility primarily on negations, and this is why, despite Derrida's
cogent argument on realised intentions, we do not feel the
accomplishment of any one desire as a loss. The openness to loss is
more than compensated for by a sense of the transitions made
possible to other desires. Finally, this line of thinking suggests that it
is reductive to imagine the entire subject's singularity at stake in any
given intention. No particular binary opposition between identity
and non-identity in any given intentional event could possibly
create that overall sense of agency, since there is never only one
context (or sense of self) in which we make those choices. We
develop the feelings of singular agency that pervade intentional
behaviour from histories of intentional acts and the interpretations
which we come to accept for those acts. So while images of
ourselves as agents are both unavoidable and useful, it also proves
possible to locate the most dynamic features of that agency in an
ongoing purposiveness that cannot be represented in concepts or
images, yet which we must grant both links and disseminates
intentional states.
To test this hypothesis consider how we attribute singularity to
those we know well. We do not (usually) try to summarise them in
images, or to imagine them as having to secure non-identity by
resisting the pressure of our gaze. We know them as characters who
manifest orientations and traits that assume many modes, all of
which become manifest through intentional powers that have very
little to do with plenitude, unless some situation requires taking full
responsibility for the various facets of those activities. Most of the
time when we attribute responsibility to them we still do not equate
our sense of them with any one concept. We attribute responsibility
to accounts of behaviour that allow people to earn certain identifica-
tions, certain respects for purposiveness by virtue of how they
connect a past to a future. Just as we cannot feel deep grief for a
moment (Wittgenstein), we cannot take responsibility for momen-
tary states without referring them to larger patterns of identification.
Nietzsche offers us probably the richest philosophical appreciation
of this dynamic intentionality, since his claims for the will to power
depend on a version of being for itself which the conatus provides.
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And he clearly has a great deal to say about style. But for my
purposes these specific remarks on style are less important than the
underlying model of intentionality. For Nietzsche's actual posi-
tioning of how we will seems to me less problematic than his
explicit theorising on the topic. This embodiment of willing
exemplifies a means of developing a singular agency not subordi-
nated to the will to truth, and hence not hollowing out that agency
from within in order to establish its submission to third-person
categories. This model then affords us a recasting of Kantian
purposiveness without purpose that applies to all expressive
manifestations of dynamic intentionality and that thus enables
singular agency to establish articulate responsibilities.
The model of a purposiveness not dependent on the will to truth
derives from Nietzsche's realisation that combatting Christianity
required a great deal more than efforts to refute its dogmas. One
must understand how that religion actually possessed souls by
seducing people into internalising its values, and one must define
the forces by which such deep emotional structures pervade cultural
life even when the dogmas lose their hold on us.4 For Nietzsche that
force resided primarily in the way Christianity led us to define will
in accord with an ideal of truth. Then who I take myself to be at my
most powerful becomes inseparable from how I imagine myself
being judged according to certain ideal truths: so the inwardness of
self gets defined as fealty to some third-person principle within the
agent that others might grasp better than the individual can. Here
then is western culture's first demonic account of subjectivity as
subjection, most striking in its capacity to define what remains
problematic in those Enlightenment philosophers who set reason
against those superstitious Christian dogmas. As examples we might
consider the ideals of subjective autonomy developed by Kant and
by Mill (as well as the need within Romantic poetry to temper its
individualism by the justificatory use of idealising allegorical
structures). Both philosophers conceive realising personal autonomy
as inseparable from adapting the self to an idealised model of
rationality - either in Kant's deontological identification of true
identity with universalising legislative powers or in Mill's emphasis
on justified practical reasoning. In both cases the dream of getting
free from the authority of priests in fact threatens only to restore a
version of that authority in more virulent form because we
internalise it as a condition for our own wills to power. Thus our
priestly heritage contaminates any direct assertion of expressive
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will, forcing us instead to locate authenticity in obedience or
collective sympathy. As these locales for value became increasingly
dreary, the will was faced with the difficult alternatives of turning to
a nihilism where no willing is possible (and subjects become only
objects) or of securing some activity of will by learning to will the
very suffering or torment that characterised agents' experiences. So
we understand the general outline shaping how modern philosophy
idealises its own resistance to idealisation: modern philosophy is
born as an ascetic effort to imitate science, in the process reducing
science's capacities for creation to principles that have only critical
force, without their own ability to create values. In order to
overcome superstition the Enlightenment ultimately devalued all
expressive energies, projecting personal liberation only as an
extension of those critical principles. The highest states of self
become those moments where the first-person is conquered by the
third, for only then could the self fully experience a voluptuousness
of willing that at the same time could feel itself justified. Our deepest
cultural experience of will then consists in its struggling against the
very demand for individuality, since its only site for subjective
intensity had become a set of disciplinary practices occupying the
hollowed core within our dreams of deep identity.
One could go on with great voluptuousness to catalogue the effects
of this will to truth - Nietzsche does precisely that. But that is not all
he does, or that we must do. Nietzsche's analysis of the subjection
imposed by wills to truth does not trap us into taking all relations to
the symbolic order as equally displaced and subjected, so one can
imagine the analysis making concrete social differences. Where
Lacan and Althusser each propose permanent structures of the
psyche or of social life to account for that subjection of expressive
will, Nietzsche roots the problems in a specific (albeit very general)
historical formation. Thus it becomes possible to imagine alternative
dispositions, since we can begin to resist the will to truth by
dwelling on the following four non-idealist features of a fully
immanent expressive agency. Through these features dynamic
intentionality finds articulate expression and opens grounds by
which to carry self-reflexive investments in its own activity.
1. We must realise that the very idea of 'will' is an abstraction and
idealisation created by the will to truth so that the various desiring
features of subjective agency can be put under the control of another
idealised force - that of judgement or reason. But willing actually
involves a complicated set of forces:
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Willing seems to me above all something complicated, something that is a
unit only as a word . . . [Therefore] let us say that in all willing there is first a
plurality of sensations, namely the sensation of the state 'away from which',
the sensation of the state 'towards which', the sensations of this 'from' and
'towards' themselves, and then also an accompanying muscular sensation,
which, even without our putting into motion 'arms and legs' begins its
action by force of habit as soon as we 'will' anything.
Therefore just as sensations (and indeed many kinds of sensations) are to
be recognised as ingredients of will, so, secondly, should thinking also: in
every act of the will there is a ruling thought - let us not imagine it is
possible to sever this thought from the 'willing', as if any will would then
remain over.
Third, the will is not only a complex of sensation and thinking, but it is
above all an affect, and specifically the affect of the command. That which is
termed 'freedom of the will' is essentially the affect of superiority in relation
to him who must obey: 'I am free, "he" must obey.'5
2. Given this complexity, we need alternatives to our idealised
rationality to describe how these various factors become articulate
within, or better, as will, and hence as the agency within acts of
valuing. This I think is the basic reason why style becomes so
important for Nietzsche, and correlatively why aesthetics becomes so
central as a model for ethics. Aesthetic analogues for human activity
make it more difficult to separate subject from object, because they
emphasise the degree to which our interests pervade the worlds we
see beyond the ego. Aesthetic analogues in effect allow us to speak of
a purposiveness that is not only without purpose but within our
purposes, yet still not reducible to the concepts governing the overall
orientation. Therefore Nietzsche can use aesthetic analogues to show
how expressive agency extends beyond psychological concerns:
expressive agency literally establishes values by transforming domi-
nant social structures and not subordinating its energies to the regime
of 'truth'. For when the artist acts to compose form, he 'obeys
thousand-fold laws, laws that . . . precisely on account of their
hardness and determination defy all formulation through concepts
(even the firmest concept is compared with them, not free of
fluctuation, multiplicity and ambiguity' (BGE, sec. 188).
3. To the degree that we can submit such values to public
discussion we must find means of judgement that can emphasise
concerns for 'truthfulness' rather than for 'truth'. For, as we have
seen, any reliance on determinate categories necessary for assessing
truth statements is likely to ignore precisely what it is that carries the
singular force of willing, namely its interest in altering or reshuffling
the very terms relied on by typical descriptions of actions. Then
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Nietzsche proposes as his spécifie model for such valuation a
concern for how that truthfulness manages a struggle between the
pathos of victimage (i.e. Nietzsche's own fears and obsessions) and
various means for opening paths and processes that enable transfor-
mations of that pathos. Such transformations can either restore a
sense of organicist coherence for the will by sponsoring actions that
'grow out of us with the necessity with which a tree bears fruit' (GM
preface, sec. 2), or they can make it possible to extend the selfs
struggles so that they become exemplary for how other agents engage
similar problems.
4. The ultimate value of truthfulness consists in the capacity it
has to bond the singular and the social along lines very different
from those fostered by the will to truth. For Nietzsche the social
bond involves a model of self-legislation very different from Kant's:
rather than reconciling the subject to the law, Nietzsche envisions
legislation in the form of promises that bind the subject to its own
expressive gestures. Here is Nietzsche's promising about promises at
its most idealised:
If we place ourselves at the end of the tremendous process where the tree at
last brings forth fruit, where society and the morality of custom at last reveal
what they have simply been the means to: then we discover that the ripest
fruit is the sovereign individual, like only to himself, liberated again from
the morality of custom, autonomous and supermoral (for 'autonomous' and
'moral' are mutually exclusive), in short, the man who has his own
independent, protracted will and the right to make promises - and in him a
proud consciousness, quivering in every muscle, of what has at length been
achieved and made flesh in him, a consciousness of his own power and
freedom. (GM II, sec. 2)
Such promises can be made explicitly, or, as style, they can take the
form of offering others a process of exploring the resources that one's
own expressive energies allow so that one builds responsibility into
the self-consciousness governing the processes of articulation.
All of Nietzsche's brilliance, however, will not save his rendering
of expressive will from the pathos that forces him to an Ecce Homo,
his tormentingly complicated effort at once to celebrate and to
ironise the need for images of his own personal power. That is why
we also need Wittgenstein if we are to develop a model of style
subject neither to the will to truth nor to the desperate efforts to
make the expressive self replace all third-person states. Where
Nietzsche's perspectivism collapses the knowing subject who takes
responsibility for propositions into the willing subject constructing
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the world in accord with specific values, Wittgenstein takes the
opposite tack. He proposes a sharp distinction between the willing
and the knowing subject. For the subject of cognitive activity the
solipsist ego becomes an extensionless point, its agency subsumed
under the task of description (or, in Philosophical Investigations,
subsumed under the grammar of language games). Thus for
Wittgenstein the eye that sees is placed within a visual field that it
does not control, so the 'I' becomes an aspect of the field that can be
described in third-person terms. But if we concentrate on the willing
subject, we shift to a mode of activity that cannot be so enclosed:
how the eye feels about what is sees and how it gives significance or
projections to that field does not appear within the scene. Rather
such feelings and affects constitute boundary conditions establishing
qualities for the scene as a whole. Boundary conditions are precisely
what we cannot hope to encompass in any form of description
because they define the parameters for the description. Thus willing
cannot be represented in any specular projection. What we can say
about it depends not on who agents imagine themselves to be but on
how they dispose themselves in relation to those fields within which
truth statements are possible. Will then is less a matter of how selves
master worlds than of the specific modalities persons bring to
specific engagements within a shared world.
It is not easy to grasp a sense of the agent as at once attentive to the
objective and irreducibly a locus of subjective will. But we get
considerable help from the figure of boundary conditions that
Wittgenstein uses to connect ethics and aesthetics to the transcen-
dental nature of logical form. In each of these domains we must
allow sharp distinctions between what can be said and what must be
shown. What can be said presupposes certain lines of connection
between language and the world. But we cannot speak about those
containing frames because any claim we made about them would
have to presuppose exactly what it purported to describe. Logic
provides the most striking example of the two conditions. Logic
gives the form of propositions, which means there cannot be
meaningful propositions about logic itself; there can only be displays
of what logical form does in its establishing boundary conditions for
what can count as truths. Ethics and aesthetics rely on analogous
distinctions, but there the nature of individual wills takes the place
of the boundary force of logical form. In aesthetics the framing
condition requires treating the object as 'seen sub specie aeternitatis
from outside' rather than from within the midst of other objects, so
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that one perceives it together with space and time rather than in
space and time. In ethics on the other hand the boundary condition
becomes the state of the subject as the force which composes values
for its specific moment in space and time:
Things acquire 'significance' only through their relation to my will.
As my idea is the world, in the same way my will is the world-will.
The will is an attitude of the subject to the world.
6.43 If good or bad acts of the will do alter the world, it can only be the
limits of the world that they alter, not the facts, not what can be expressed by
means of language.
In short their effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world.
It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole.
The world of the happy man is a different one from that of the unhappy
man.6
Ethics becomes a matter of how agents establish investments in and
as the dynamic intentionality that gives particular casts to events
and that projects connections to other features of the agent's life.
Then, near the end of his life, Wittgenstein managed to make this
vision concrete by envisioning the process of framing as simply the
particularising work of the 'now' and the 'this', as if purposiveness
resided in the very activity of identifying with what occupies
consciousness.
Style is for me the making visible of the conditions allowing us
our investments in the 'now' and the 'this', whether we imagine
those conditions as fundamentally matters of how we engage the
world or how we dispose ourselves towards other agents in those
engagements. Style maps a will onto a world. But since such activity
is so various, and so resistant to concepts and to images, the force of
that willing must be developed through the kind of examples that art
affords, that is examples where the intensity of investment is
fundamental to the engagement with the world. So I will turn to a
recent volume of poetry, C. K. Williams' Flesh and Blood in which
experiments with a long, highly self-conscious line provide a
dramatic analogue for this Wittgensteinian model of subjective
agency. Here we find a version of Spinoza's conatus which cannot
be made the object of an image or of imaginary projections, but
which none the less makes continually present the contours of an
expressive will inseparable from yet not reducible to a knowing
subject bound entirely to the facts of a shareable world. At heart
Williams is a Cartesian. He dreams of introspectively capturing
consciousness at the very originating source of its deepest proprio-
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ceptive energies. But that very desire demands that he turn to a
vehicle like the line which can survive the collapse of the images it
generates in its Cartesian quest, and thus which can define a will
able to reject the demand for thematisable self-images in favour of
satisfying itself simply in the purposive process of framing and
dynamising that it can bring to bear.
Had we the space we could develop the fundamental oppositions
haunting Williams' Cartesian quest - at one pole a fierce 'lust of self
toward self, and at the other a sense of insubstantiality so
encompassing that he imagines his lyric activity as
this infected voice that infects itself with its despair, this voice that won't
stop,
that lays the trap of doubt, this pit of doubt, this voiceless throat swallows us
in doubt.7
But for now the most I can do is track a single poem's effort to
negotiate these oppositions by letting the line at once de-interiorise
subjectivity and celebrate its force as a mode of command embodied
simply in how the will becomes articulate in and as its control of
relational movements. This is 'Conscience', a poem whose title
positions it beautifully between Descartes and Nietzsche:
That moment when the high-wire walker suddenly begins to falter, wobble,
sway, arms flailing
that breathtakingly rapid back-and-forth aligning-realigning of the displaced
center of gravity,
weight thrown this way, no too far; that way, no, too far again, until the
movements themselves
of compensation have their rhythms so that there is no way possibly to stop
now. . .
that very moment, wheeling back and forth, back and forth, appeal, repeal,
negation,
just before he lets it go and falls to deftly catch himself going by the wire
somersaulting up,
except for us it never ceases, testing moments of the mind-weight this way,
back and back and forth
no re-establishing of balance, no place to start again, just this, this force, this
gravity and fear. (Flesh and Blood p. 67)
We begin with 'that moment' because Williams wants to have
voice emerge in the kind of situation where it is most threatened,
where unpredictable events challenge conscience and drive it to its
full intensity. That intensity requires an analogy in order to find
expression at all, so the specific comparison to the high-wire
walker's beginning to falter must do double labour. The analogy
214
Personal style as articulate intentionality
establishes a dramatic focus for reflection, and it calls attention to
the mind's need for that analogical mode in order to suture the gap
that the sudden eruption of events opens up. Yet the sense of time's
pressure will not relent. Notice the repeated 'that's, which display a
mind seeking to fix itself by setting stable reference points as its
boundary conditions. However each 'that' phrase soon collapses
because of the weight it must bear, both within the analogy and in
relation to the demand for analogy. None the less by facing this risk
of falling, the poem ultimately discovers its own way of 'somer-
saulting up', since it manages to shift from those 'thats' to a sense of
rhythm within the balancing that gives conscience its access to a
constantly shifting 'now'. This sense of 'now' then requires surren-
dering any hope for specific stopping points (which I take to be
figures for the ego's desires for specific images of itself), so that one
can reconcile oneself to the irreducible and inescapable demands of
conscience. Even the analogy must collapse, destroyed by that
painful 'except us' marking the mind's difference from any satisfying
allegorical representations of itself. Instead self-reflection finds itself
forced back on the pun in 'gravity' as the ironic price exacted by the
effort to take oneself seriously. Personal identity founded on
demands like these cannot be separated from a constant sense of
fear, a sense left beautifully indeterminate at and as the poem's
conclusion: 'no reestablishing of balance, no place to start again, just
this, this force, this gravity and fear.'
Yet this naming of fear also provides a means of gravity for
handling the otherness of events. As images fail, the structure of
dynamic intentionality becomes visible, and we realise that the 'this'
may suffice to take responsibility for, and within, what the line
brings together. This repetition of 'this', grounded in an intricate
syntactic balance and emerging from repeated negations, locates in
simple assertion a responsiveness to the motions of mind and shifts
in its contents far more supple than any analogy. First the repeated
negations insist on the return of doubt's voiceless throat as the
analogy collapses. Dreaming of gravity seems inseparable from a
constant fear of falling. For taking identity as a serious issue and
allowing conscience its nagging voices submits all ideas about the
self to judgements about truth that lack any possible means of
determining a will. Not only does gravity then elicit direct fear, it
also opens the possibility that conscience makes fools of us all by
producing the ironic suspicion that the fears we feel are themselves
only stage props in a circus act we create in order to claim that
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conscience had some determining power in our struggles.8 But there
remains the real and the metaphoric force of the line's ability to
contour itself even to such gravities because it does not impose
specular images upon them. Instead the line proposes its own
activity as its figure for a 'this' that engages the destructive forces,
establishing at least an intimacy and directness sharply opposed to
the mind's efforts earlier in the poem to make repeated 'that's
sustain a distanced balance. Thus there may be no need for a place
elsewhere from which one might start again. While the effort to
negotiate the mind's desires for gravity and the fears which this
generates may strip away all projected stabilities, there remains
available a Cartesian response to the poem's version of Cartesian
doubt: the poem cannot doubt its own passionate investment in the
process of defining those doubts. That is its gravity. Yet Williams
need not follow Descartes' way of locating the 'I am' purely in some
inner process. Here the cogito finds a home within the activity of
language, in the justness of how that concluding string of deictics
defines the mind's desperation. In that definition Williams moves
from analogies for the mind's actions to a literal process of
interpretive attention, to the actual force of the mind's activities
within, and as, the poem. There need be no place from which to
begin because the tracking of beginnings takes us beyond abstract
possibilities to a place continually in the making. Where Williams'
namesake had called for no ideas about the thing but the thing itself,
this Williams locates the necessary alternative to ideas in the mind's
coming to feel the force of the gravity it constantly produces.
Not all of the later Williams is as grim as this, or as Cartesian. But we
best prepare the context for his more positive assertions by
beginning with those poems that in effect win the right to locate
investments within the movement of the line as at once metaphor
and enactment of an underlying conatus. Unfortunately I have been
so consumed by the preparation that I have very little time for the
feast. All I can do is indicate some of the basic investments that
become available if we grant Williams' line the metaphoric capacity
to struggle against the Cartesianism that calls it into being. Line
becomes the linguistic bearer of an intentional will locating values
and a sense of identity not in concepts nor in images but only in the
qualities of engagement it can sustain and the long-term relational
work it manages to accomplish. Line in Williams then is style
become conscious of itself, and thus freed to a Nietzschean war
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against the dependencies that attend to the will when it is
subordinated to criteria based on ideals of truth.
The test of these ideas, in turn, becomes how well they allow us to
appreciate the life that Williams' poetry offers, both in itself and as a
figure for what style can make available in any endeavour. First it is
crucial to take into account how Williams' line becomes a means of
conceiving a 'really now' constantly available to the imagination. By
insisting on its own powers his line asks us to reflect on what
follows from grasping intentionality as a condition of linguistic
activity treated as an end in itself without a need for governing or
justifying concepts. Then we are in a position to appreciate how
desire can be disposed simply in how verbs heap on one another, in
how complex syntactic balances develop, or in how descriptions
move through supple ranges of register — all freed from the need for
supplementary allegories. On this basis we can move to a second
level where the discursive can return to poetry under a new
regimen. Rather than imagine discursivity as a mode of abstracting
from particular engagements with aspects of experience, we are free
to treat discursivity as simply one of the ways that his mobile line
organises its investments so that we can engage the considerable
desires that we invest directly in processes of abstract reflection.
Discursiveness then is as concrete as images, since both are simply
aspects or what Williams calls 'vehicles' of mental life. Discursive-
ness then can engage the world with at least the same concreteness
as images, since what matters is the ways the movement of the
poetry becomes a 'vehicle' for mental life.
Finally, we must note the power of lyric affirmation that Williams
manages by putting such emphasis on what binds and enables the
poem's movements. On one level this affirmative power consists
simply in Williams' capacity to free poetry from the pastoralism and
the cult of lyric silence so common in recent years. By locating lyric
force in how the line apprehends a world rather than in how poetry
might transcend that world, if only into vague mysteries, he gives
poetry back the full data of the world as its subject. These poems
become analogous to photographs in their digestive capacity, except
for the very important difference that their instrument allows direct
access to the beliefs we hold, while providing a far more complex
medium for capturing the various aspects of desire that the objects or
thematic topics might engage.
For one instance of a power radically different from the photo-
graph we might turn to the moment when Williams finds a simple
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scene of his wife going out into the snow demanding a second poem,
as if not even the long line could gather in one poem the range of
feelings that she elicits in this context. For another, more elaborate
version of the work of desire accomplished by the long line, let us
turn to 'Dawn', Williams' signature version of both the contemporary
nature lyric and of the Modernist insistence on making the work of
the medium (here a single sentence) the figure for the powers of
agency by which nature can still carry value for us:
The first morning of mist after days of draining, unwavering heat along the
shore: a breath:
a plume of sea fog actually visible, coherent, intact, with all of the quieter
mysteries
of the sea implicit in its inconspicuous, unremarkable gathering in the weary
branches
of the drought-battered spruce on its lonely knoll; it thins now, sidles
through the browning needles,
is penetrated sharply by a sparrow swaying precipitously on a drop-glitting
twiglet,
then another bird, unseen, is there, a singer chattering, and another, long
purls of warble,
which also from out of sight insinuate themselves into that dim, fragile,
miniature cloud,
already now, almost with reluctance, beginning its dissipation in the over-
powering sunlight. (Flesh and Blood p. 50)
As in most of Williams, every moment of pleasure or shape is on the
verge of disappearance. But the long line can adapt to that sense of
time and let go, with no more than a hovering hint of reluctance,
because of how lovingly and extensively it can inhabit what that
moment offers a sensibility content with its own modes of gravity.
NOTES
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Style and innocence - lost, regained - and
lost again?
DOROTHEA FRANCK
Motto:
What's fagged should be left ragged.
(L. Wittgenstein, Vermischte Bemerkungen)
POSTSCRIPT AND PREFACE
This chapter is born out of a failure: the failure to turn an improvised
oral monologue, presented at a conference, into a written document.
The generally assumed convertability of oral and written currency
did not work in my region. But just at the moment when I was ready
to give up, this struggle started to appeal to me. Turning vice into
virtue, the task of reconstructing past paths of reasoning could be
redefined as deconstructing a writer's block symptomatic of its
theme. The suspicion that my view of style could be hiding in those
heaps of contradiction and confusion that were blocking my road
gave me the courage to try again.
What had happened? How had I become stuck? As you will see in
the fragment below, I set out to confront the 'morally dubious' notion
of style with some images and concepts usually not associated with
it, hoping that they might throw some light on the peculiar
ambivalence of this notion. Being both the most and the least
conventional and imitable, the most and the least individual and
original aspect of human activities, style, as a notion, seems to
record the itinerary itself of the fall from paradise: from origin and
innocence to affectation, imitation, cliché and forgery. Heinrich von
Kleist's essay of 1811 'Über das Marionettentheater' ('On the Theatre
of Marionettes') served as major source of inspiration for my
meditations, containing a wealth of images and parables for this fall
as well as for its paradoxical continuation: the 'Kehre' or return, the
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move forward back to paradise, to the union of natural grace and
total consciousness, the dream behind every work of art. Hölderlin,
Kleist's contemporary, wrote somewhere in a letter 'one can also fall
upward'.
From where Kleist had left me I laid out an itinerary that should
have led me in a similar, circular movement through several
stations, defined by questions such as: If style at the innocent end is
not conventional, is not a sign at all, how can it be interpreted? What
is the relation between the concept of style and the notion of truth?
And other weighty questions seemed to wait down the road, still
partially in the fog. What seemed to loom up at the end of this path
was a glimpse of a well-known tableau: the curse of alienation,
brooding over us since we left the garden of Eden: the fissure
between aims and means, the gap between style and content, form
and function; the crevice between 'Sagen' and 'Zeigen' (what can be
said and what shows), the abyss between subject and object and
between Me and You. For me, this pointed to the conclusion that I
had to end with Hölderlin, who did what others after him only have
proposed or attempted: miraculously bridged the abyss 'mit leichtge-
bauten Brücken' (delicate bridges). He ended and began philosophy
by making philosophy and poetry coincide.
But soon, not even halfway along this path, my forces began to fail
me. Not only did the Leitmotiv 'style' become lost here and there
and the connections between the stations often refuse to rise out of
the fog, but worse: my growing unease in constructing coherences
and relevancies willfully and my remaining confined in the
academic prose of 'Sagen', while the tendencies inherent in my
theme were drawing me towards the Utopia of 'what shows',
produced in me an intellectual paralysis. I seemed to suffer from a
defect in the academic immune system which keeps topic and talk
safely apart. It is usually provided by a will to control trains of
thought and features of style, a will which is accustomed to
obedience and which presupposes feasability. Without this immu-
nity, we can no longer maintain the separation between what we
assert and the act of asserting it. Thus, when talking about a
breakdown of communication, our own communication might break
down before we are able to give it a formulation. Or when we state
that a strict borderline between art and the discourse about art can
no longer be drawn, our own discourse might become infected by
this confusion, without, however, automatically becoming art. We
might just end up in a limbo where the safety and discipline of
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'aboutness' is gone but no other haven is yet in sight. And that is
where I think I am now. However, even with no shore in reach, the
need to move on, to talk, to write, has not disappeared. So, if we
cannot hold out in silence until a clear vision, a new language, a new
— or regained - spontaneity or innocence has become manifest, we
may write postcards from Limbo. That is also a place to be
explored . . .
STYLE - INNOCENCE LOST AND REGAINED
Style is a shy animal. It appears to belong to the category of things
which change as soon as you take a sharp look at them, like quarks
or the expression on a face. As a kind of shadow, attached to every
human action or its products, style functions unproblematically as
long as it stays in peripheral perception. (This is not just the usual
dissolution that happens to every word once you put it under the
microscope of inquisition or repetition.) But I will try to sneak up a
little closer by circular motion, without, however, trying to catch it
in the narrow trap of a definition.
Style not only is a shy animal, but also belongs to the class of
creatures able to lose their innocence. Related to this potential of
having or losing innocence is its paradoxical connection to the
notion of convention and the equally questionable, fragile relation-
ship to 'will', 'intention' and 'control'. The complexity of the
relation between style and intentionality seems to lie, at least in
part, in a strange kind of indexicality: being sensitive to first/
second/third-person perspective, to tempora and modes, as well as
to degrees of self-consciousness and artisticality. (Charles Altieri
also talks about the first/third-person difference in chapter 11 of
this volume.)
As Berel Lang writes in chapter 1, style is (mostly) a retrospective
category. Even when an artist characterises his or her work as being
mainly a struggle with problems of a stylistic nature, we cannot infer
from this that this artist aims at 'having a particular style'. Cézanne
did not intend to paint 'in the style of Cézanne'. Most of our
activities and creations are perceived as having a style while they are
produced with no thought of style whatever. As soon as style-as-
such is intended, we seem to enter dangerous waters, the realm of
mannerism or at least its neighbourhood. Style is sensitive to the
degree of self-consciousness of the person producing it, but the
respects in which this sensitivity and the aesthetic effects of it show
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are all but clear. Certainly, there is no strict inverse correlation
between self-consciousness and quality, although Schleiermacher
seems to pronounce a widely shared intuition when he states that
mannerism lurks in the sphere of self-consciousness, and that
mannerism is a movement 'downhill'.
Ist aber . . . etwas nicht aus der persönlichen Eigentümlichkeit hervorge-
gangen, sondern angelernt und angewöhnt, oder auf den Effekt gearbeitet, so
ist das Manier, und maniriert ist immer schlechter Stil.
But i f . . . something does not come forth from personal individuality but is
learned or made a habit, or produced aiming at a specific effect, then this is
mannerism, and mannerism is always bad style.1
On what is this intuition, that 'good' and 'natural' are almost
synonyms when applied to style, based? How to account for the
deep gap between art and artifice? How can artefacts or controlled
action even be called 'natural'? Unable to provide any direct answers
to these questions, I will nevertheless follow the threat of this theme
through a reading of Heinrich von Kleist's essay 'Über das
Marionettentheater', where he connects the notions of (self-)con-
sciousness, intention, innocence, and gracefulness in an unusual but
elucidating way.
THE SECOND BITE
In his famous essay Kleist is concerned with the devastating effect of
(self-)consciousness on the natural grace of a human being. What
distinguishes humankind from animals and automatons as well as
from gods is a feature of dubious value: namely the possibility of
'Ziererei', i.e. affectation and artificiality in our way of acting. A
physical metaphor for this lack or loss of grace Kleist finds in the fact
that our movements can issue from places other than the centre of
gravity of our body, in which the soul or 'vis motrix' is located;
whereas the movements of a marionette can never arise anywhere
else. This accounts for the unfailing gracefulness of the latter. In
terms of a single polarity, the machine, the animal and the god are
all at one end of the scale of gracefulness and we human beings on
the other - gods having infinite consciousness and the machine and
the animal (according to Kleist) none. To err is our privilege. Kleist
depicts the evolution not as a linear but as a circular or spiral
movement, from the innocence of the unconscious creatures towards
the infinitely conscious gracefulness of the divine. Since we have
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been exiled from the garden of innocence by eating of the Tree of
Knowledge, and since there is no way of sneaking back past the
cherub with the flaming sword, we can only go forward, hoping, as
the world is round, to end up at the garden's back entrance. Or, in
other words: since we cannot 'uneat' the first bite (knowledge is
irreversible), we must try to eat from the tree a second time.
Kleist's essay is written as a conversation between the narrator and
an acquaintance who is a famous ballet dancer, and, to the
amazement of the narrator, an amateur of marionettes. The dancer
recalls the Genesis story of our exile from the garden in his attempt
to justify his seemingly vulgar predilection. The narrator, feeling
slightly provoked by his friend's argument, wishes to demonstrate
his own understanding of the myth, by relating a concrete experi-
ence of his own: an example of the loss of innocence, a fall from
grace which he himself had witnessed and, in fact, triggered in a
young man of his circle of acquaintances. He had taken a bath
together with this particularly graceful adolescent of about sixteen
years of age, shortly after a visit to an exhibition where they had both
seen the famous Greek sculpture of a boy pulling a thorn from his
foot. Now, when the young lad was drying his foot, he happened to
cast a glance into a mirror and was reminded of this statue by his
own stance. He told this to his friend the narrator, who secretly had
also noticed this similarity. But, in order to tease his young friend, or
to counter those first traces of vanity that he had lately found in him,
he pretended not to have seen the likeness and challenged him to
repeat the gesture - a response with devastating consequences. With
each attempt to repeat the original graceful act, the movements of the
young man became more tense and awkward, until he gave up in
embarrassment. From that moment on, the previous grace and charm
of the boy left him more and more and was all gone within a year's
time, never to return.
It is obvious how this story applies to the case of style. To focus on
one's own style means to become self-conscious - in the negatively
connotated meaning that this expression carries in English. The
mirror plays a crucial role in this process: from anticipation and
concern of how one is perceived by others it is a small step to
affectation and distraction by mere form. (In this context, I find it
interesting that primate apes, with the exception of the chimpanzee
and orang-utan, fail to recognise 'themselves' in a mirror, as
researchers have recently reported.)
Although we strive, in Kleist's terms, towards the infinitely great
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consciousness of the gods, it is clear that more consciousness is not
always better: after all, an increase in consciousness caused the fall.
But why this should be so, remains mysterious. At any rate, self-
reflection seems to be a double-edged sword, a mixed blessing, and
not least in the realm of communication. While on the one hand we
feel that there can hardly be enough empathy or 'Einfühlung' with
the recipient, which means that we attempt to share the other's
perspective, this concern turns sour when too much attention is paid
to the anticipation of how one is perceived by the other. Where does
reflection become corrupted? An answer is not (yet?) in sight. We
can only state that the notion of style seems to travel along the same
line as our fall from a first natural (or ignorant) innocence into
awkwardness and artifice - which turn out to be two sides of the
same coin. The rise from there to a consciousness of renewed
innocence, the 'fall upward', we can only hope for; art and literature
grant us a glimpse of it now and then. But whether our reflections on
style, talking topically about it, contribute more to falling upward or
downward, I cannot say. I suspect that the style in writing about
style is not irrelevant in this respect; but then I become afraid that
this article may end in a cul-de-sac right here. So let me try a fresh
start from another angle, pretending innocence or ignorance of the
signalled traps, and see whether this new path leads a little closer to
some answers.
DIVINATION AND SUBJECTIVE TRUTH
Style is the natural place of difference, the irreducible residue of
individuality, the objective trace of concrete subjectivity. As such it
should be impossible to interpret (by for example current linguistic
theory), but it isn't. On the contrary, it is seldom misunderstood.
Style communicates directly. Of course it is not independent of
culture and custom, but it is not communicating in the way of the
discrete 'coded' codes. It is not a system, not a sign. Although it
cannot escape becoming conventionalised once it is recognised and
valued as such, it does not originate in convention. The interpreta-
tion of individual style, then, seems to us, so enslaved by our need of
system, little less than miraculous.
Schleiermacher, one of the first and still one of the foremost
theoreticians of style, calls the essential parts of the procedure by
which we understand style 'divination', in contrast to the technique
of grammatical interpretation. 'Divination' might seem a rather
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mysterious procedure, but if we consider the analogous nature of
style, based on the fact that language, in spite of radical structural-
ists, is never totally in the grip of arbitrariness but has preserved
layers of motivation under the ruins of the Tower of Babel, the
notion of divination might lose some of its obscurity.
Nevertheless, the notion of divination can in our times hardly
hope for popularity, especially when we talk about successful
divination. It suits neither the analytic optimist nor postmodern
sceptics of communication. Everyday life contains both success and
failure to communicate. We all experience both satisfying and
unsatisfying attempts to understand, superficial exchanges and the
precious but rare instances of deep communion. The actual variety
in quality and depth is accounted for neither by a shallow idea of
'total' and completely rule-governed communication, nor by radical
and fundamental doubts about the mere possibility of non-hapha-
zard understanding. Hopes and fears concerning communication
become operational articles of faith in those approaches, while the
variation in satisfaction remains unexplored.
At present, the analytical prospect of an 'ideal', that is to say,
logical and completely intersubjective language, is vanishing,
together with its own illusory foundation: a metaphysics of unequi-
vocal, pre-linguistic reference - even though one aspect of it is
materialised in technological tools, good enough 'for all practical
purposes'. Related to this modern ideal was the notion of a radically
style-less language, in which the last traces of subjectivity, obscuring
the clear view of objects and facts, are dissolved. The postmodern
counterposition of unredeemable subjectivity, on the other hand,
will collapse on its own premises too. It cannot be more than a
(temporarily useful) strategic subversive topos, if only because the
position it claims cannot truly be inhabited by the thinker who
endeavours to communicate it to others. (Likewise, the logicians
could never do without our messy 'natural' language before, after,
and around their formulae.) So, perhaps what we should be looking
for is not another theory but another attitude towards language: one
which allows the thinker - as speaker, hearer, writer, reader - to live
up to his or her own declarations without immediately getting
caught in the snares of his or her own paradoxes.
It might not be accidental that great philosophers are great stylists
as well. In fact, the best of them realise or approximate the stylistic
ideal that style and content mirror each other. This is not the same as
the above-mentioned ideal of a logical style-free language, but
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ultimately it comes from the same desire for a language without
'Ziererei', without detours for the sake of form or alienated and
distracting traces of vanity. In fact, as Wittgenstein has shown in the
Tractatus, logic has in a way realised this ideal of making form and
content coincide, albeit at a high price: that of meaning. So let me
continue with two quotations from the later Wittgenstein, who was
more consequent, I think, in drawing the 'moral' conclusions from
the end of the modern project of total communication than many of
his later postmodern colleagues. Already in the Tractatus he points
to the limits of the sayable. He draws these very strictly but
admittedly does not keep to these limits himself, seeing the sayable
obviously as a tiny island in the vast space of the unspeakable. He
realised - in the double sense of the word — that a tertium is given:
what cannot be said but what shows ('was sich zeigt"). And many
things 'showed' in his own discourse. While, for example, he did not
talk much about the fragmentation and liquidisation of our systems
of thought, his own writing became fragmentary out of an inner
necessity. His position could no longer be systematically identified
and fixed with any single statement, but rather had to be gathered
between the lines, in the movement from sentence to sentence. (In
German, 'Satz', the word for sentence, also means 'leap'.) The notes
printed under the title 'Vermischte Bemerkungen', in English
'Culture and Value', were perhaps not even meant to be published.
Nevertheless, the following notes might be taken as valid statements,
leading a step further in our discussion. The first remark refers
directly to Wittgenstein's own practice of style.
Ein stilistischer Behelf mag praktisch sein, und mir doch verboten. Das
Schopenhauer'sche 'als welcher' z.B. Es würde den Ausdruck manchmal
bequemer, deutlicher machen, kann aber nicht von dem gebraucht werden,
der es als altvaterisch empfindet; und er darf sich nicht über diese
Empfindung hinwegsetzen.
A stylistic device may be useful and yet I may be barred from using it.
Schopenhauer's 'as which' for instance. Sometimes this would make for
much more comfortable and clearer expression, but if someone feels it is
archaic, he cannot use it; and he must not disregard this feeling either.2
For a literary writer such a remark might seem trivial (given a wish
to avoid archaism), but for a philosopher in the analytic tradition it
is not self-evident that an aesthetic principle should overrule values
like clarity and economy of expression. But then, clarity as such is
not sacrificed here. Wittgenstein aims at a higher order of clarity: the
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clarity of representation is made subordinate to the authenticity of
subjective expression. The stylistic intuition has equal say in the
process of cognition and clarification, or, we may say: of truth.
This remark reflects the direction in which the notion of truth
changed in Wittgenstein's writings - and in the course of current
philosophy in general: from Objective' truth to 'subjective' truthful-
ness. This ethical notion of truth appears again in the following note.
Man kann die Wahrheit nicht sagen; wenn man sich noch nicht selbst
bezwungen hat. Man kann sie nicht sagen; aber nicht weil man noch nicht
gescheit genug ist. Nur der kann sie sagen, der schon in ihr ruht, nicht der,
der noch in der Unwahrheit ruht, und nur einmal aus der Unwahrheit
heraus nach ihr langt.
No one can speak the truth; if he has still not mastered himself. He cannot
speak it; but not because he is not clever enough yet. The truth can be
spoken only by someone who is already at home in it; not by someone who
still lives in falsehood and reaches out from falsehood towards truth on just
Here 'truth' appears in two different positions, which are identified
under specified conditions: truth as something to be said (but, in
general, that cannot be said) and truth as a place where our mind
should dwell (German 'ruht in' means: rests in). This particular state
of mind is the conditio sine qua non of truthful statements, not
incidental efforts to match words and facts. 'Truthcondition' then is
the condition of the speaking subject. How can we understand this
being in truth? I hear in these words a faint echo of Holderlin's
invocation, written about one hundred and fifty years earlier, at the
beginning of one of his fragmentary hymns (Dem Fürsten): 'Lass in
der Wahrheit immerdar / mich bleiben' ('Let in the truth me stay
always'). Can we get a glimpse of that place where truth can be
spoken because the speaker lives in it? I am afraid this is asking the
question too bluntly. Could the answer be one that cannot be said
but must be shown? But then my own discourse catches up with me
again: how can I pretend to stand in that truth in order to say or to
show it? Again, I shall try another angle, making recourse to some
other quotations.
HANDWRITING: STYLE AND CONTROL
Du mußt die Fehler deines eigenen Stils hinnehmen. Beinahe wie die
Unschönheiten des eigenen Gesichts.
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(You have to accept the faults in your own style. Almost like the blemishes
in your face.)4
The impalpable whimsical notion of style is due in part to its
bemused relationship with the notion of control. Here, the sensi-
tivity to first, second, and third person in handling style comes in. I
produce a style, I can work at my style, but I cannot really see my
style as a whole, as 'my style'. Like our handwriting, it is so much
part of ourselves, that the view from the inside differs inevitably
from the one from outside, i.e. the view of someone else. Looking
back at (a trace of) myself from a certain distance in time, I can do
this somewhat more Objectively', but this is just because it is no
longer the same 'me'. Wittgenstein says
Man kann den eigenen Charakter so wenig von Außen betrachten, wie die
eigene Schrift. Ich habe zu meiner Schrift eine einseitige Stellung, die mich
verhindert, sie auf gleichem Fuß mit anderen Schriften zu sehen und zu
vergleichen.
It is as impossible to view one's own character from outside as one's own
handwriting. I have a one-sided relation to my handwriting which prevents
me from seeing it on the same footing as others' writing and comparing it
with theirs.5
The first-person blind spot for our own style has to do with the
'physicality' of style: it shares with the body the fact that we
cannot see our own face. This similarity goes further: while the
body is the only thing we immediately control, this control is
limited. Most of its qualities are given — we 'find' ourselves in the
world with this body and of course there are physical and other
limits to what we can do and which functions of the body we can
control. But again, here, as with style, the limits of control and the
awareness of it differ from person to person, and from moment to
moment. And here too it is not at all clear whether or when a
higher degree of control is desirable. The blind spot is not
necessarily a default.
Thus, the relationship between style and body seems to open a
new avenue of insight, but we must not push the parallel between
body and style too far. We can say for instance: 'I haven't found my
style yet' or 'What I did there wasn't like me.' Here we are facing the
crux of writing itself: we assume that we have a 'natural' personal
style, but first we have to find it. Is this another example for Goethe's
motto: 'Werde wer du bist!' ('Become who you are!')?
Unlike the modelling of the body, the search for our style is not
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like plastic surgery: adopting a somewhat arbitrary change through
an outside instance. It seems more like looking for a clear mirror, a
mirror made of our actions or products, reflecting our selves to
ourselves.
So it seems that style is, like the body, a zone where the reach of
control ends somewhere in its unaccessible middle. Where exactly
the borderline runs varies and cannot be seen clearly, neither from
inside nor from outside. This is inherent to its nature, not because
'we are not yet clever enough'. What is even more puzzling is the
fact that this limit of control which restrains the reach of intention
does not prevent us from interpreting and evaluating the style of
others in depth, or to respond instinctively and strongly to its
subtlest features.
We can choose a style, we cannot choose our style: we have ίο find
it. For everyone not content with mere routine, this remains a never-
ending quest, as we remain a riddle to ourselves, no matter how far
we progress on the road of the Delphic advice: 'Know thyself!' - but,
if style is something 'natural', don't we just have a style? What about
the commonplace that we 'are' our style ('Le style c'est l'homme
même')? How can we search for something, if that something is
intrinsic to our very nature? It would seem that this searched-for
style could only be an artifice, a case of fashion or affectation. But
this is not the case. Could it be then, that when we are in search of
our style, we are in a way in search of our own future, the future
where 'we become who we are'? And, what is even stranger:
whenever we find a token of it, it seems to be something of our past,
because of the anamnetic evidence, the feeling that we have always
had it. (Is this perhaps a hint at the circular movement of which
Kleist was talking?)
To complicate things further: How can I speak of 'a' style? Is there
or should there be a common denominator to all our actions? In our
times, the subject as a monolithic entity has been dissolved - it has
only been a theory anyway. So style fractures in its turn. But isn't
authenticity, the truthfulness, the style without artifice, linked to a
singularity? Or can we be authentic in various versions, i.e. in the
different personae we are embodying? This has been explored in
literature. As the best example, the great Fernando Pessoa comes to
my mind, for he is authentic as Pessoa and as (or rather through)
each of the personae or heteronyms which he impersonates as
author.
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THE MIRROR
Now perhaps the metaphor of the mirror can bring us back to Kleist's
version of the story of the Fall. Eating from the Tree of Knowledge
for the first time is like looking into a mirror - and discovering what
a mirror is. After Adam and Eve had eaten from the sweet forbidden
fruit, they looked at each other and at themselves and they felt
shame at their nakedness.
This means they have been looking at the other like one looks into
a mirror: to see how one is seen by another. The look from the inside
makes place for a look (as if) from outside, mirroring ourselves in the
eyes of another consciousness. With this, the unity of our own
consciousness is lost, it is splitting up into reflecting and reflected.
But, as we know, one mirror is not enough to see oneself as one is:
the image is reverted. We have to reflect the reflection again in order
to reverse the reversal. On the physical plane, we can reach only an
approximation and not a frontal view, because we are standing in
between and obstructing the reflections. Can our mind reach more
transparency? Kleist's version of the Genesis story suggests a
continuation to the Fall, the return to the garden and an entrance to
it from the other side. He calls this 'the last chapter of the story of
mankind'. Since we cannot go back to pre-self-conscious innocence,
we have to take the path of knowledge all the way to its end and eat
from the tree again, that is to say: to reflect the reflection completely.
The first reflection produces shame or loss of grace. We compare
what we think the other is seeing with what we wish them to see. We
are not prepared to accept the difference. Insisting on a unity which
we have already lost produces only delusion.
The second reflection does not cancel the difference, but it leads
the look that went astray back to the looker. When I see that I
confused myself with my image in the first mirror, that is: when I see
what I projected into the view of the other, then I start to see
something of my real self. In seeing the procedure of how I construct
my self-image and related 'illusions', I might be able to make myself
a little bit more transparent to myself, even without having the
confidence of Kleist's protagonist, that this process might ever come
to a completion.
In our time, we even have new kinds of mirrors. When we hear or
see ourselves for the first time on audio- or video-recordings, we
tend to feel embarrassed: 'This is not me!' If we could become fully
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conscious of the causes of this embarrassment and integrate the
inside and the outside view - would the embarrassment vanish?
Could we say then, that we have seen or found our style?
THE END OF PHILOSOPHY
To close the circular itinerary of this chapter and to make some loose
ends meet, I present Wittgenstein reflecting on Kleist.
Kleist schrieb einmal, es wäre dem Dichter am liebsten, er könnte die
Gedanken selbst ohne Worte übertragen. (Welch seltsames Eingeständnis.)
Kleist wrote somewhere that what the poet would most of all like to be able
to do would be to convey thoughts by themselves without words. (What a
strange admission.)6
Wittgenstein is probably referring to Kleist's 'Letter from one poet to
another', also published in 1811. The letter is a critical response to
the well-meant compliments of another poet for the perfection of his
use of poetic forms like rhythm, sound, and verse. Kleist concludes
from these compliments that his friend and colleague had not
understood him at all. All his efforts of form are directed towards
one single goal: to direct total attention to the thought that he
expressed. Form must never be an aim in itself. Good form enables
the spirit to communicate directly, as if unmediated, while bad form
draws attention to itself like a distorting mirror. Kleist and
Wittgenstein have a similar stylistic ideal, the style 'without style':
maximum transparency. So, in fact, the colleague's compliment
revealed to Kleist that he had failed, at least with respect to this
reader, unless the latter is to blame for an inadequate reading. Style,
when noticed as such, is the painful trace of our alienation and
distraction, a reminder of our exile from the place where aims and
means, wording and things, acts and their meaning are one.
But can this ideal ever be realised in 'real life'? How far can we
approximate the truthfulness, where saying and doing coincide? Can
we get past the turning point? Here I come to a most essential remark
of Wittgenstein, where he sums up his philosophy in a rather
unexpected way:
Ich glaube meine Stellung in der Philosophie dadurch zusammengefaßt zu
haben, indem ich sagte: Philosophie dürfte man eigentlich nur dichten.
Daraus muß sich, scheint mir, ergeben, wie weit mein Denken der
Gegenwart, Zukunft oder der Vergangenheit angehört. Denn ich habe mich
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damit auch als einen bekannt, der nicht ganz kann, was er zu können
wünscht.
I think I summed up my attitude to philosophy when I said: philosophy
ought really to be written only as a poetic composition. It must, as it seems
to me, be possible to gather from this how far my thinking belongs to the
present, future or past. For I was thereby revealing myself as someone who
cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do.7
By now, it should no longer sound like a contradiction, when
Wittgenstein on the one hand strives towards the 'style-without-
style', and on the other hand names poetry as the ultimate goal of his
philosophical writing. He sees poetry as the consequent continua-
tion of philosophy with other, that is, more apt means - a
continuation that he, in his own opinion, did not fully realise. But
what exactly does 'dichten' (create poetry) mean in this context? In
German, 'dichten' contains the notion of density. In poetry, words
have a different specific weight than in regular use. In true poetry,
the truth-conditions are not outside but inside the text itself. 'Sagen'
and 'zeigen' coincide. The alienation between what and how,
between meaning and style, seems at least momentarily healed. Not
that the gap between every me and every you has disappeared, but
the most profound poetry actually seems to approach and inhabit
the abyss as a dwelling place, creating every once in a while those
miraculous fragile momentary bridges, where the most individual
and the most universal are reconciled. Poetry is the language past
the turning point.
There is a philosopher, rediscovered (or first really discovered in
his significance) in this century, who did draw this radical conclu-
sion. Hölderlin, the central member of the triad formed with his
friends Hegel and Schelling, formulated the necessity of this step
from philosophy to poetry, and in doing so, took it. Renouncing the
discursive mode of speaking, the philosophy of 'aboutness', he paid
a high price for his consequentiality. Official philosophy did not
follow his path but stayed, with Hegel, on the side of a safe,
discursive language of argumentation, that is on the side of mere
'sagen'.
It is in this sense that Wittgenstein's clear, sober, cruelly honest,
and yet unmistakably personal prose did and did not fail, still
belonging more to either past and future than to the present.
The world is round. We do go in circles. Hölderlin appears now
rather as continuing than as preceding Wittgenstein. He says in
'Mnemosyne':
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Lang ist
Die Zeit, es ereignet sich aber
Das Wahre.
(Long is / the time, but what happens is / the truth.)
More than Wittgenstein's writing, of course this chapter fails, on
stylistic grounds, to manifest the philosophy it attempts to express.
But, through Wittgenstein and Hölderlin, we might be better able to
accept what shows, independently of our intentions, through the
limits we meet. It shows where I stand.
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On the theatre of marionettes
APPENDIX
Heinrich von Kleist, 'On the theatre of marionettes' (1810)8
While I was spending the winter in M., I met in a public garden Mr
C., who had recently been engaged as first dancer at the Opera and
who was an extraordinary success with the public. I told him that I
had been astonished several times to have found him in the theatre
of marionettes which has been set up temporarily at the marketplace
and which entertained the public with burlesque mixed with song
and dance.
He assured me that he enjoys the pantomime of these puppets a
great deal and he explained to me that a dancer who wants to
improve himself can learn a great deal from them. Since the tone of
voice in which he said this made me realise that it was more than
just fancy, I sat down with him to hear more about just why he made
his strange claim. He asked me if I had not found some of the
puppets' movements, especially those of the smaller ones, particu-
larly graceful.
I could not deny that this was so. A group of four peasants,
dancing a rondo to a fast rhythm, could not be depicted better even
by Teniers.
I asked him about the mechanism of these figures and how it was
possible to control their individual limbs and extremities without
having myriads of threads at one's fingertips, to move them
according to what the rhythm of the movement of the dance
required.
He answered that I would be wrong to suppose that each of the
limbs had to be moved separately by the puppeteer at the various
moments of the dance.
Each movement, he said, had a centre of gravity; it was sufficient
to move this in the interior of the puppet; the limbs, which were
nothing but pendulums, followed automatically, without any
independent action.
He added that these movements were very simple; each time the
centre of gravity was moved in a straight line, the limbs would
describe a curve, and often, when shaken in an arbitrary way, the
whole puppet could start moving rhythmically, as though executing
a dance. This remark, so it seemed to me, helped me to understand
the pleasure he claimed to find in the puppet show. Meanwhile I
still could not foresee all the conclusions he would draw from it. I
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asked him if he believed that the puppeteer who directed these
marionettes should be a dancer himself or at least have a notion of
the beauty of dance.
He replied that the fact that a certain activity was easy on its
mechanical side didn't mean that it could be carried out without
sensitivity.
The line which the centre of gravity describes was, in his opinion,
very simple and in most cases straight. When it was curved, the law
of its curve seemed no more than of the first or second degree, and
even in the latter case it was only elliptic, which is the form of
movement most natural for the extremities of the human body
(because of the joints), and therefore not difficult for the puppeteer to
produce.
On the other hand, he said, this same line was something very
mysterious. Because it is no less than the path of the dancer's soul.
And he doubted that the puppeteer could find it in any other way
than by placing himself in the centre of gravity of the puppet; in
other words: by dancing. I replied that I had imagined this activity to
be something quite dull and uncreative, like turning the handle of a
barrel-organ.
'Not at all', he answered, 'on the contrary: the way in which the
movements of the fingers relate to the movement of the doll is quite
sophisticated, roughly similar to the relation between numbers and
their logarithms or between the asymptote and the hyperbola'.
Moreover, he believed that even this last fragment of consciousness
could be removed from the marionettes, that their dance could be
transported entirely into the realm of mechanical forces and
produced by turning a handle, just as I had imagined. I expressed my
astonishment about all the attention he dedicated to this common
variant, designed for the masses, of a fine art. He not only considered
it worth further development, he even seemed personally preoccu-
pied with it.
He smiled and said he would be prepared to state that if a
craftsman were to make him a puppet following his instructions
precisely, he could produce a dance with it which neither he nor
any other skilful dancer of his time would be able to imitate. Since I
remained silent, with my eyes cast down, he asked, 'have you ever
heard of those mechanical legs which English artists make for those
unfortunate people who have lost a limb?'
I said no, I had never seen anything like that.
'That is a pity', he replied, 'because if I told you that these
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unfortunate people dance with them, I am afraid that you might not
believe me. Did I say dance? Admittedly the range of their move-
ments is very limited, but they produce the few movements
available to them with such calm, lightness, and grace, that any
intelligent being would be amazed by it. I said jokingly, that he had
found the man for the job: because the artist capable of constructing
such a remarkable leg should surely also be able to construct a
marionette to order. Now it was his turn to avoid my gaze in
embarrassment, and so I asked him what exactly were the require-
ments of art that such a craftsman would have to meet.
'Nothing' he replied, 'that I don't already have here: good
proportions, mobility, lightness - but everything to a greater extent;
and especially a more natural arrangement of the centres of gravity'.
'And what advantage would these puppets have over human
dancers?'
'What advantage? First of all a negative one, my dear friend, that
the puppet can never have artificial affectation. Because affectation
appears, as you know, when the soul, (vis matrix) resides in any
point other than the centre of gravity of the movement. Since the
puppeteer cannot through his thread control any point other than
this one, all the other limbs, quite rightly, are dead - pure
pendulums, in other words, obedient only to the law of gravity —
which we would fail to find in the majority of our dancers.'
'Just look at our much feted Miss P.' he continued, 'When she is
dancing the role of Daphne and - pursued by Apollo - looks round
as she flees from him, her soul is seated in the vertebrae of her back,
turning almost to breaking point, like a young najad of the school of
Bernini. Or look at the young F., when, in the role of Paris, he is
standing among the three goddesses and hands the apple to Venus:
his soul is even situated, shockingly enough, in his elbow. Such
mistakes' he added, interrupting himself, 'are unavoidable since we
have eaten from the tree of knowledge. But paradise is locked now
and the cherub is behind us; we have to travel the whole way round
the world and see if perhaps we might find a back entrance open on
the other side.'
I laughed. Indeed, I thought, the spirit cannot err where it doesn't
exist. But I noticed that he had more to say and so I asked him to go
on.
'What is more', he said, 'these puppets have the advantage that
they are antigravitational. They are untouched by the inertia of
matter - the force that is most opposed to dance: the force that draws
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them up is greater than the one that pulls them down. What
wouldn't our dear G. give to be sixty pounds lighter or to be assisted
by an equivalent force in her entrechats and pirouettes? The
marionettes only use the floor to touch it lightly, like elves, and give
new impetus to their limbs by the momentary restraint; we, in
contrast, use the floor in order to rest and to recover from the effort of
dancing, a moment which by itself is not dance and with which we
can do nothing better than try to reduce it to a minimum.
I said that, no matter how eloquently he stated the case for his
paradoxes, he could never make me believe that a mechanical
jointed doll could contain more grace than the structure of the
human body.
He replied that it was simply impossible for a human dancer to
reach the level of a puppet; only a god could compare himself with
inanimate matter in this way, and that this was the point where the
two ends of the ring round the world would join once more.
I was more and more dumbfounded and did not know what to
reply to such strange remarks.
Apparently I had not read the third chapter of the first book of
Moses properly, he said, taking a pinch of snuff. 'Properly speaking,
it isn't possible to talk about subsequent periods of human
evolution, let alone the last, with someone who doesn't know about
the first.'
I said that I was quite well aware of the derangement that
consciousness can cause in the natural grace of man. A young man
of my acquaintance had lost his innocence - as it were in front of my
eyes - through one remark and since then had never found his way
back to paradise, however hard he tried. 'But what can you conclude
from this?' I asked.
He wanted to know what incident I was referring to.
'About three years ago' I recalled, 'I was taking a bath together
with a young man whose features radiated a marvellous grace-
fulness. He might have been sixteen years old then, and he betrayed
only the very first traces of vanity, encouraged by the admiration of
women. By chance we had just recently seen, in Paris, the statue of
the youth taking a splinter out of his foot; copies of the statue are
well known and exist in most of the German collections. The glance
he threw at the mirror just at the moment when he was putting his
foot on a stool to dry it made him think of it. He smiled and told me
what he had just noticed. Indeed, the same thing had just struck me
at the same moment; but - either to put his gracefulness to the test or
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to tease him a little for his vanity - I laughed and replied that he
must be seeing a ghost! He blushed and lifted his foot again to show
me, but his attempt, as one might have guessed, failed. He lifted it a
third, a fourth, maybe even ten times in bewilderment, but in vain!
He was incapable of producing the same movement again - or,
rather, the movements he made looked so comical, I could hardly
stop myself laughing.
From that day, or rather from that very moment, a mysterious
change took place in the young man. He began to spend whole days
in front of the mirror. An invisible and incomprehensible force
seemed to have cast an iron net over the free play of his gestures, and
after a year had gone by, there was no trace left of his former charm
which used to give so much pleasure to his circle of friends. I even
know someone else who could vouch for this strange and tragic
incident, just as I've told it to you.'
'At this point' said Mr C. warming to his theme, 'I have to tell you
another story, and you will easily understand its relevance in this
context.
On a journey to Russia I stayed on the estate of Herr von G., a
count from Livonia, whose sons at that time were very much
involved in practising fencing. The oldest son, especially, who had
just returned from the university, played the virtuoso and, one
morning, when I was in his room, offered me a rapier. We fought,
and it turned out that I was his superior. Almost every one of my
thrusts struck home and finally his rapier flew into a corner. Half-
joking and half-hurt, he remarked, while he was picking up his
rapier, that he had found his master; but that everyone on earth has
their master somewhere or other, and now he was going to lead me
to mine. The brothers roared with laughter and shouted: "Come on,
come on, let's go to the woodshed!" and with these words they took
my hand and led me to a bear which Herr von G. kept on his estate. I
looked at him in amazement. The bear was standing on his hind
legs, leaning with his back against a pole to which he was chained,
his paw lifted ready to strike, and looked into my eyes: this was his
fighting position. I felt as though I was dreaming, seeing myself faced
with such an adversary. "Thrust! Thrust!" said Herr von G., "and see
if you can touch him!" After I had recovered a little from my
astonishment, I lunged with the rapier. The bear made a very short
movement with his paw and parried the blow. I tried to trick him
with feints: the bear did not move. Again I made a lightning thrust -
if it had been a man I would not have missed his chest this time — the
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bear made a tiny movement with his paw and parried the thrust.
Now I was almost in the same position as the son of Herr von G. The
gravity of the bear's demeanour added to my bewilderment; thrusts
and feints followed one on top of the other; I was drenched in sweat:
it was all in vain! Not only did the bear parry all my thrusts as
effectively as the best swordsman on earth; what is more - and here
no fencer on earth could match him — he did not even respond to
feints: he stood, facing me eye to eye, as if he could read my soul, his
paw lifted and ready; and when my thrusts were not meant, he
didn't move.
Do you believe this story?'
'Absolutely!' I said, agreeing enthusiastically. 'The story is so
probable, that even if a stranger had told me it, I would have
believed him - how much more if you are the one telling it! '
'Well then, my worthy friend', Mr C. said, 'you have all you need
to know to understand my point. We see, that in proportion as in the
animal world self-awareness becomes dark and diminishes, so
gracefulness increases and becomes more radiant. But, just as two
lines, starting from one point, meet again, after having passed
infinity, or just as the image in a concave mirror, after vanishing
completely, suddenly shows up right in front of our eyes: in the
same way gracefulness reappears after consciousness, as it were, has
gone through infinity; so that it appears in its purest form in the
human body either when it has no consciousness at all or when it
has an infinite one: that is, either in a puppet or in a god.'
'Which means', I continued, slightly bewildered, 'that we have to
eat from the tree of knowledge once again in order to regain the state
of innocence?'
'Precisely,' he replied. 'This is the last chapter of the history of the
world.'
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